Scientific Explanation

Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 14
0. Introduction......Page 18
0.1 A Bit of Background......Page 19
0.2 The Received View......Page 23
1. The First Decade (1948-57): Peace in the Valley (but Some Trouble in the Foothills)......Page 26
1.1 The Fountainhead: The Deductive-Nomological Model......Page 27
1.2 Explanation in History and Prehistory......Page 40
1.3 Teleology and Functional Explanation......Page 41
2. The Second Decade (1958-67): Manifest Destiny—Expansion and Conflict......Page 48
2.1 A Major Source of Conflict......Page 50
2.2 Deeper Linguistic Challenges......Page 52
2.3 Famous Counterexamples to the Deductive-Nomological Model......Page 61
2.4 Statistical Explanation......Page 65
2.5 Early Objections to the Inductive-Statistical Model......Page 73
3. The Third Decade (1968-77): Deepening Differences......Page 76
3.1 The Statistical-Relevance Model......Page 77
3.2 Problems with Maximal Specificity......Page 83
3.3 Coffa's Dispositional Theory of Inductive Explanation......Page 98
3.4 Explanation and Evidence......Page 104
3.5 Explanations of Laws......Page 109
3.6 Are Explanations Arguments?......Page 116
3.7 The Challenge of Causality......Page 122
3.8 Teleological and Functional Explanation......Page 126
3.9 The End of a Decade/The End of an Era?......Page 131
4.1 New Foundations......Page 132
4.2 Theoretical Explanation......Page 137
4.3 Descriptive vs. Explanatory Knowledge......Page 141
4.4 The Pragmatics of Explanation......Page 150
4.5 Empiricism and Realism......Page 165
4.6 Railton's Nomothetic/Mechanistic Account......Page 169
4.7 Aleatory Explanation: Statistical vs. Causal Relevance......Page 181
4.8 Probabilistic Causality......Page 183
4.9 Deductivism......Page 187
4.10 Explanations of Laws Again......Page 192
4.11 A Fundamental Principle Challenged......Page 193
5.1 Consensus or Rapprochement?......Page 195
5.2 Agenda for the Fifth Decade......Page 200
Chronological Bibliography......Page 211
Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy, by Peter Railton......Page 235
Explanation: In Search of the Rationale, by Matti Sintonen......Page 268
1. Why-Questions......Page 269
2. A Thin Logic of Questions......Page 272
3. The Epistemic Conception of Explanation......Page 276
4. Theory Nets and Explanatory Commitments......Page 280
5. Pruning the Web of Belief......Page 284
6. Beyond the Third Dogma of Empiricism......Page 288
1. Introduction......Page 298
2. The Multiplicity, Diversity, and Incompleteness of Causal Explanations......Page 300
3. The Canonical Form for Causal Explanations......Page 301
4. Ontology......Page 303
5. Why Probability Values Are Not Explanatory......Page 308
6. Why Ask Why-Questions?......Page 311
Appendix: The Causal Failures of the Covering-Law Model......Page 315
1. Introduction......Page 322
2. Some Initial Intuitions......Page 324
3. Pure and Mixed Probabilities......Page 325
4. Screening Off and Spurious Correlations......Page 327
5. Spuriousness and Statistical Research......Page 329
6. The Importance of the Single Case......Page 330
7. The Compatibility of Probabilistic Intuitions with a Deterministic View of Causation......Page 332
8. The Deterministic Causation of Chances......Page 334
9. Rational Action......Page 336
10. Quantitative Decisions......Page 337
11. Causal and Evidential Decision Theory......Page 339
12. Action and Causation Again......Page 343
13. The Metaphysics of Probability......Page 345
14. Causal Chains......Page 346
15. Causal Asymmetry......Page 349
16. Digression on Independence Requirements......Page 352
17. Causal Processes and Pseudo-Processes......Page 356
18. Negative Causes......Page 358
1. The Primacy of Singular Causes......Page 364
2. The Failure of the Defeasibility Account......Page 365
3. Abstractions and Idealizations......Page 367
4. Conclusion......Page 370
The Causal Mechanical Model of Explanation, by James Woodward......Page 372
1. Introduction......Page 399
2. Interpretativism......Page 403
3. Rationality and Explanations of Behavior......Page 409
4. The Existence of Appropriate Laws......Page 414
5. Ethical Issues......Page 419
6. Conclusion......Page 423
1.1 Hempel's Accounts......Page 425
1.2 Hempel's Problems......Page 426
2. The Pragmatics of Explanation......Page 428
2.1 Van Fraassen's Pragmatics......Page 429
2.2 Why Pragmatics Is Not Enough......Page 430
2.3 Possible Goals for a Theory of Explanation......Page 432
3. Explanation as Delineation of Causes......Page 434
3.1 Causal Why-Questions and Causal Explanations......Page 435
3.2 Are there Noncausal Explanations of Singular Propositions?......Page 437
3.3 Causal Explanation and Theoretical Explanation......Page 443
4.1 The Ideal of Unification......Page 445
4.2 Argument Patterns......Page 447
4.3 Systematization of Belief......Page 449
4.4 Why-Questions Revisited......Page 450
4.5 Explanatory Unification and Causal Dependence......Page 451
4.6 Unification and Theoretical Explanation......Page 452
5. A Defense of Deductive Chauvinism......Page 463
5.1 The Objection from Quantum Mechanics......Page 465
5.2 The Idealization of Macro-Phenomena......Page 467
5.3 Further Sources of Indeterminism?......Page 469
5.4 Two Popular Examples......Page 470
5.5 Explanation and Responsibility......Page 472
6. Epistemological Difficulties for the Causal Approach......Page 474
6.1 Hume's Ghost......Page 475
6.2 Causal Processes and Causal Interactions......Page 476
6.3 Causation and Counterfactuals......Page 485
6.4 Justifying Counterfactuals......Page 488
6.5 Changing the Epistemological Framework......Page 490
7.1 Comparative Unification without Change of Belief......Page 492
7.2 The Possibility of Gerrymandering......Page 495
7.3 Asymmetry and Irrelevance......Page 497
7.4 Comparative Unification and Scientific Change......Page 503
8.2 "What If the World Isn't Unified?"......Page 509
8.3 Correct Explanation Again......Page 512
8.4 Conclusions......Page 514
Contributors......Page 522
A......Page 524
B......Page 525
C......Page 526
D......Page 527
E......Page 528
F......Page 530
H......Page 531
K......Page 533
L......Page 534
M......Page 535
N......Page 536
P......Page 537
Q......Page 538
R......Page 539
S......Page 540
U......Page 542
Z......Page 543