Spinoza on Reason, Passions and the Supreme Good

Frontmatter
	Contents
	Acknowledgements
	List of Abbreviations
Introduction
	I.1 Theme
	I.2 Approach
	I.3 Contents
1 The Path Towards the Supreme Good in the Treatise on the Emendation
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 The Supreme Good
	1.3 Social Factors and the Supreme Good
	1.4 What Are the Passions?
	1.5 An Intellectual Virtuous Circle
	1.6 Truth and Certainty
	1.7 Conclusion
2 Passions and Reason inthe Short Treatise
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Passions and Inadequate Ideas
	2.3 The Passive Nature of the Intellect
	2.4 The Epistemic Remedy for the Passions
	2.5 The Problem of Superstition
	2.6 The Limits of Spinoza’s Early Ethics
	2.7 Conclusion
3 A Passionate Path Towards the Supreme Good in the Theological-Political Treatise
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Vicious and Virtuous Circles
	3.3 The Problem of Salvation
	3.4 Obedience as a Means of Achieving the Supreme Good
	3.5 The Virtue of the Prophets
	3.6 The Instrumentalist Reading and the Scholarly Debate
	3.7 Conclusion
4 Common Notions in the Ethics
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 The Problem of the Origin of Reason
	4.3 Mereology, Laws, and Agreement in Nature
	4.4 Agreement in Nature and Common Notions
	4.5 Universal and Proper Common Notions
	4.6 Between Empiricism and Innatism
	4.7 Conclusion
5 Passions and Reason in the Ethics
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 Conatus, Power of Acting, and Agreementin Nature
	5.3 Passivity and Activity
	5.4 Cooperation and Feedback Loops
	5.5 Mastering the Passions
	5.6 Objections and Replies
	5.7 Conclusion
6 Cultivating Passionate Agreement. Spinoza’s Political Science
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 Descriptive and Normative Uses of Reason
	6.3 Political Science and Proper Common Notions
	6.4 Designing the State: Monarchy
	6.5 Designing the State: Aristocracy
	6.6 Oppressive Societies and the Implications of Spinoza’s Political Science
	6.7 Conclusion
Conclusion
Index