The End of Epistemology As We Know It

Cover
The End of Epistemology   As We Know It
Copyright
Contents
Preface
1. The importance of epistemic norms demands an explanation
	1.1. Introduction
	1.2. The epistemic norms should matter or be replaced
	1.3. Does anything really matter?
	1.4. Calls for vindications of epistemic norms
		1.4.1. Pointless beliefs
		1.4.2. Mundane beliefs
		1.4.3. Do mundane beliefs really raise questions?
		1.4.4. Interesting beliefs
		1.4.5. Conflicts and trade-​offs
	1.5. Wrap-​up
		1.5.1. Roadmap and how to read the rest of the book
	1.6. A taste of what is to come
2. Consequentialist vindication
	2.1. Introduction
		2.1.1. Clarifying consequentialism
	2.2. Trade-​offs
	2.3. Against maximization
		2.3.1. Satisficing
			2.3.1.1. Implications of satisficing consequentialism for epistemology
			2.3.1.2. Arguments against satisficing
		2.3.2. Scalar consequentialism
	2.4. Summary thus far
	2.5. Indirect vindications
	2.6. No full vindication of standard norms
	2.7. Partial vindication?
	2.8. Conclusion
	Appendix
3. Responding to some fundamental objections
	3.1. Introduction
	3.2. This is not really epistemology, version 1
	3.3. This is not really epistemology, version 2
	3.4. Our abilities, or lack thereof
		3.4.1. Doxastic involuntarism
		3.4.2. The inability to make trade-​offs
		3.4.3. Guidance and norms
	3.5. Metaphysics
	3.6. Conclusion
4. Respect-​based vindication
	4.1. Introduction
	4.2. What is the deontological vindication of norms?
	4.3. Respecting mundane beliefs
		4.3.1. Can’t we find some other account of respect?
	4.4. Trade-​offs
		4.4.1. First argument for trade-​offs: Differential  importance of beliefs
		4.4.2. Second argument for trade-​offs: Beliefs of equal importance
		4.4.3. Third argument for trade-​offs: Aggregation
		4.4.4. Objection
	4.5. Conclusion
5. Epistemic norms and action
	5.1. Introduction
		5.1.1. Examples and specifications of Status  and Tendency
	5.2. Trade-​offs
	5.3. Irrelevance to action and Tendency
	5.4. Status
	5.5. Emotion and belief
	5.6. Suboptimal action and suboptimal belief
	5.7. Conclusion
6. Social vindication
	6.1. Introduction
	6.2. Social vindication unpacked
	6.3. Social vindication and nonstandard norms
		6.3.1. Trade-​offs
		6.3.2. Laxer epistemic norms
	6.4. Interpersonal disagreement and the possibility of error
	6.5. Social vindication and deviation
		6.5.1. The Razian account
		6.5.2. Consent and fairness
			6.5.2.1. Consent
			6.5.2.2. Fairness
			6.5.2.3. Summary
	6.6. Conclusion
7. Tying up loose ends
	7.1. Introduction
	7.2. The master challenge
		7.2.1. Virtue epistemology and nonstandard norms
	7.3. Constitutive norms of belief
		7.3.1. The problem with constitutivism
	7.4. Brute importance
8. Speculation about replacement epistemic norms
	8.1. Introduction
	8.2. How to vindicate epistemic norms
	8.3. Epistemic norms on mundane beliefs
	8.4. The epistemic good
	8.5. Interesting beliefs
	8.6. Replacing knowledge
	8.7. Pointless beliefs
	8.8. Disagreements with other norms
	8.9. Conclusion
References
Index