The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume

Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
I.1. The aims......Page 16
I.2. The literature......Page 18
I.3.1. Consciousness and self-consciousness......Page 20
I.3.2. Individuation and identity......Page 33
I.3.3. The person and personal identity......Page 41
I.4. The general development......Page 45
PART I . THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY BACKGROUND......Page 48
1. The ontological view of the self: Scholastic and Cartesian conceptions......Page 50
1.1. Descartes and the Cartesians on the person and the soul......Page 51
1.2. Descartes and the Cartesians on consciousness......Page 58
1.3. The trinity, human personality, and self-consciousness: the debate between Sherlock and South......Page 69
1.4. Essayistic alternatives: Pascal and La Rochefoucauld......Page 75
2.1. Spinoza on individuation, identity, and consciousness......Page 76
2.2. Cambridge Platonism: Cudworth’s account of consciousness......Page 82
2.3. The subjectivist treatment of identity: Clauberg, Hobbes, and Boyle......Page 87
2.4. Personality and moral responsibility: Hobbes and Pufendorf......Page 91
2.5. The afterlife: the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body......Page 96
PART II. LOCKE’S SUBJECTIVIST REVOLUTION......Page 110
3.1. Locke and his ‘sources’......Page 112
3.2. Locke and the subjectivist treatment of identity......Page 117
3.3. Locke on man, soul, and person......Page 121
3.4. Locke on consciousness......Page 124
3.5. Locke on consciousness, self-consciousness, and intuition......Page 133
4.1. Personal identity: consciousness and memory......Page 136
4.2. Personal identity: self-concern and moral and legal responsibility......Page 142
4.3. Original sin......Page 146
4.4. Self-concern and the afterlife......Page 147
4.5. The resurrection of the body: Locke’s controversy with Stillingfleet......Page 149
4.6. Repentance and moral miracles......Page 154
4.7. Thinking matter and personal identity. Locke and his followers: Collins, Voltaire, and Cuenz......Page 159
PART III. PROBLEMS WITH LOCKE: CRITIQUE AND DEFENCE......Page 166
5. The notion of a person and the role of consciousness and memory......Page 168
5.1. Person, man, soul, and the resurrection of the body......Page 171
5.2. The debate about the role of consciousness and memory......Page 183
6.1. The charge of circularity against Locke......Page 205
6.2. Locke and the transitivity of identity......Page 225
6.3. Conclusion......Page 235
PART IV. SUBJECTIVITY AND IMMATERIALIST METAPHYSICS OF THE MIND......Page 238
7. The soul: human and universal......Page 239
7.1. Cartesian themes......Page 242
7.2. The universal soul and human personal identity: Shaftesbury......Page 255
8.1. On relating to one’s own soul......Page 263
8.2. Berkeleian themes......Page 273
8.3. The senses of identity: Butler’s epistemology and metaphysics of personal identity and the future life......Page 281
8.4. ‘Pure thought’ and identity: the anonymous Essay on Personal Identity, and Tucker’s critique......Page 284
8.5. Conclusion......Page 290
PART V. SUBSTANCE, APPERCEPTION, AND IDENTITY: LEIBNIZ, WOLFF, AND BEYOND......Page 292
9. Individuation and identity, apperception and consciousness in Leibniz and Wolff......Page 294
9.1. Leibniz on individuation and identity......Page 295
9.2. Leibniz on personal identity......Page 304
9.3. Problems with Leibniz: apperception and consciousness......Page 310
9.4. Leibniz and Wolff......Page 316
9.5. Wolff on consciousness, self-consciousness, and apperception......Page 319
9.6. Wolff on consciousness, personal identity, and immortality......Page 326
10. Beyond Leibniz and Wolff: from immortality to the necessary ‘unity of the subject’......Page 330
10.1. Wolffian accounts of immortality and identity......Page 331
10.2. Wolffian accounts of consciousness, the unity of the soul, and personal identity......Page 343
11.1. The primacy of consciousness: Rüdiger and Crusius contra Wolff and Klosse......Page 358
11.2. On Wolffian self-consciousness: Hollmann and von Creuz......Page 364
11.3. Self-consciousness and the body: Sulzer......Page 369
11.4. Towards Kant? Mérian on apperception and identity......Page 380
PART VI. BUNDLES AND SELVES: HUME IN CONTEXT......Page 396
12. Hume and the belief in personal identity......Page 398
12.1. The ‘natural propension’ to believe in personal identity......Page 400
12.2. Time, change, and identity......Page 403
12.3. Confounding identity with diversity: Hume, Shaftesbury, and Buffier......Page 405
12.4. ‘The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man’......Page 408
12.5. Hume and Lockean theory......Page 411
12.6. Hume’s Appendix......Page 413
12.7. The Abstract......Page 417
12.8. Hume on consciousness and reflection......Page 418
13.1. Critique of the bundle view of the self: Beattie’s and Reid’s objections to Hume’s account......Page 422
13.2. Varieties of the bundle view. ‘Anticipations’ of the Humean position: Hutcheson, Bayle, Berkeley, Régis, Boulainviller, and Deschamps......Page 425
13.3. What is Hume’s bundle view of the self?......Page 433
13.4. Personal identity ‘as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves’: Hume and Kames......Page 438
13.5. A note on Hume and Kant......Page 443
Conclusion: beyond Hume and Wolff......Page 446
C.1. Sentiment intime and Selbstgefühl......Page 447
C.2. Materialism......Page 448
C.3. Common Sense......Page 449
C.4. Kantian thought......Page 450
Bibliography......Page 453
B......Page 486
C......Page 487
F......Page 489
H......Page 490
K......Page 491
M......Page 492
P......Page 493
R......Page 494
S......Page 495
V......Page 497
Z......Page 498