Reference without Referents

Contents......Page 14
1 A short history of theories of names......Page 18
1.1.1 Connotation and denotation......Page 19
1.1.2 Lack of denotation; sameness of denotation......Page 23
1.2.1 Frege’s puzzle......Page 25
1.2.2 Identity......Page 27
1.2.3 Idiosyncrasies of sense......Page 30
1.2.4 Sense without a referent......Page 33
1.3.1 ‘Logically proper’ names and knowledge by acquaintance......Page 36
1.3.2 Russell on ordinary proper names......Page 41
1.4 Saul Kripke......Page 44
1.5.1 Understanding and truth theories......Page 50
1.5.2 Axioms for names......Page 52
1.5.3 De re senses......Page 58
1.6 The Road Ahead......Page 61
2 Framework issues......Page 64
2.1 Truth theory......Page 65
2.2 Russellian propositions......Page 77
2.3 Negative free logic (NFL)......Page 81
2.4 Ontology......Page 92
2.5 Rigidity and the essence of reference......Page 93
2.6 Notions resembling rigidity......Page 98
3.1 Prima facie considerations in favour of intelligible empty names......Page 103
3.2 Names name......Page 108
3.3 Evans and Russellian names......Page 111
3.4 Alternatives to RWR......Page 114
3.5 Baptism......Page 123
3.6 Transmission......Page 128
3.6.1 Initiation......Page 130
3.6.2 Continued participation......Page 133
3.6.3 A referent is forever?......Page 136
3.7 Vagaries in name-using practices......Page 139
4.1.1 Some kinds of dependence......Page 142
4.1.2 Dependent unbound pronouns are referring expressions......Page 147
4.1.3 Evans’s proposal......Page 149
4.1.4 Intention, speaker’s referent, and salience......Page 153
4.1.5 Evans’s account amended......Page 156
4.1.6 Understanding dependent pronouns......Page 160
4.1.7 Interpretation and individual concepts......Page 163
4.1.8 Interpretation and truth conditions......Page 167
4.2.1 Introduction......Page 170
4.2.2 Understanding and identification......Page 171
4.2.3 Understanding and theories of meaning......Page 174
4.2.4 Conditional truth conditions......Page 175
4.2.6 Understanding without identification?......Page 180
4.2.7 Understanding empty demonstratives......Page 183
4.3 Main themes reviewed......Page 186
5.1 Compound names......Page 187
5.2.1 Introduction......Page 191
5.2.2 Examples of referential axioms......Page 193
5.2.3 Intentions......Page 196
5.2.4 Donnellan and the referential/attributive distinction......Page 205
5.2.5 Plural and mass descriptions......Page 208
6 Existence and fiction......Page 212
6.1 Existence and scope......Page 213
6.2 A second-level approach......Page 215
6.3 A simple RWR account of fiction......Page 219
6.4 Fictional characters......Page 226
7 Mental reference and individual concepts......Page 233
7.1 Development and individual concepts......Page 234
7.2 The nature of individual concepts......Page 238
7.2.1 Concepts and information: addition and subtraction......Page 239
7.2.2 Information and sortals......Page 241
7.2.3 Individual concepts and discriminating knowledge......Page 243
7.2.4 Concepts and recognition......Page 246
7.2.5 Principles governing the reference of individual concepts......Page 249
7.2.6 Individual concepts without a referent......Page 252
7.2.8 The determination of reference......Page 255
7.2.9 Acquaintance versus description as ways of thinking of objects......Page 257
7.3.1 The issue......Page 259
7.3.2 Problems for ‘generalism’ (the view that all perceptual contents are general)......Page 263
7.3.3 Hallucination and two kinds of singularism: DR (direct reference) and RWR......Page 269
References......Page 272
H......Page 278
P......Page 279
Y......Page 280