Social Choice and Welfare

Content: 
Contributions to Economic Analysis
Page ii

Front Matter
Page iii

Copyright page
Page iv

Introduction to the series
Page v

Preface
Page vii
P.K. PATTANAIK, M. SALLES

List of participants
Pages xi-xii

Introduction
Pages 1-15
P.K. PATTANAIK, M. SALLES

Chapter 1 - Arrow\'s theorem: Unusual domains and extended co-domains
Pages 19-30
J.-P. BARTHELEMY

Chapter 2 - Pivotal voters: A simple proof of Arrow\'s theorem
Pages 31-35
SALVADOR BARBERA

Chapter 3 - The structure of general probabilistic group decision rules
Pages 37-54
R.A. HEINER, P.K. PATTANAIK

Chapter 4 - Positive association and its relatives
Pages 55-71
MAURICE McMANUS

Chapter 5 - On the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory
Pages 73-78
BERNARD MONJARDET

Chapter 6 - Social choice and game theory: Recent results with a topological approach
Pages 79-102
G. CHICHILNISKY

Chapter 7 - Contractibility and public decision-making
Pages 103-122
GEOFFREY HEAL

Chapter 8 - Resolving conflicting views of justice in social choice
Pages 125-149
KOTARO SUZUMURA

Chapter 9 - Some broader issues of social choice
Pages 151-173
YEW-KWANG NG

Chapter 10 - Ex-post optimality as a dynamically consistent objective for collective choice under uncertainty
Pages 175-205
PETER HAMMOND

Chapter 11 - Welfare aspects of naive and sophisticated decision-making
Pages 207-224
PAUL GROUT

Chapter 12 - Strategic voting for weakly binary group decision functions: The case of linear individual orderings
Pages 227-238
TARADAS BANDYOPADHYAY, RAJAT DEB

Chapter 13 - Further results on voting with veto
Pages 239-250
BHASKAR DUTTA

Chapter 14 - On simple games and social choice correspondences
Pages 251-268
BEZALEL PELEG

Chapter 15 - Equilibria in simple dynamic games
Pages 269-284
NORMAN SCHOFIELD

Chapter 16 - Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
Pages 285-299
PETER COUGHLIN, SHMUEL NITZAN

Chapter 17 - Λ-transfer value and fixed-price equilibrium in two-sided markets
Pages 301-323
ROY GARDNER