The Ethics of War and the Force of Law: A Modern Just War Theory

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Introduction and Overview
2 What is War – and Can a Lone Individual Wage One?
	2.1 Defining War – What is it Good For?
	2.2 War as Event and War as Action
	2.3 Individual War
	2.4 Sovereignty
	2.5 Violent Struggle
	2.6 A Comparison with Some Other Definitions
3 Jus ad Bellum: Justifying the Use of War
	3.1 Legitimate Authority
		3.1.1 Traditional Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority
		3.1.2 The Spurious “Priority” of Legitimate Authority
		3.1.3 The Consequentialist Argument for Legitimate Authority: The Specter of Chaos and Anarchy
		3.1.4 Other Arguments for Legitimate Authority or “Authorization”?
		3.1.5 Conclusion
	3.2 Just Cause and “Right Intention”
		3.2.1 Just Cause, Retribution, and the Continuous Application of Jus ad Bellum
			3.2.1.1 The Formal Question: What Kind of Thing is a “Just Cause” for War?
			3.2.1.2 The General Substantive Question: “Which Causes are Just?” or “Under What Conditions is There a Just Cause?”
			3.2.1.3 The Question of Timing: Does the “Just Cause” Criterion Only Apply to the Initiation of a War or Also to its Continuation?
		3.2.2 Right Intention? The Subjective Element of a Justified War
			3.2.2.1 The Indispensability of “Right Intention” in the Form of a Knowledge Requirement
			3.2.2.2 Objections to the Previous Argument
			3.2.2.3 The Mere Knowledge Requirement Is also Sufficient
		3.2.3 Just Cause and the Subjective Element: Conclusions and Practical Consequences
	3.3 Proportionality (Again): The Subcriteria of Prospects of Success and Last Resort
		3.3.1 Prospects of Success
		3.3.2 Last Resort
	3.4 Summary
4 Jus in Bello: Justifying the Use of Force in War
	4.1 Ordinary Morality and Jus in Bello: Correcting “Revisionist” Misrepresentations of Domestic Peacetime Morality and its Implications for War
		4.1.1 McMahan’s “Responsibility Account” of “Liability to Defensive Force” as a Non-Starter
		4.1.2 Rodin on Self-Defense and the “Myth” of National Self-Defense: A Refutation
			4.1.2.1 Necessity and the “Duty to Retreat”
			4.1.2.2 Proportionality in Self-Defense
			4.1.2.3 Wide Proportionality and Imposing the Risk of Death on People One Defends
			4.1.2.4 Rodin on Just War Theory, International Law, and “Copernican Moments”
			4.1.2.5 War as Law Enforcement and Punishment: The Incoherence of Rodin’s Account
			4.1.2.6 Conclusion
		4.1.3 Self-Defense Redeemed: The Common Understanding of the Self-Defense Justification
		4.1.4 Beyond Self-Defense: The Defensive and the Aggressive Emergency Justification
		4.1.5 Self-Defense vs. Justifying Emergency: Implications for Participating in War
			4.1.5.1 Equality and Inequality in War: Background and Conceptual Clarifications
			4.1.5.2 The Dubious Argument for the Two Inequality Doctrines
			4.1.5.3 Proportionality and Special Responsibilities or Prerogatives
			4.1.5.4 In Which Wars May Soldiers Participate?
		4.1.6 The Deceptive Allure of the “Revisionist” Inequality of Combatants Doctrine: On Imagined Innovations, Question-Begging Definitions, and Dogmatic Insistence
			4.1.6.1 T he Moral Inequality Thesis in History: Imagined and Real Orthodoxies
			4.1.6.2 T he Revisionist Formulation of the Inequality Thesis: Tautologies and Question-Begging
			4.1.6.3 The Inequality Thesis as Sustained by the “Justification Defeats Liability” Doctrine: On Ad Hoccery and Dogmatism
		4.1.7 The Doctrine of Double Effect (and Related Principles)
			4.1.7.1 Preliminaries: A Non-Absolutist Formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect and First Doubts about its Credibility
			4.1.7.2 A Rigged Comparison: The Terror Bomber/Tactical Bomber Example
			4.1.7.3 The Equally Rigged Trolley Examples – and a Universal Counter-Example
			4.1.7.4 A Convenient Distraction: The “Sophisticated Bomber”
			4.1.7.5 Conclusion
	4.2 War, Law, and Reciprocity: Devising the Moral Rules of War
		4.2.1 Moral Fundamentalism vs. Constitutivism: The Relation between Widely Accepted Laws and the Ethics of War
			4.2.1.1 Moral Fundamentalism and McMahan’s Incoherent Account of the Relation between the “Deep Morality” and the Laws of War
			4.2.1.2 Two Kinds of “Reductivism”
			4.2.1.3 On Haque’s “Service View” of the Laws of War – A Brief Critique
			4.2.1.4 Examples against Moral Fundamentalism: Reciprocity and the Morally Constitutive Force of Widely Accepted Conventions
			4.2.1.5 Lessons for War, Part I: The Variable Moral Scopes and Limits of Necessity and Proportionality in War
			4.2.1.6 Lessons for War, Part II: Reciprocity, Conventions, and the Moral Equality of Combatants
			4.2.1.7 Lessons for War, Part III: The Principle of Distinction
			4.2.1.8 A Further Reason Why Moral Fundamentalism is Mistaken: The Moral Significance of Publicly Authorized Functions and Roles
			4.2.1.9 Conclusions
		4.2.2 A gainst Benbaji’s and Statman’s “Contractarianism”
Concluding Remarks
References
Index