Risk, Ambiguity and Decision (Studies in Philosophy)

Studies in Philosophy......Page 2
Risk, Ambiguity and Decision......Page 3
Contents......Page 6
DECISION MAKING WHEN PROBABILITIES ARE INDETERMINATE......Page 8
THE BERNOULLI PROPOSITION......Page 10
PROBABILITY AND IGNORANCE......Page 21
EARLY SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE BERNOULLI PROPOSITION: ORDINALISM......Page 12
VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITY......Page 13
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY AND THE BERNOULLI PROPOSITION......Page 14
INDETERMINACY IN PROBABILITY JUDGMENT......Page 15
THE SURE THING PRINCIPLE......Page 17
UNCERTAIN PROSPECTS THAT ARE NOT RISKS......Page 18
THE THREE-COLOR URN PROBLEM......Page 19
THE RESTRICTED BAYES/HURWICZ CRITERION......Page 25
INDETERMINACY IN PROBABILITY AND THE VON NEUMANN- MORGENSTERN AXIOMS.......Page 26
THE ALLAIS PROBLEM......Page 27
COMMENTS......Page 29
REFERENCES......Page 34
Further Readings on Choice Under Uncertainty, Beliefs and the Ellsberg Paradox......Page 37
2. BOOKS OF READINGS......Page 38
3. RESEARCH ARTICLES......Page 39
Acknowledgments......Page 47
Note to Reader......Page 49
AMBIGUITY AND RISK......Page 52
VAGUENESS, CONFIDENCE AND THE WEIGHT OF ARGUMENTS......Page 57
THE NATURE AND USES OF NORMATIVE THEORY......Page 68
THE VALIDATION OF NORMATIVE PROPOSITIONS......Page 73
THE UTILITY AXIOMS AS NORMS......Page 77
NORMATIVE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH......Page 81
THE BERNOULLI PROPOSITION......Page 88
A POSSIBLE COUNTEREXAMPLE: ARE THERE UNCERTAINTIES THAT ARE NOT RISKS?......Page 93
VULGAR EVALUATIONS OF RISK......Page 96
THE MEASUREMENT OF DEFINITE OPINIONS......Page 104
VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN UTILITIES......Page 107
PROBABILITY AS PRICE......Page 108
" COHERENCE"AND " DEFINITENESS"OF PROBABILITY- PRICES......Page 116
ON MAKING A FOOL OF ONESELF: THE REQUIREMENT OF COHERENCE......Page 126
ACCEPTABLE ODDS: DEFINITE, COHERENT, AND OTHERWISE......Page 132
OPINIONS AND ACTIONS: WHICH COME FIRST?......Page 142
THE LOGIC OF DEGREES OF BELIEF......Page 144
OPINIONS THAT MAKE HORSE RACES......Page 148
POSTULATE 2: THE "SURE-THING PRINCIPLE"......Page 157
INTUITIVE PROBABILITIES AND "VAGUENESS""......Page 166
Appendix to Chapter Four......Page 177
UNCERTAINTIES THAT ARE NOT RISKS......Page 182
THE "THREE-COLOR URN" EXAMPLE......Page 188
VULGAR EVALUATIONS OF AMBIGUITY......Page 194
THEOREM 1:......Page 201
THEOREM 2......Page 203
THEOREM 3......Page 204
WHY ARE SOME UNCERTAINTIES NOT RISKS?......Page 207
DECISION CRITERIA FOR " COMPLETE IGNORANCE"......Page 210
DECISION CRITERIA FOR "PARTIAL IGNORANCE"......Page 221
THE "RESTRICTED HURWICZ CRITERIONN......Page 230
THE "RESTRICTED BAYES/HURWICZ CRITERION"......Page 241
BOLDNESS AND PRUDENCE: THE "N-COLOR URN" EXAMPLE......Page 250
IGNORANCE, PROBABILITY, AND THE VARIETIES OF GAMBLERS......Page 260
AMBIGUITY AND THE UTILITY AXIOMS......Page 271
THE PRATT/RAIFFA CRITICISMS AND......Page 282
RUBIN'S AXIOM......Page 298
ALLAIS AND THE SURE-THING PRINCIPLE......Page 307
WINNING AT RUSSIAN ROULETTE......Page 316
Bibliography......Page 322