Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources

Front Cover\r......Page 1
Title Page\r......Page 4
Copyright......Page 5
Preface......Page 6
Contents......Page 10
Tables......Page 14
Figures......Page 16
Part 1. Theoretical Background\r......Page 18
CHAPTER 1 Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resource Problems\r......Page 20
CHAPTER 2 Institutional Analysis and Common-Pool Resources\r......Page 40
CHAPTER 3 Games Appropriators Play\r......Page 68
CHAPTER 4 Rules and Games\r......Page 92
Part 2. Experimental Studies\r......Page 116
CHAPTER 5 CPR Baseline Appropriation Experiments\r......Page 122
CHAPTER 6 Probabilistic Destruction of the CPR\r......Page 146
CHAPTER 7\rCommunication in the Commons......Page 162
CHAPTER 8 Sanctioning and Communication Institutions\r......Page 188
CHAPTER 9 Regularities from the Laboratory and Possible Explanations\r......Page 212
Part 3 Field Studies\r......Page 238
CHAPTER 10 Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems\r......Page 242
CHAPTER 11 Fishers\' Institutional Responses to Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas\r......Page 264
CHAPTER 12 Rules, Rule Making, and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit between Rule Systems and Resource Use\r......Page 284
CHAPTER 13 Changing Rules, Changing Games: Evidence from Groundwater Systems in Southern California\r......Page 300
CHAPTER 14 Regularities from the Field and Possible Explanations\r......Page 318
CHAPTER 15 Cooperation and Social Capital\r......Page 336
Bibliography......Page 348
Contributors......Page 378
Index......Page 380
Back Cover\r......Page 387