Self-organising Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Foundations Of Cyber-anarcho-socialism

Contents
Preface
About the Author
Part I: Foundations
	Chapter 1. Multi-Agent Systems
		1.1 Introduction
		1.2 Example: The SmartHouse
			1.2.1 Community Energy Systems
			1.2.2 Three Contextual Issues
		1.3 Open Systems and Agent Societies
			1.3.1 Open Systems
			1.3.2 Open Societies and Agent Societies
		1.4 Methodology: Sociologically-Inspired Computing
		1.5 Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
			1.5.1 Autonomous Agents
			1.5.2 Multi-Agent Systems
		1.6 Agent Communication
			1.6.1 The Contract-Net Protocol
			1.6.2 Standardisation and FIPA ACL
			1.6.3 Institutionalised Power
		1.7 Specification of Agent Societies
			1.7.1 Norm-Governed MAS (NG-MAS)
			1.7.2 Dynamic NG-MAS
			1.7.3 Event Calculus
		1.8 Simulation and Animation
		1.9 Summary
	Chapter 2. Self-Organising Systems
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 Example: Same As It Ever Was
		2.3 Emergence
			2.3.1 Swarms
			2.3.2 Cellular Automata
			2.3.3 Self-Organisation
			2.3.4 Planned Emergence
		2.4 The Self and The Organisation
			2.4.1 The Self
			2.4.2 The Organisation
		2.5 The Dimensions of Self-Organisation
			2.5.1 An Analytic Framework for Self-Organisation
			2.5.2 The General Setting for Self-Organisation
		2.6 The Mechanics of Change
			2.6.1 Parameter Modification
			2.6.2 Policy Modification
		2.7 Summary
Part II: Strategic Interaction
	Chapter 3. Game Theory
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Example: The Kitchen Stand-Off
		3.3 Game Theory: Terminology and Representation
			3.3.1 Utility and Preferences
			3.3.2 Games: Matrix Form and Extensive Form
		3.4 Solution Concepts
			3.4.1 Dominant Strategy
			3.4.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategy
			3.4.3 Pareto Optimal Strategy
			3.4.4 Social Welfare Maximisation
			3.4.5 The Kitchen Stand-Off, Revisited
			3.4.6 The Hawk–Dove Game, aka Chicken
		3.5 The Prisoners’ Dilemma
			3.5.1 Analysing the Prisoners’ Dilemma
			3.5.2 The Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma
			3.5.3 A Slight Digression on Rationality
		3.6 Other 2-Player Games
			3.6.1 (Pure) Coordination Game
			3.6.2 Battle of the Sexes
			3.6.3 Stag Hunt Game
			3.6.4 Ultimatum Game
			3.6.5 Focal Point Games
		3.7 Beyond 2-Player Games
			3.7.1 n-Player Games
			3.7.2 Coalitions and the Shapley Value
			3.7.3 Evolutionary Game Theory
		3.8 Summary
	Chapter 4. Social Choice Theory
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 Example: The Big Breakfast Menu Variations
		4.3 The Vocabulary of Social Choice Theory
			4.3.1 Basics
			4.3.2 Aggregation Rules
			4.3.3 Some ‘Nice’ Properties
			4.3.4 The Condorcet Winner and Condorcet Loser
			4.3.5 Example: Skulduggery in the Roman Senate
		4.4 Voting Procedures
			4.4.1 Running Example
			4.4.2 Procedures
			4.4.3 The D’Hondt Method
		4.5 Paradox Abounds
			4.5.1 Condorcet’s Paradoxes
			4.5.2 Yet More Paradoxical Results
			4.5.3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
			4.5.4 Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
			4.5.5 Comparison of Voting Methods
		4.6 A Voting Protocol
			4.6.1 Actions and Fluents
			4.6.2 Institutionalised Powers
			4.6.3 Permission and Obligation
			4.6.4 Implementation Route
		4.7 Summary and Conclusions
	Chapter 5. Alternative Dispute Resolution
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Example: The Missing Sausage Quarrel
		5.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution
		5.4 Test Domain
			5.4.1 Mass-Participation Content Creations
			5.4.2 Colored Trails
			5.4.3 Coloured Trials
			5.4.4 Experimental Parameters in Coloured Trials
		5.5 Error Toleration: Access Control
			5.5.1 Basics of Access Control
			5.5.2 Fluents, Actions and Institutionalised Power
			5.5.3 Permission and Obligation
			5.5.4 Sanction
		5.6 Error Retrospection: Regulatory Compliance
			5.6.1 Token Surrender
			5.6.2 Location Movement
			5.6.3 Communication: Token Exchange
			5.6.4 Outcome
		5.7 Error Recovery: Alternative Dispute Resolution
			5.7.1 Informal Specification
			5.7.2 Phase I: Initiation
			5.7.3 Phase II: ADR Method Selection
			5.7.4 Phase III: Execution
		5.8 Summary
	Chapter 6. Ostrom Institution Theory
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Example: The Common-Pool Refrigerator
		6.3 Collective Action
			6.3.1 Three Types of Collective Action
			6.3.2 Common-Pool Resource Management
			6.3.3 Linear Public Good Games
		6.4 Self-Governing (Ostrom) Institutions
			6.4.1 Collective Action: Analytically and Empirically
			6.4.2 Self-Governing Institutions
			6.4.3 Institutional Analysis and Development
		6.5 Self-Organising Electronic Institutions
			6.5.1 Structural and Functional Specification
			6.5.2 Procedural Specification
			6.5.3 Self-Governing Institutions and Sustainable MAS
		6.6 Boundaries and Congruence
			6.6.1 Experimental Setting
			6.6.2 Specification Space
			6.6.3 Policy Specification
			6.6.4 Experimental Results
		6.7 Dignity, Polycentricity and Self-Amendment
			6.7.1 Principle 7 and the Zone of Dignity
			6.7.2 Principle 8 and Polycentricity
			6.7.3 The Paradox of Self-Amendment
		6.8 Summary
Part III: Social Interaction
	Chapter 7. Computational Justice
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Example: The Biscuit Distribution Dilemma
		7.3 Justice and Fairness: A Brief Overview
			7.3.1 A Brief Review of Distributive Justice
			7.3.2 Fairness
			7.3.3 Rescher’s Theory of Distributive Justice
		7.4 Distributive Justice
			7.4.1 Satisfaction and Compliance
			7.4.2 Representing Legitimate Claims
			7.4.3 Computing a Resource Allocation
			7.4.4 Self-Organising the Weights
			7.4.5 Some Experimental Results
		7.5 Retributive Justice
			7.5.1 Experimental Setting
			7.5.2 Policy Specification
			7.5.3 Experimental Results
		7.6 Procedural Justice
			7.6.1 Participation Principle
				7.6.1.1 A Metric for Decision Frequency
			7.6.2 Transparency Principle and Balancing Principle
			7.6.3 Procedural Justice: On Reflection
		7.7 A General Framework
		7.8 Summary
	Chapter 8. Artificial Social Construction
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Example: The Cheese-and-Wine Controversy
		8.3 Trust
			8.3.1 Making Decisions Under Uncertainty
			8.3.2 A Socio-Cognitive Trust Framework
			8.3.3 Trust in a Producer–Consumer Scenario
		8.4 Forgiveness
			8.4.1 Trust Breakdowns
			8.4.2 A Forgiveness Framework
			8.4.3 Forgiveness in Computer-Mediated Communication
		8.5 Electronic Social Capital
			8.5.1 Favours
			8.5.2 Social Capital
			8.5.3 A Social Capital Framework
			8.5.4 The Unscrupulous Diners’ Dilemma
		8.6 Values
			8.6.1 Depreciating Values
			8.6.2 Reinventing Values
		8.7 Artificial Social Constructionism
		8.8 Summary
	Chapter 9. Knowledge Aggregation
		9.1 Introduction
		9.2 Example: The Kitchen Aggravation
		9.3 Judgement Aggregation
			9.3.1 The Condorcet Jury Theorem
			9.3.2 The Doctrinal Paradox
		9.4 Opinion Formation
			9.4.1 Hegselmann–Krause Model
			9.4.2 Ramirez-Cano–Pitt Model
		9.5 Social Networks
			9.5.1 Networks: Some Definitions and Metrics
			9.5.2 Ring and All-to-All Networks
			9.5.3 Random Graphs (Erdös–Rényi) Networks
			9.5.4 Small-World (Watts–Strogatz) Networks
			9.5.5 Scale-Free (Barabási–Albert) Networks
		9.6 A Framework for Interactional Justice
			9.6.1 Individual Self-Assessment
			9.6.2 Collective Assessment
			9.6.3 Implementation
		9.7 Experiments with Interactional Justice
			9.7.1 Economy of Scarcity
			9.7.2 ‘Clique’ Detection and Protection
			9.7.3 Network Variations
		9.8 Summary
	Chapter 10. Algorithmic Self-Governance
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Example: The Ministry of Culinary Affairs
		10.3 Knowledge Management
			10.3.1 Knowledge Management in Classical Athens
			10.3.2 Facts, Policies and Values
		10.4 Relevant Expertise Aggregation
		10.5 The Tolerance of Dissent
		10.6 Basic Democracy and Demopolis
			10.6.1 Basic Democracy
			10.6.2 Demopolis
			10.6.3 SimDemopolis
		10.7 Experiments with SimDemopolis
			10.7.1 Civic Participation
				10.7.1.1 Variation 1: Base Case
				10.7.1.2 Variation 2: ‘Power Grabs’ and ‘Free Riding’
				10.7.1.3 Variation 3: Role Assignment Bias
			10.7.2 Legislation
			10.7.3 Entrenchment
		10.8 Algorithmic Comparative Politics
		10.9 Summary: Why This Stuff Matters
Bibliography
Index