The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy

Contents......Page 5
Translator's Introduction......Page 11
PART I The Crisis of the Sciences as Expression of the Radical Life-Crisis of European Humanity......Page 41
§ 1. Is there, in view of their constant successes, really a crisis of the sciences......Page 42
§2. The positivistic reduction of the idea of science to mere factual science. The "crisis" of science as the loss of its meaning for life......Page 44
§ 3. The founding of the autonomy of European humanity through the new formulation of the idea of philosophy in the Renaissance......Page 46
§ 4. The failure of the new science after its initial success, the unclarified motive for this failure......Page 49
§ 5. The ideal of universal philosophy and the process of its inner dissolution......Page 50
§ 6. The history of modern philosophy as a struggle for the meaning of man......Page 53
§ 7. The project of the investigations of this world......Page 55
PART II Clarification of the Originof the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism......Page 59
§ 8. The origin of the new idea of theuniversality of science in the reshaping of mathematics......Page 60
§ 9. Galileo's mathematization of nature......Page 62
a. "Pure geometry."......Page 63
b. The basic notion of Galilean physics: nature as a mathematical universe......Page 67
c. The problem of the mathematizability of the "plena."......Page 73
d. The motivation of Galileo's conception of nature......Page 76
e. The verificational character of natural science's fundamental hypothesis......Page 80
f. The problem of the sense of natural-scientific "formulae."......Page 82
g. The emptying of the meaning of mathematical natural science through "technization."......Page 85
h. The life-world as the forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science......Page 87
i. Portentous misunderstandings resulting from lack of clarity about the meaning of mathematization......Page 92
k. Fundamental significance of the problem of the origin of mathematical natural science......Page 95
l. Characterization of the method of our exposition......Page 96
§ 10. The origin of dualism in the prevailing exemplary role of natural science. The rationality of the world more geometrico......Page 99
§11. Dualism as the reason for theincomprehensibility of the problems of reason, as presupposition for the specialization of the sciences, as the foundation of naturalistic psychology......Page 100
§ 12. Over-all characterization of modern physicalistic rationalism......Page 104
§ 13. The first difficulties of physicalistic naturalism in psychology: the incomprehensibility of functioning subjectivity......Page 106
§ 14 Precursory characterization of objectivism and transcendentalism. The struggle between these two ideas as the sense of modern spiritual history......Page 107
§15. Reflection on the method of our historical manner of investigation......Page 109
§ 16. Descartes as the primal foundernot only of the modern idea of objectivistic rationalism but also of the transcendental motif which explodes it......Page 112
§ 17. Descartes's return to the ego cogito.Exposition of the sense of the Cartesian epoche......Page 114
§ 18. Descartes's misinterpretation of himself. The psychologistic falsification of the pure ego attained through the epoc......Page 117
§ 19, Descartes's obtrusive interest in objectivism as the reason for his self-misinterpretation......Page 120
§20. "Intentionality" in Descartes......Page 121
§21, Descartes as the starting point of two lines of development, rationalism and empiricism......Page 122
§22. Locke's naturalistic-epistemological psychology......Page 123
§ 23. Berkeley. David Hume's psychology as fictionalistic theory of knowledge: the "bankruptcy" of philosophy and science......Page 125
§ 24. The genuine philosophical motif hidden in the absurdity of Hume's skepticism: the shaking of objectivism......Page 127
§25. The "transcendental" motif in rationalism: KanVs conception of a transcendental philosophy......Page 130
§ 26. Preliminary discussion of the concept of the "transcendental" which guides us here......Page 136
§ 27. The philosophy of Kant and his followers seen from the perspective of our guiding concept of the "transcendental." The task of taking a critical position......Page 137
PART III The Clarification of theTranscendental Problem and the Related Function of Psychology......Page 141
§28. KanVs unexpressed "presupposition": the surrounding world of life, taken for granted as valid......Page 142
§29. The life-world can be disclosed as a realmof subjective phenomena which have remained "anonymous."......Page 150
§ 30. The lack of an intuitive exhibitingmethod as the reason for KanVs mythical constructions......Page 153
§31. Kant and the inadequacy of the psychologyof his day. The opaqueness of the distinction between transcendental subjectivity and soul......Page 155
§ 32. The possibility of a hidden truth in KanVs transcendental philosophy: the problem of a "new dimension.'9 The antagonism between the "life of the plane" and the "life of depth"......Page 157
§33. The problem of the "life-world" as a partial problem within the general problem of objective science......Page 160
a. The difference between objective science and science in general......Page 162
b. The use of subjective-relative experiences for the objective sciences, and the science of them......Page 164
c. Is the subjective-relative an object for psychology?......Page 165
d. The life-world as universe of what is intuitable in principle, the "objective-true" world as in principle nonintuitable 'logical" substruction......Page 166
e. The objective sciences as subjective constructs—those of a particular praxis, namely, the theoretical-logical, which itself belongs to the full concreteness of the life-world......Page 168
f. The problem of the life-world not as a partial problem but rather as a universal problem for philosophy......Page 171
§ 35. Analysis of the transcendental epoche.First step: The epoche of objective scienc......Page 174
§36 How can the life-world, after the epoche of the objective sciences, become the subject matter of a science? The distinction in principle between the objective-logical a priori and the a priori of the life-world......Page 176
§ 37. The formal and most general structures of the life-world: thing and world on the one side, thing-consciousness on the other......Page 181
§ 38. The two possible fundamental ways of making the life-world thematic: the naive and natural straightforward attitude and the idea of a consistently reflective attitude toward the "how" of the subjective manner of givenness of life-world and life-world objects......Page 182
§ 40. The difficulties surrounding the genuine sense of performing the total epoche. The temptation to misconstrue it as a withholding of all indivi......Page 187
§41. The genuine transcendental epoche makes possible the "transcendental reduction"— the discovery and investigation of the transcendental correlation between world and world-consciousness......Page 190
§ 42. The task of concretely plotting ways in which the transcendental reduction can actually be carried out......Page 191
§43. Characterization of a new way to the reduction, as contrasted with the ''Cartesian way."......Page 193
§44. The life-world as subject matter for a theoretical interest determined by a universal epoche in respect to the actuality of the things of the life-world......Page 194
§45. Beginnings of a concrete exposition of what is given in sense-intuition purely as such......Page 196
§46. The universal a priori of correlation......Page 198
§47. Indication of further directions of inquiry: the basic subjective phenomena of kinesthesis, alteration of validity, horizon-consciousness, and the communalization of experience......Page 200
§48, Anything that is—whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs—is an index of a subjective system of correlations......Page 204
§49. Preliminary concept of transcendental constitution as "original formation of meaning." The restricted character of the exemplary analyses carried out so far, an indication of further horizons of exposition......Page 206
§ 50. First ordering of all working problemsunder the headings ego—cogito—cogitatum......Page 209
§51. The task of an "ontology of the life-world"......Page 212
§ 52. The emergence of paradoxical enigmas. The necessity of new radical reflections......Page 213
§ 53. The paradox of human subjectivity:being a subject for the world and at the same time being an object in the world......Page 217
a. We as human beings, and we as ultimately functioning-accomplishing subjects......Page 221
b. As primal ego, I constitute my horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects within the transcendental intersubjectivity which constitutes the world......Page 223
§ 55. The correction in principle of our first application of the epoche by reducing it to the absolutely unique, ultimately functioning ego......Page 225
§ 56. Characterization of the philosophicaldevelopment after Kant from the perspective of the struggle between physicalistic objectivism and the constantly reemerging "transcendental motif"......Page 230
§ 57. The fateful separation of transcendental philosophy and psychology......Page 237
§ 58. The alliance and the difference betweenpsychology and transcendental philosophy. Psychology as the decisive field......Page 242
§ 59. Analysis of the reorientation from the psychological attitude into the transcendental attitude. Psychology "before9'and "after9'the phenomenological reduction. (The problem of "flowing in")......Page 247
§ 60. The reason for the failure of psychology: dualistic and physicalistic presuppositions......Page 250
§ 61. Psychology in the tension between the (objectivistic-philosophical) idea of science and empirical procedure: the incompatibility of the two directions of psychological inquiry (the psycho-physical and that of "psychology based on inner experience'9)......Page 252
§ 62. Preliminary discussion of the absurdity of giving equal status in principle to souls and bodies as realities, indication of the difference in principle between the temporality, the causality, and the individuation of natural things and those of soul......Page 254
§ 63. The questionable character of the conceptsof "outer" and "inner" experience. Why has the experience of the bodily thing in the life-world, as the experience of something "merely subjective" not previously been included in the subject matter of psychology......Page 258
§ 64 Cartesian dualism as the reason for the parallelization. Only the formal and most general features of the schema ''descriptive vs. explanatory science" are justified......Page 260
§ 65. Testing the legitimacy of an empirically grounded dualism by familiarizing oneself with the factual procedure of the psychologist and the physiologist......Page 263
§ 66. The world of common experience: its set of regional types and the possible universal abstractions within it: "nature" as correlate of a universal abstraction, the problem of ''complementary abstractions.''......Page 265
§ 67. The dualism of the abstractions grounded in experience. The continuing historical influence of the empiricist approach (from Hobbes to Wundt). Critique of data-empiricism......Page 269
§ 68. The task of a pure explication of consciousness as such: the universal problem of intentionality. {Brentano9 s attempt at a reform of psychology.)......Page 272
§ 69. The basic psychological method of''phenomenological-psychological reduction'' (first characterization: [1] intentional relatedness and the epoche, [2] levels of descriptive psychology, [3] establishing the "disinterested spectator'')......Page 274
§ 70. The difficulties of psychological "abstraction." (The paradox of the "intentional object", the intentional primal phenomenon of "sense.")......Page 280
§71. The danger of misunderstanding the"universality" of the phenomenological-psychological epoche. The decisive signifiance of the correct understanding......Page 283
§ 72. The relation of transcendental psychology to transcendental phenomenology as the proper access to pure self-knowledge. Definitive removal of the objectivistic ideal from the science of the soul......Page 296
Appendixes......Page 306
Appendix I:Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity......Page 308
Appendix II:Idealization and the Science of Reality—The Mathematization of Nature......Page 340
Appendix III: The Attitude of Natural Science and the Attitude of Humanistic Science. Naturalism, Dualism, and Psychophysical Psychology......Page 354
Appendix IV: Philosophy as Mankind's Self-Reflection, the Self-Realization of Reason......Page 374
Appendix V:[Objectivity and the World of Experience]......Page 382
Appendix VI: [The Origin of Geometry]......Page 392
Appendix VII: [The Life-World and the World of Science]......Page 418
Appendix VIII: Fink's Appendix on the Problem of the"Unconscious"......Page 424
Appendix IX: Denial of Scientific Philosophy. Necessity of Reflection. The Reflection [Must Be] Historical. How Is History Required?......Page 428
Appendix X: Fink's Outline for the Continuationof the Crisis......Page 436