Sandinista Nicaragua’s Resistance to US Coercion: Revolutionary Deterrence in Asymmetric Conflict

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title page......Page 5
Copyright information......Page 6
Table of contents......Page 7
List of figures......Page 8
List of tables......Page 9
Preface......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 19
Introduction......Page 25
Process Tracing......Page 33
Plan of the Book: A Note on Methods......Page 36
Significance of Nicaraguan Case......Page 39
Conclusion......Page 40
1 History of U.S.–Nicaragua Relations......Page 42
Nicaragua’s Incorporation into the Global System......Page 43
Postindependence......Page 44
U.S. Military Intervention and the Rise of Augusto Cesar Sandino......Page 45
The Somoza Period......Page 47
Carlos Fonseca and the Rebirth of Sandinismo......Page 48
End of the Dictatorship and Relations with the United States......Page 49
The Revolution, Reagan, and the Failure of U.S. Coercive Policy......Page 52
Alternative Explanations for the Defeat of the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua......Page 56
Nicaragua a Low Priority for Reagan Administration......Page 57
Contras Likely to Overthrow FSLN......Page 58
Soviet Deterrence......Page 60
Reagan Constrained Solely by Domestic Opposition......Page 62
2 International Relations Theory, Asymmetric Conflicts, and Contentious Politics......Page 64
Previous International Relations Accounts of U.S.–Nicaraguan Relations......Page 65
What’s Missing: The Sandinista Response......Page 69
Revolutionary Deterrence......Page 74
Asymmetric Conflicts......Page 79
Contentious Politics and International Relations......Page 86
Signal Flare Strategy......Page 91
Transnational Public Diplomacy......Page 95
Contentious Politics’ Lessons for Studying Asymmetric Conflicts......Page 96
Conclusion......Page 97
3 Revolutionary Deterrence......Page 99
Maintaining Domestic Support: Sandinista Reforms, Mass Organizations......Page 100
Increased FSLN Military Capacity: Irregular Warfare Doctrine......Page 105
Sandinista Diplomatic Strategy: Undermining U.S. Legitimacy......Page 109
Cultivating U.S. Opposition: Signal Flare Strategy and Transnational Public Diplomacy......Page 111
Conclusion......Page 113
4 Challenging Reagan......Page 116
Origins of the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement......Page 119
Phase 1: Migrant Enclave Activism (1960s–1979)......Page 122
Phase 2: Launching the Signal Flare (1979–1983)......Page 124
Phase 3: Amplifying the Signal Flare’s Reach (1983–1990)......Page 127
Signal Flare Strategy and Transnational Public Diplomacy......Page 131
Drawing U.S. Citizens’ Attention......Page 133
Direct FSLN Message to U.S. Citizens......Page 135
Hosting Congressional Visits to Nicaragua......Page 138
International Diplomacy: Contadora and Esquipulas......Page 140
Promote Sustained Contentious and Formal Collective Action......Page 141
Creating a Counternarrative......Page 143
Conclusion......Page 144
5 Media Framing and Opposition to the Use of Force in U.S. Foreign Policy......Page 146
Analyzing FSLN and CAPSM’s Alternative Framing in Mainstream Media......Page 149
Framing Contradictions......Page 150
Revolutions Are Not Like Coca-Cola......Page 151
Contra War Is Illegal......Page 153
Contra War Is Immoral......Page 154
Contra War Is Futile and Unnecessary......Page 156
Contra War Is Counterproductive......Page 158
Narrative 1: United States as the Aggressor......Page 160
Narrative 2: Sandinistas Willing to Negotiate and Need for Peaceful Settlement......Page 161
Narrative 3: Central America Another Vietnam......Page 162
Narrative 4: Reagan Administration Lies to the American People......Page 163
Narrative 5: Ordinary U.S. People Telling the Truth......Page 164
Contrast with Democratic Opposition......Page 165
Media Standing: Prevalence of FSLN and CAPSM’s Alternative Frames......Page 167
Impact of Framing Contradiction on Public Opinion......Page 170
Results of Statistical Tests......Page 172
What Do These Findings Mean?......Page 175
Conclusion......Page 176
Appendix 5.A. Question Wordings......Page 177
Appendix 5.B. Coding Sheet......Page 178
6 Activating Public Opinion......Page 179
Public Opinion and Social Movements......Page 181
Data......Page 183
Methods......Page 187
Content Analysis: Expected Findings......Page 188
Activating Opposition to Reagan’s Central American Policy......Page 189
Military Solution of the Conflict Rejected......Page 195
FSLN’s International and Transnational Diplomacy......Page 196
FSLN’s Signal Flare Strategy......Page 198
CAPSM Amplification......Page 200
Interpretation of Findings......Page 201
Conclusion......Page 202
Appendix 6.A Coding Sheet......Page 203
7 Stopping Rollback......Page 205
Impact on Congress......Page 208
Quantitative Analysis of Hearings......Page 211
Qualitative Analysis of Testimonies......Page 213
Sister Nancy Donovan......Page 214
Reverend Thomas J. Gumbleton......Page 216
Sister Maureen Fiedler, Codirector of Quest for Peace......Page 218
Reverend William Callahan, Codirector of Quest for Peace......Page 221
Congressional Voting Behavior......Page 222
Impact on Reagan Administration......Page 226
Impact on President Reagan’s Decision Making......Page 228
CIA Mining of Nicaragua’s Harbors......Page 229
The Iran-Contra Affair......Page 231
Conclusion......Page 232
Conclusion......Page 233
Salvadoran Civil War: Another Revolutionary Deterrence Success......Page 234
U.S. Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Phase 1): Unconventional Warfare Missing......Page 236
Reagan Doctrine in Afghanistan: Domestic Political Support Missing and No Transnational Movement......Page 237
Sri Lanka versus Tamil Tigers: Unconventional Warfare and International Support Missing......Page 238
Civil War in Colombia: Inter- and Transnational Diplomacy Missing......Page 240
Assessing the Sandinista Revolution’s Achievements......Page 242
Epilogue: Postrevolutionary Developments......Page 245
Index......Page 251