The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
TABLES......Page 11
FIGURES......Page 12
Preface and Acknowledgments......Page 13
Introduction......Page 17
EXPLAINING MODES AND OUTCOMES OF EMULATION......Page 21
CASES, METHODS, AND DATA......Page 28
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK......Page 32
1 Emulation as Embedded Rationalism......Page 36
THREE INSTITUTIONALISMS......Page 38
Historical Institutionalism......Page 39
Rational Institutionalism......Page 41
Sociological Institutionalism......Page 42
A PRAGMATIC SYNTHESIS......Page 43
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF: EXPLAINING MODES AND OUTCOMES......Page 47
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER......Page 50
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND FALSIFIABILITY......Page 52
2 Emulation as Rapid Modernization......Page 57
The High Politics of Enlargement: A Summary......Page 58
EU Instruments of Preparation and Channels for Emulation......Page 60
INSTITUTIONAL EMULATION IN HEALTH CARE......Page 61
The Hungarian Case: A Brief Overview......Page 63
The Czech Case: A Brief Overview......Page 65
Dense Actors, Thin Acquis......Page 67
Phase 1: Voluntary Emulation......Page 68
The Insurance Model......Page 69
Provider Payment Systems......Page 72
Phase II: The EU’s Modest Role in Health Care......Page 76
INSTITUTIONAL EMULATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION......Page 80
The Czech Case: A Brief Overview......Page 82
The Hungarian Case: A Brief Overview......Page 84
Phase I: Voluntary Emulation......Page 85
Phase II: The EU Enters the Picture......Page 86
Summary of the Consumer Protection Case: Emulation as Institutional Homesteading......Page 90
3 Emulation Under Pressure......Page 93
REGIONAL POLICY: THE EU STRUCTURAL AND COHESION FUNDS......Page 94
Hungarian Regional and Cohesion Policy: A Brief Overview......Page 99
Czech Regional and Cohesion Policy: A Brief Overview......Page 100
Dense Rules, Sparse Actors......Page 101
Phase 1: Voluntary Emulation......Page 103
Phase 2: The EU Grows Assertive......Page 104
Summary: Emulation as Scaffolding......Page 109
AGRICULTURE: STRATEGY AND STRUGGLE......Page 110
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy......Page 112
Hungarian Agriculture: A Brief Description......Page 117
Czech Agriculture: A Brief Description......Page 119
Phase 1: Voluntary Emulation – CAP-Like or CAP-Lite?......Page 121
Phase 2: Less-Voluntary Emulation......Page 123
Summary: Emulation and Struggle......Page 127
4 The Struggle for Civilian Control of the Military......Page 132
COMPARING THE EU AND NATO: SIX KEY DIFFERENCES......Page 134
Bureaucracy......Page 135
THE HIGH POLITICS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW......Page 136
WHY IS THE MILITARY POLICY AREA INTERESTING?......Page 138
THE STARTING POINT: HISTORY, LEGITIMACY, MONEY......Page 140
Historical Legacies......Page 141
The Societal Legitimacy of CEE Militaries......Page 145
Badly Funded Armies......Page 146
THE ROLE OF WESTERN CONTACT IN WEAKENING THE OLD MODEL......Page 149
THRESHOLDS: BORDERS, BUDGETS, AND CIVILIAN CONTROL INSTITUTIONS......Page 152
SELLING THE INSTITUTIONS: BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT......Page 159
IS MORE “CIVILIAN CONTROL” NEEDED?......Page 162
PARLIAMENTARY DEFENSE COMMITTEES......Page 165
SUMMARY......Page 167
5 Military Professionalization in War and Peace......Page 170
WELCOME TO NATO: THE BOMBING OF SERBIA......Page 172
NEW FORMS OF EMULATION......Page 177
TEMPLATES: COORDINATION, NCO CORPS, AND ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMIES......Page 178
NCO Corps......Page 180
The Electoral Logic of the Volunteer Army......Page 183
PATCHES: DPQ, TFG, DCI......Page 186
LEVERAGE LOST, LESSONS LEARNED......Page 191
SUMMARY......Page 193
DEFENSE REFORMS IN LIGHT OF THE THREE THEORY TRADITIONS......Page 195
Historical Institutionalism......Page 197
Rational Institutionalism......Page 199
Sociological Institutionalism......Page 201
Historical Institutionalism......Page 203
Rational Institutionalism......Page 204
Sociological Institutionalism......Page 208
7 Synthesis and Sequence......Page 212
The RI–HI Synthesis: The Counterfactuals......Page 213
The SI–RI Synthesis: Political Barriers to Emulation......Page 218
The SI–HI Synthesis: Historical Barriers to Emulation......Page 222
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY: SUPPLY, REASON, SYNTHESIS......Page 228
The HI–RI Synthesis: CEE Capacities for Indigenous Change......Page 229
The HI–SI Synthesis: Gap Between Commitments and Implementation......Page 230
8 Extensions and Conclusions......Page 232
ORDERING FROM THE MENU: A SUMMARY OF THE CASES......Page 233
EXTENSIONS I: MOVING BEYOND THE MOST SIMILAR AND MOST LIKELY CASES......Page 235
Poland: How Much Does Size Matter?......Page 236
Bulgaria: Do Imperial Legacies Matter?......Page 240
Ukraine: Does Distance Matter?......Page 243
Sweden: When Membership Requires Lower Standards Rather Than Higher......Page 246
EXTENSIONS II: WESTERN MODELS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION, LIBERALIZATION, MEMBERSHIP......Page 248
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT......Page 253
OPEN QUESTIONS......Page 256
Appendix: Selected List of Persons Interviewed......Page 259
Works Cited......Page 265
Index......Page 299