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ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Gordon W. Rudd
سری:
ISBN (شابک) : 9780700627370, 2010048252
ناشر: University Press of Kansas
سال نشر: 2011
تعداد صفحات:
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : EPUB (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 9 Mb
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Reconstructing Iraq: Regime Change, Jay Garner, and the ORHA Story به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب بازسازی عراق: تغییر رژیم، جی گارنر، و داستان ORHA نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
زمانی که رئیس جمهور جورج دبلیو بوش روی عرشه های ایالات متحده ایستاد. لینکلن در می 2003 و پایان پیروزمندانه عملیات های رزمی بزرگ در عراق را اعلام کرد، او این کار را در مقابل یک بنر بزرگ که "ماموریت انجام شد" را اعلام کرد. \"
When President George W. Bush stood on the decks of the U.S.S.
Lincoln in May 2003 and announced the victorious end to major
combat operations in Iraq, he did so in front of a huge banner
that proclaimed "Mission Accomplished." American forces had
successfully removed the regime of Saddam Hussein with "rapid
decisive operations"—and yet the United States was
unprepared to effectively replace that regime. Gordon Rudd's
excellent history reveals why in stark detail.
Between the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the creation of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that May, the Allied
forces struggled to plug the governance gap created by the
removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plugging that gap became
the job of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance. Cobbled together with staff from diverse federal
agencies and military branches, ORHA was led by Jay Garner, a
key figure in assisting Kurdish refugees following Operation
Desert Storm in 1991. Garner and ORHA were given mere weeks to
stabilize a nation that had come completely apart at the seams.
Iraq's infrastructure was in such a shambles-thanks to years of
poor maintenance, international sanctions, and massive
looting-that the mission was doomed to fail from the
start.
Rudd, field historian for ORHA and CPA, offers a critical look
at this impossible effort. He shows that, while military
planning for the invasion of Iraq had been conducted for over a
decade, planning for regime replacement was haphazard at best.
The result was an unnecessarily large loss of lives, treasure,
time, and American prestige, despite the inspired efforts of
Garner and his staff. Based on nearly 300 interviews and time
on the ground in Iraq, Rudd's account also provides an
unsettling look at the awkward transition from ORHA to CPA,
revealing how Ambassador Paul Bremer managed to make things
even worse.
Garner here emerges as both heroic and tragic, a charismatic
leader of great enthusiasm who took on a task of grand
proportions but was poorly served by those who chose him for
the mission. As Rudd makes clear, the key lesson of this
experience is that regime removal solves nothing without
effective regime replacement. That lesson, learned the hard
way, serves as a cautionary tale for our engagement in future
foreign conflicts.