Ruling the World?: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 11
Preface:International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize?......Page 13
Acknowledgments......Page 17
Part I: What Is Constitutionalization beyond the State?......Page 19
Introduction......Page 21
A. Globalization......Page 23
B. Fragmentation......Page 24
II. The Functional Dimensions of International Constitutionalization: Enabling, Constraining, and Supplemental Constitutionalization......Page 27
A. Enabling Constitutionalization......Page 28
B. Constraining Constitutionalization......Page 29
C. Supplemental Constitutionalization......Page 32
III. The Mechanisms of Constitutionalization......Page 36
IV. Domestic and International Constitutionalization and Democratic Legitimacy......Page 43
V. A Preliminary Constitutional Matrix......Page 44
VI. Constitutional Coordination, Constitutional Pluralism, and Constitutional Synthesis......Page 48
Conclusion......Page 51
Is the International Legal System a Constitution for International Society?......Page 54
Introduction: How Little We Know......Page 55
Earlier Efforts to Reimagine the Legal World and the World in Legal Terms......Page 61
Comparative Evaluation: Things We Should Be Sure to See......Page 72
Constitutionalism as Global Governance......Page 78
Constitution or Not, Global Governance Will Be Transformed......Page 83
Constitutionalism and Fragmentation of the International Legal System......Page 87
1. International Law as a System......Page 90
2. Institutionalism and Constitutionalism......Page 93
3. Chaos or System: The Fragmentation Debate......Page 100
III. Substantive Constitutional Principles and the International Legal System......Page 105
1. Jus Cogens and the Basic Principles of International Law......Page 106
2. From Form to Substance: Constitutional Principles......Page 108
a. Democracy......Page 112
b. Rechtsstaat and Rule of Law......Page 115
c. Separation of Powers......Page 118
d. From State Rights to World Federalism?......Page 119
e. Human Rights: Toward Protection before International Organizations......Page 121
f. Equality and Solidarity......Page 123
g. Conclusion......Page 124
IV. Conclusion and Outlook: From Formal to Substantial Constitutionalism......Page 125
Part II: The Constitutional Dimensions of Specific International Regimes......Page 129
4. The UN Charter - A Global Constitution?......Page 131
The UN Charter: Supra over Some and Less So for Others......Page 134
The International Civil Servant as Neutral Man......Page 137
Transitional Peace Operations Authority......Page 139
The MDGs: Road Map to Confrontation......Page 143
Conclusion......Page 149
5. Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the UN Charter in the International Legal Order......Page 151
An Almost-Forgotten Constitution and the Keeper of the Truth......Page 152
The UN Charter as a Constitution: A Functionalist Approach......Page 155
Rules of Positive International Law Recognizing the UN Charter......Page 159
Interpretation of the Primary Role of the UN Charter by Legal Science......Page 162
The European Union......Page 166
A. Introduction: Disputing the European Constitution......Page 167
B. Constitutional Framing......Page 171
C. The EU Constitutional Frame......Page 180
D. Framing the Future......Page 187
The World Trade Organization......Page 195
I. Introduction......Page 196
II. Is the WTO a Constitutionalized Regime?......Page 198
A. Enabling Constitutionalization......Page 199
B. Constraining Constitutionalization......Page 201
III. Competing Conceptions of the WTOs Constitution in Trade Scholarship......Page 202
A. Institutional Architecture as Constitution......Page 203
B. The Constitutional Entrenchment of Normative Values......Page 205
C. Constitutionalization through Judicial Mediation......Page 207
IV. What Is the Relationship between Constitutionalization and International Trade Politics?......Page 210
V. The Allure of Constitutional Discourse......Page 214
A. Responding to Fragmentation: International Trade Law as First among Equals?......Page 215
B. A Strategy of Resistance: Constraining the Trade Regime......Page 216
C. A Compensatory Mechanism?......Page 217
VI. Toward a New Wave of Constitutionalism Scholarship......Page 220
Conclusion......Page 222
a. Globalization......Page 224
b. Unbalanced Demand for International Law......Page 226
2. Constitutional Economics......Page 230
3. Application of the Method of Constitutional Economics to the WTO......Page 234
a. WTO Decision Making......Page 235
b. Accountability and the Democratic Deficit......Page 238
c. WTO Dispute Settlement, Supremacy, and Direct Effect......Page 240
d. Fragmentation and the WTO......Page 241
e. Trade and Redistribution......Page 244
f. The WTO Demos?......Page 245
4. Conclusion: The Level of Analysis Problem......Page 246
Part III: Crosscutting Issues......Page 249
I. Introduction......Page 251
II. How Different Are the Two Systems?......Page 253
A. Is Human Rights Law International Constitutional Law?......Page 256
B. The Human Rights System as a Constitutionalized Regime of International Law......Page 263
C. Human Rights and the Constitutionalization of International Law......Page 267
III. Why Have Two Systems?......Page 269
IV. Conclusion......Page 274
1. Constitutionalism beyond the State? The Skeptics Challenge......Page 276
2. Clarifying the Stakes: A Clash of Constitutional Paradigms......Page 281
3. The Idea of a Constitutional Paradigm and Its Connection to Constitutional Practice......Page 284
II. The Structure of Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism......Page 290
1. The Construction of Legal Authority: Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism as a Framework for Legal Pluralism......Page 291
a. Beyond Monism and Dualism: Constitutionalism as a Principled Framework for Legal Pluralism......Page 292
b. Constitutional Pluralism in Context: The European Court of Human Rights, the European Union, and the United Nations......Page 297
c. The Structure of Legal Authority: The Techniques and Distinctions of Graduated Authority......Page 307
2. Complex Procedural Legitimacy: Subsidiarity, Due Process, and Democracy......Page 308
a. Jurisdictional Legitimacy: From Sovereignty to Subsidiarity......Page 309
b. Due Process I: The Connection between Subsidiarity and Democracy......Page 314
c. Due Process II: Procedural Standards of Good Governance......Page 319
a. Rights and Public Reason......Page 321
b. Rights, Courts, and Legislatures......Page 323
c. The Relationship between National and International Rights Practice......Page 324
III.  Criticisms and Challenges to Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism......Page 328
1. Is Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism \"Hard Law\" or Just an Ideal?......Page 329
2. Is It Morally Attractive, Given the Normative Commitments That People Actually Have?......Page 331
3. Even If Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism Fits Practice and Is Generally Morally Attractive, Are the Assumptions It Makes about International Law Realistic?......Page 334
4. What Makes the Cosmopolitan Paradigm Constitutional Properly So Called?......Page 338
IV. Conclusions......Page 341
Navigating Constitutional Pluralism......Page 343
I. Introduction......Page 344
II. Constitutionalism and Pluralism: The European Union and the United States Compared......Page 347
III. Managing Pluralism in the European Union and the United States......Page 354
A. Voice......Page 356
B. Expertise......Page 362
C. Rights......Page 366
IV. Conclusion......Page 371
12. Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism......Page 374
Reasoning with Pluralism......Page 379
Institutional Choices and Judicial Dialogues......Page 389
The Puzzle of Democratic Legitimacy......Page 398
Introduction......Page 399
a. Concepts......Page 403
b. Conceptions......Page 406
a. From the Material Constitutions of International Law......Page 407
b. To the Formal Constitutions of International Law......Page 410
a. The International Community qua Community of Communities......Page 411
i.  The International Community as Political Community......Page 414
ii.  The International Community as Self-Constituting Political Community......Page 416
4. Internal Implications of International Constitutional Pluralism......Page 417
a. Vertical Internal Constitutional Pluralism......Page 418
b. Horizontal Internal Constitutional Pluralism......Page 419
a. Validity and External Constitutional Pluralism......Page 420
b. Rank and External Constitutional Pluralism......Page 421
6. Conclusion......Page 424
Index......Page 427