The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives

COVER......Page 1
HALF-TITLE......Page 3
TITLE......Page 5
COPYRIGHT......Page 6
CONTENTS......Page 7
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 9
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 13
ABBREVIATIONS......Page 14
IL–IR scholarship......Page 17
The contributions in this book......Page 21
2 International law and international relations theory: a prospectus......Page 32
Realism......Page 36
Institutionalism......Page 41
Liberalism......Page 45
Calculation and socialization......Page 48
The elements of Constructivism......Page 50
Marrying Constructivism with Realism, Institutionalism and Liberalism......Page 53
The road ahead......Page 55
International lawyers can profit from an analysis of power......Page 56
Legalized rules and institutions operate differently from non-legalized rules and institutions......Page 57
Soft law is as important as hard law in global governance but plays a different role......Page 59
Regime design matters......Page 61
Domestic politics are as important for international lawyers as international politics......Page 62
Conclusion......Page 64
3 Pathways to international cooperation......Page 66
Three dynamic pathways......Page 70
Deepening substantive content: the Framework Convention (FC) Pathway......Page 71
Expanding membership: the Plurilateral (PL) Pathway......Page 73
Strengthening legalization: the Soft Law Pathway......Page 75
Choosing among pathways......Page 77
Nature of the issue......Page 78
Technical uncertainty and the Framework Convention Pathway......Page 79
Actor uncertainty and the Plurilateral Pathway......Page 81
Political uncertainty and the Soft Law Pathway......Page 85
Character of the advocates......Page 87
Institutional arenas......Page 90
Initial arrangement......Page 91
Administrative support......Page 92
Forum shopping......Page 94
Blending and sequencing the pathways......Page 95
Soft Law and Framework Convention......Page 96
Framework Convention and Plurilateral......Page 97
Plurilateral and Soft Law......Page 98
Blends and sequences in complex cooperation......Page 99
Introduction......Page 101
Customary international law as a proxy for efficiency......Page 104
Customary international law and market failures......Page 108
Judicial findings on efficiency......Page 115
Efficiency and the contemporary crisis of customary international law......Page 118
Efficiency, equity and fairness: contradiction or affinity?......Page 120
Equity as discretion......Page 122
Equity as an efficient incentive......Page 125
Efficiency and human rights......Page 129
The doctrine in national courts: serving a different function......Page 130
Concluding observations......Page 131
Introduction......Page 133
Development and compliance......Page 134
The reputational consequences of non-compliance: the traditional view......Page 137
The case formultiple reputations......Page 139
Reputation, multilateralism and development......Page 144
Conclusion......Page 148
6 Rethinking compliance with international law......Page 150
The international system......Page 152
The network paradigm......Page 153
The individualist paradigm......Page 154
Understanding compliance with international environmental agreements......Page 155
Factors that affect compliance......Page 157
Differentiating among countries party to international agreements......Page 160
Compliance strategies......Page 162
Applying compliance strategies to theWTO......Page 167
Human rights and labor......Page 174
Arms control agreements......Page 177
Explaining the trends in compliance......Page 180
Introduction......Page 182
Globalization: processes and characteristics......Page 183
Explaining compliance: the inter-paradigms debate......Page 187
The rational choice model and compliance with international norms......Page 188
The Prisoner’s Dilemma......Page 191
The Assurance Game......Page 192
The Game of Chicken......Page 193
Summary of the factors affecting compliance......Page 194
The sociological perspective and compliance with international norms......Page 195
The impact of globalization processes on the prospects of compliance......Page 199
Retaliation......Page 200
Rebounded externalities and structural change......Page 201
Conflict between domestic and international norms......Page 204
Socio-economic stratification......Page 206
Concluding remarks......Page 208
Introduction......Page 210
Pacta sunt servanda and compliance in territorial disputes......Page 211
Why and when do states comply with international commitments in territorial disputes?......Page 213
The peculiarities of Latin American international society......Page 214
The Latin American record of arbitration in comparative perspective......Page 217
Two cases of non-compliance: Ecuador from 1960 to 1995; Argentina from 1977 to 1984......Page 221
The Ecuadorian rejection of the Rio Protocol (1941) and of the Brazilian Arbitration of 1945, from 1960 to 1995......Page 222
The Argentine rejection of the Arbitral Award of 1977 on the Beagle Channel Islands, 1977–1984......Page 225
Summary and conclusions......Page 229
Introduction......Page 232
Domestic incentives for leaders to sign trade agreements......Page 237
Domestic influences on the design of international trade agreements......Page 243
Conclusion......Page 258
The issue......Page 260
A developing country is?......Page 261
Essentially negative integration......Page 265
But some . . . to do???......Page 270
To do: so says theWTO......Page 271
To do: so says public international law......Page 272
Participation in theWTO: a race-to-the-bottom?......Page 273
Some concluding remarks......Page 275
Introduction......Page 277
The Enabling Clause and its relationship to Article I.1 of the GATT (MFN)......Page 280
The justiciability of the Enabling Clause and its alleged “requirements”......Page 281
India’s claim that EC preferential treatment is contrary to paragraph 2(a)......Page 288
Paragraph 3(a) of the Enabling Clause......Page 296
Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause......Page 298
The consistency of EC labor and environmental preferences with Article I GATT......Page 299
Article XX(a): “public morals”......Page 301
Article XX(b): protection of human life and health......Page 306
Article XX chapeau......Page 307
Environmental conditionality......Page 308
Article XX chapeau......Page 310
Scenario 1: the EC preferences are upheld under the Enabling Clause......Page 311
Scenario 3: EC preferences upheld under Article XX alone......Page 312
Scenario 4: EC preferences fail Enabling Clause but are upheld under Article XX......Page 313
Scenario 5: EC preferences fail both the Enabling Clause and Article XX......Page 314
INDEX......Page 315