Representational Content and the Objects of Thought

Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations
1 Introduction
	Reference
2 Narrow Representational Content
	2.1 Narrow Content and Wide Content: The Initial Picture
	2.2 A Complication
	2.3 Representational Content
	2.4 Truth and Representational Content
	2.5 Jackson on Representational Content
	2.6 Chalmers on Subjunctive Content and Epistemic Content
		2.6.1 Subjunctive Content as Wide Content
		2.6.2 Epistemic Content as Narrow Content
		2.6.3 Truth Conditions and CFT
	2.7 Internalism and CFT
	2.8 Conclusion
	References
3 Narrow Content and Propositions
	3.1 The Traditional Doctrine of Belief
	3.2 CFT and the Traditional Doctrine of Belief
	3.3 The Case for Relativized Propositions
		3.3.1 Different Conceptions of Relativized Propositions
		3.3.2 Why Believe in Relativized Propositions?
	3.4 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions as Sets of Centered Worlds (and as Functions from Centered Worlds to Truth Values)
	3.5 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions and, Consequently, Internalism
		3.5.1 The Argument Against Relativized Propositions
		3.5.2 Premise (5)
		3.5.3 Premise (6)
		3.5.4 Internalism and the Argument Against Relativized Propositions
	3.6 Conclusion
	References
4 Private Propositions
	4.1 The Fregean Argument for Private Propositions
	4.2 Objections to the Fregean Argument for Private Propositions
	4.3 In Defense of Private Propositions
		4.3.1 Distinguishing Between Private Propositions
		4.3.2 Private Propositions as Incommunicable
		4.3.3 Private Propositions as not Worth the Cost
	4.4 In Defense of Egocentric Externalism
	4.5 Conclusion
	References
5 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents
	5.1 Thinking as Relational and Thinking about Nonexistents
	5.2 The Magician Argument
	5.3 Formally Analyzing the Magician Argument
	5.4 The Straightforward Analysis
	5.5 Kriegel’s Monadic Adverbialism
	5.6 Thinking by Proxy
	5.7 Generalizing about Generalizing
	5.8 The Magician Argument Arguments
	5.9 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents
	5.10 What We’re Thinking about When We Think We’re Thinking about Nonexistents
	5.11 Conclusion
	References
6 Against Necessary Existence
	6.1 The Argument from Propositions
	6.2 Necessitism, Necessitarianism, and Events
	6.3 Implications from the Varieties of Views on Propositions
		6.3.1 Propositions as Sets of Possible Worlds
		6.3.2 Propositions as Structured
		6.3.3 Propositions as Action Types
		6.3.4 Propositions as Simple
	6.4 The Argument from Propositions Is, at Best, Unmotivated
	6.5 The Argument from Propositions Is Unsound
	6.6 Conclusion
	References
7 Conclusion
Appendix A: Two Revised Arguments for CFT
Appendix B: Another Argument from Propositions
Name Index
Subject Index