The Endurance of National Constitutions

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
1 Introduction......Page 13
DESIGN VERSUS ENVIRONMENT......Page 14
WHAT GOOD IS CONSTITUTIONAL ENDURANCE?......Page 17
WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION......Page 18
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE......Page 19
THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH......Page 20
CONCLUSION......Page 22
THE JEFFERSONIAN POSITION......Page 24
Habits of Obedience......Page 29
Issues of Process and Timing......Page 30
Ancillary Institutional Development......Page 31
Constituting the Polity......Page 32
Economic Welfare and Endurance......Page 33
Summarizing the Debate......Page 34
The Jeffersonian Claims......Page 35
The Madisonian Claims......Page 41
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION......Page 45
INTRODUCTION......Page 48
CONSTITUTION-AS-FUNCTION VERSUS CONSTITUTION-AS-FORM......Page 50
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER......Page 52
The Written Charter......Page 53
Other Texts......Page 56
Nontextual Instruments......Page 57
Comparability and the Problem of Conceptual Stretching......Page 59
Identifying Constitutions......Page 60
Issues of Completeness and Representativeness of the Written Charter......Page 63
The Sometimes Fuzzy Line between Amendment and Replacement......Page 67
Constitutional Change versus Regime Change......Page 71
CONCLUSION......Page 75
A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RENEGOTIATION......Page 77
NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BARGAIN: TWO TYPES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION......Page 78
The Problem of Uncertain Payoffs......Page 80
The Problem of Hidden Information......Page 81
Standard Contractual Solutions to Problems of Incomplete Information......Page 83
CONSTITUTIONAL RENEGOTIATION......Page 84
Deciding to Renegotiate......Page 85
Intra- versus Extra-Constitutional Change......Page 86
The Problem of Enforcement......Page 88
Inclusion......Page 90
Flexibility......Page 93
Specificity......Page 96
How the Mechanisms Interact......Page 100
A Note on Time and Aging......Page 102
CONCLUSION......Page 103
INTRODUCTION......Page 105
DESIGN FACTORS......Page 106
Inclusion......Page 109
Ease of Amendment......Page 111
Specificity: Scope and Detail......Page 115
Constitutional Review......Page 118
Executive and Legislative Power......Page 121
Territorial Change......Page 123
Diffusion......Page 124
Regime Change......Page 126
Leadership Transition......Page 127
Intrastate Conflict and Consensus......Page 128
Interstate Conflict......Page 129
Economic Crisis and Development......Page 131
Other Relevant Factors......Page 132
CONCLUSION......Page 133
INTRODUCTION......Page 134
ON THE ISSUE OF HETEROGENEOUS, REMOTE, AND MULTI-CHANNELED CAUSATION......Page 135
ANALYTIC AND STATISTICAL ISSUES......Page 138
Life cycle and Period Effects......Page 141
Estimates of Risk Factors......Page 145
Environmental Factors......Page 146
Design Factors......Page 151
Some Projections......Page 154
Robustness of the Estimates......Page 155
CONCLUSION......Page 158
A STRUCTURED CASE-STUDY APPROACH......Page 159
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: STABILITY AND CRISIS......Page 162
India: Robust at Birth......Page 163
Pakistan: Congenital Defects......Page 169
Summary......Page 173
United States: Youthful Experimentation and Increasing Returns......Page 174
France: Underlying Instability, but Gradual Crystallization......Page 179
CHINA AND TAIWAN: ENDURANCE OF IDEOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONS......Page 183
Taiwan......Page 185
China......Page 186
CONCLUSION......Page 189
8 Cases of Constitutional Mortality, Part II: Contrasting Contexts, Similar Outcomes......Page 191
Haiti......Page 192
Dominican Republic......Page 195
Summary......Page 199
THAILAND: INSTABILITY SUSTAINED BY UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS......Page 200
MEXICO AND JAPAN: FLEXIBLE COOPTATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY......Page 204
Mexico: Flexible Co-optation......Page 205
Japan: The Unlikely Endurance of an Imposed Constitution......Page 211
IMPLICATIONS OF CASE STUDIES......Page 214
Conclusion......Page 219
IS ENDURANCE ALWAYS GOOD?......Page 220
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE......Page 224
CONCLUSION......Page 226
Appendix......Page 227
References......Page 243
Index......Page 259