Sameness and Substance Renewed

Contents......Page 5
Preface......Page 9
1. AIMS AND PURPOSES......Page 17
2. FORMAL PROPERTIES OF IDENTITY......Page 20
3. NOTIONS......Page 21
4. PHILOSOPHICAL TERMINOLOGY: A MANIFESTO......Page 23
5. SORTAL PREDICATES AND SORTAL CONCEPTS: AND CONCEPTS VERSUS CONCEPTIONS......Page 24
6. REAL AND NOMINAL......Page 27
7. NECESSARY/CONTINGENT AND A PRIORI / A POSTERIORI......Page 28
8. FORMAL NOTATIONS......Page 30
9. THE MODE OF COMBINATION INVOLVED IN ‘ IS THE SAME DONKEY AS’......Page 31
10. QUESTIONS OF PRIORITY......Page 34
1. A CENTRAL QUESTION ABOUT IDENTITY; AND RIVAL ANSWERS GIVEN BY DEFENDERS OF THE ABSOLUTENESS OF IDENTITY AND THE RELATIVITY OF IDENTITY......Page 37
2. LEIBNIZ’ S LAW AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF RELATIVE IDENTITY......Page 40
3. FIVE WAYS FOR IT TO BE FALSE THAT a = b g......Page 44
4. POSSIBLE EXAMPLES OF TYPE-( 4) RELATIVITY......Page 50
5. SOME CASES THAT MIGHT BE ALLEGED TO BE OF TYPE ( 5)......Page 51
6. DISCUSSION OF TYPE-( 4) CASES......Page 52
7. DISCUSSION OF TYPE-( 5) CASES AND SOME ATTEMPTED AMENDMENTS OF LEIBNIZ’ S LAW......Page 59
8. A MATHEMATICAL EXAMPLE SUPPOSEDLY OF TYPE ( 5)......Page 66
9. CONCLUSION CONCERNING R, THE RELATIVITY OF IDENTITY......Page 67
10. ABSOLUTENESS AND SORTAL DEPENDENCE JOINTLY AFFIRMED AND FORMALIZED......Page 69
1. PROPOSITION D AND THE RATIONALE OF THE ‘ SAME WHAT?’ QUESTION......Page 71
2. THE CHARGE OF CIRCULARITY, OR OF EMPTINESS......Page 74
3. THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES......Page 77
4. PROPOSITION D FURTHER EXPLICATED AND AMPLIFIED: AND D(i i ) AS THE PROPER DEVELOPMENT OF D......Page 79
5. EXISTENCE AND SORTAL PREDICATIONS......Page 84
6. FURTHER D PRINCIPLES......Page 85
7. MISCELLANEOUS FURTHER PRINCIPLES; AND A DOUBT ABOUT COUNTING......Page 90
1. THE SORTAL PREDICATES OF NATURAL KINDS......Page 93
2. THE OTHER SORTAL PREDICATES......Page 102
3. PROBLEMS OF ARTEFACT IDENTITY......Page 107
4. TWO APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF ARTEFACT IDENTITY......Page 111
5. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS TO DATE: AND A METHODOLOGICAL REMARK......Page 118
6. TRANSITION TO CHAPTERS FOUR AND FIVE......Page 121
1. INDEPENDENCE FROM THE EXPLICITLY MODAL OF THE FOREGOING THEORY OF INDIVIDUATION......Page 123
2. PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS GOVERNING THE DERIVATION OF A MODEST ESSENTIALISM......Page 124
3. THE NECESSITY OF IDENTITY AND THE NECESSITY OF DIFFERENCE......Page 130
4. CONCEIVABILITY, THEORY AND ESSENCE......Page 134
5. CONCEIVABILITY CONTINUED......Page 137
6. INDIVIDUATIVE ESSENTIALISM AND ITS CONSEQUENCES......Page 139
7. THAT THE IDEA OF ‘ HAECCEITAS’ IS AS MISBEGOTTEN AS THE WORD ITSELF IS UNLOVELY......Page 141
8. THE ESSENTIALIST ‘ MUST’ AND ‘ CAN’......Page 142
9. AVOIDING OVERSPECIFICITY, ALLOWING VAGUENESS......Page 144
10. OTHER DE RE NECESSITIES, REAL OR PUTATIVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER INQUIRY......Page 146
11. THE ESSENCES OF ARTEFACTS AND THE MATTER OF ARTEFACTS......Page 149
12. ONE SPECIAL KIND OF ARTEFACT: WORKS OF ART AND THE ESSENCES OF THESE......Page 152
1. ANTI-REALIST CONCEPTUALISM AND ANTI-CONCEPTUALIST REALISM......Page 155
2. FOUR CLARIFICATIONS......Page 158
3. A CONVENTIONALIST RECONSTRUCTION OF OUR MODAL CONVICTIONS: A CONCEPTUALIST ANTI-REALIST VIEW OF ESSENCE......Page 160
4. A HYPOTHESIS CONCERNING THE SOURCES OF ANTI-ESSENTIALISM......Page 163
5. AN EXAGGERATION OF CONCEPTUALISM, DEPRECATED AND CORRECTED IN THE LIGHT OF CERTAIN TRUISMS; AND THE REPLY TO THE ANTI-CONCEPTUALIST REALIST BEGUN......Page 164
6. THE PERFECT CONSONANCE OF SOBER REALISM AND SOBER CONCEPTUALISM......Page 167
7. THE REALIST REQUIREMENT RESTATED, REFURBISHED AND SATISFIED......Page 169
8. CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS......Page 171
1. THREE CONTRASTED VIEWS OF SINGLING OUT AN OBJECT......Page 173
2. BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE THOUGHT OF THE OBJECT......Page 175
3. SOME PUTATIVE EXAMPLES OF INDETERMINATE OBJECTS......Page 177
4. IF OBJECT a IS THE SAME AS OBJECT b, THEN a IS DETERMINATELY THE SAME AS b......Page 178
5. WHAT, IF ANYTHING, FOLLOWS FROM SUCH FORMAL DERIVATIONS?......Page 179
6. TREATMENT OF EXAMPLES ( a)(b)(c ) OF § 3......Page 183
7. SENSE AND POINT; AND SENSE AS THE WORK OF THE MIND......Page 187
8. ON THE LEVEL OF REFERENCE, THINGS CANNOT BE SIMPLY CONCEIVED INTO BEING OR POSTULATED INTO EXISTENCE ² NOT EVEN MATERIAL THINGS WITH MATTER PUTATIVELY READY AT HAND......Page 189
9. ONCE AGAIN ( ONE LAST TIME) THE THINGS TO WHICH SIMPLE IDENTITY SENTENCES MAKE A REFERENCE......Page 192
10. MORE ABOUT THE RELATION OF IDENTITY......Page 199
11. MIGHT IT EVER BE TRUE TO SAY THAT a WAS ALMOST b, THAT a WAS ALMOST NUMERICALLY IDENTICAL WITH b?......Page 204
12. CONCLUSION......Page 208
1. AN EXPEDITIOUS IF PRECIPITATE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY......Page 209
2. DOUBTS, AND ANSWERS TO DOUBTS: SUBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS......Page 210
3. THE LOCKEAN CONCEPTION; AND BUTLER’ S CRITICISMS OF SUCH CONCEPTIONS......Page 213
4. A NEO-LOCKEAN IDENTITY-CONDITION......Page 216
5. BUTLER’ S CENTRAL INSIGHT......Page 219
6. A NEO-LOCKEAN CONCEPTION......Page 221
7. UNFINISHED BUSINESS......Page 224
8. THE THESES TO BE ARGUED IN THIS CHAPTER......Page 227
9. CO-CONSCIOUSNESS AGAIN, AND QUASI-MEMORY......Page 228
10. A SECOND AND THIRD QUESTION ABOUT PARFIT’ S DEFINITION OF ‘ Q-REMEMBER’......Page 230
11. DIGRESSION: AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF DEFINITION, REVEALING BY ITS INADEQUACY THE SEMANTICAL POINT OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENTIAL MEMORY......Page 233
12. MORE ABOUT ‘ DEPENDENT IN THE RIGHT WAY’......Page 238
13. AS IT NOW APPEARS, THE STATE OF THE WHOLE ARGUMENT TO DATE......Page 241
14. PARTICIPATION IN THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE......Page 243
15. THE PENULTIMATE PROBLEM AND A VERDICT UPON IT, ALL LEADING IN DUE COURSE TO A REASSESSMENT OF THE ORIGINAL SHOEMAKER CASE 40......Page 247
16. BROWN-BROWNSON RECONSIDERED......Page 248
17. ONE LAST VARIANT ² AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL MORAL OF SAME. FINALLY, HUMAN PERSONS AS ARTEFACTS?......Page 252
Select bibliography......Page 261
Index of names of persons cited or mentioned......Page 267
Index of content (themes, theses, examples, etc)......Page 269