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ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Joshua Gans
سری:
ISBN (شابک) : 303133082X, 9783031330827
ناشر: Palgrave Pivot
سال نشر: 2023
تعداد صفحات: 127
[128]
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 2 Mb
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب The Economics of Blockchain Consensus: Exploring the Key Tradeoffs in Blockchain Design به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب اجماع اقتصاد بلاک چین: بررسی مبادلات کلیدی در طراحی بلاک چین نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
Blockchain technologies have been rapidly adopted for the creation of cryptocurrencies and have been explored for a myriad of applications. While this is of important economic interest, the computer science behind how blockchains operate to provide security and provenance has been largely inaccessible to economists. This book is a bridge between the computer science and the economics of blockchains. The focus is on the value and the achievement of blockchain consensus; that is, how distributed and independent nodes are able to reach an agreement on what the current state of digital ledgers, that are the product of blockchains, are. The book shows that the goals of computer scientists in designing blockchains place very high weight on security beyond what an economist trained in game theory and mechanism design would require. It shows how blockchains can be redesigned to account for key economic trade-offs, and will be of interest to researchers and students of economics, financial technology and computer science, alongside policymakers.
Acknowledgements Contents List of Figures 1 Introduction References 2 The Value of Blockchain Consensus 2.1 Defining Blockchains Ledgers Distributed Ledgers Blocks of Transactions How to Timestamp a Digital Document Distributed Blockchain Networks 2.2 The Driver of Value Trust Enforceable Contracts Cheap Verification Cryptocurrencies: Verification-Enabled Payments 2.3 Consensus and Trust References 3 Security Versus Speed 3.1 Byzantine Fault Tolerance Idealised Environment Malicious Nodes No Digital Signatures Asynchronous Networks What Determines the Power of Malicious Actors? Summarising the Trade-Off 3.2 The Longest Chain Rule The Mechanics of LCR Coordination Block Finality 3.3 Conclusion References 4 Permissioned Versus Permissionless 4.1 Bitcoin Proof of Work 4.2 Permissionless Leader Selection 4.3 Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains The Costs of a Double-Spend Attack 4.4 Comparison with Permissioned Network Transaction Safety in a Permissioned Network Comparison Cost Incidence 4.5 Conclusion References 5 Proof of Work Versus Proof of Stake 5.1 Proof of Stake in a Permissionless Environment A Longest Chain Rule Approach A BFT Approach 5.2 Comparison with Proof of Work References 6 Cryptography Versus Incentives 6.1 Blockchain Front-Running 6.2 A Model of Front-Running 6.3 Using Cryptography 6.4 A Mechanism to Deter Front-Running The Need to Discretise Time The Single Legitimate Claimant Case Further Issues The Multiple Legitimate Claimant Case Implementation Choices 6.5 Conclusion References 7 Rules Versus Mechanisms 7.1 What Is Blockchain Truth? 7.2 Mechanism for Byzantine Fault Tolerance A Simultaneous Report Mechanism Robustness to Multi-node Attacks 7.3 Mechanism to Resolve Forks A Solomonic Mechanism 7.4 Conclusion References References Index