Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 9
1 Introduction......Page 11
POSTSCRIPT: SOME TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH......Page 18
REFERENCES......Page 22
PART ONE SOME PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRENDS IN THEIR EVOLUTION......Page 23
NEGATIVE ADVERTISING AND THE QUALITY OF ELECTIONS......Page 25
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE......Page 26
IDEOLOGY......Page 27
MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS......Page 33
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAME BETWEEN CANDIDATES FOR THE VOTERS......Page 36
CONCLUSION......Page 38
REFERENCES......Page 39
INTRODUCTION......Page 40
WHEN PUBLIC DISCOURSE IS JUST CONSUMPTION......Page 43
Noncooperative Contributions......Page 44
Optimal Contributions......Page 45
Public Space......Page 46
WHEN DISCOURSE ALSO MATTERS FOR GROWTH......Page 47
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? SPORTS, WWW, OR IDIOCY?......Page 50
APPENDIX......Page 51
REFERENCES......Page 52
INTRODUCTION: IMPLICIT ASSUMPTIONS IN DEMOCRATIC ANALYSIS......Page 54
Indecisiveness and Majority Rule......Page 57
Institutionally Induced Stability......Page 58
Culturally Induced Stability......Page 59
AVOIDING THE REDISTRIBUTIVE POVERTY TRAP......Page 61
The Meltzer-Richard Model and the Majoritarian Poverty Trap......Page 62
Economic Escape from the Majoritarian Poverty Trap: A Broad Middle Class......Page 64
Constitutional and Cultural Escapes from the Majoritarian Poverty Trap......Page 65
CAN WINNER TAKE ALL ELECTIONS BE AVOIDED?......Page 68
Avoiding Majoritarian Takeovers – Binding Electoral Winners......Page 69
How to Guarantee Constitutional Guarantees?......Page 70
Cultural Support for Electoral Competition......Page 71
Reducing Electoral Opposition to the Next Election......Page 72
CONCLUSION: HOW DIFFICULT IS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE?......Page 74
REFERENCES......Page 75
INTRODUCTION: REDISCOVERING CIVIL SOCIETY......Page 78
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: AN HAYEKIAN APPROACH......Page 80
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS ENGINEERED BY CIVIL SOCIETY......Page 82
Relational Networks and the Spontaneous Maintenance of “Cooperation Rules”......Page 83
The Emergence of Relational Rules......Page 86
Degeneration of Informal and Formal Rules......Page 89
Institutional Dissatisfaction: Voice or Exit?......Page 90
Marginality and Incivilities......Page 92
The Rationality of Civil Engagement......Page 93
ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE CHOICE BETWEEN POLITICAL SOCIETY AND CIVIL SOCIETY......Page 94
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY......Page 95
CONCLUSION: THE STRENGTH OF THE INVISIBLE HAND......Page 96
REFERENCES......Page 97
PART TWO MORALS IN POLITICS......Page 101
6 When Does Altruism Overcome the Intransitivity of Income Redistribution?......Page 103
THE THEORETICAL MODEL......Page 104
DISCUSSION......Page 108
REFERENCES......Page 110
INTRODUCTION......Page 111
SOME IDEAS......Page 114
Virtue......Page 115
Economizing on Virtue......Page 118
Economizing in Use......Page 119
Economizing in Allocation......Page 120
Institutions That Employ Virtue......Page 121
Screening......Page 122
Virtue Enhancing......Page 123
Virtue Producing......Page 124
TWO-TIER REPRESENTATION......Page 125
The Homo Oeconomicus Case......Page 126
The Partly Virtuous Case......Page 129
OVERVIEW......Page 131
REFERENCES......Page 132
PART THREE SOCIAL CAPITAL......Page 133
INTRODUCTION......Page 135
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOLIDARITY......Page 136
THE PRODUCTION OF TRUST......Page 140
TRADE IN BELIEFS......Page 141
THE GENERAL WILL......Page 147
CONDORCET......Page 148
THE OPTIMUM LEVEL OF SOLIDARITY......Page 150
CONTAGION: SOCIAL CAPITAL AND DEMOCRACY......Page 152
CONCLUSION......Page 153
REFERENCES......Page 154
INTRODUCTION......Page 157
Bonds......Page 158
Three Categories Difficult to Reconcile with Homo Oeconomicus......Page 159
Some Methodological Issues......Page 161
Delineating Bonds......Page 163
On Bonds and Related Concepts......Page 167
Constitutional Democracy......Page 170
On the Preconditions for Establishing Sustainable Democracy: Bonds as Exogenous Variables......Page 171
On the Repercussions of Democracy: Bonds as Endogenous Variables......Page 176
OPEN QUESTIONS......Page 180
REFERENCES......Page 181
PART FOUR THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONS......Page 185
INTRODUCTION: STABILITY AND CHANGE OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS......Page 187
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF VOTING RULES: WHOSE CALCULUS OF CONSENT?......Page 189
Origin and Evolution of Electoral Rules......Page 190
THE ‘‘PARADOX OF DELEGATION’’ AND THE INNER TENSION OF THE POLITICAL PROXY......Page 192
Political Bond versus Voters’ Controlling Power......Page 193
STAGES OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ASYMMETRIC MISTRUST......Page 195
REDUCING INCUMBENTS’ UNCERTAINTY VIA VOTERS’ ENTRAPMENT: A CONVERGENT PATH......Page 198
The Convergence of the Seat/Vote Ratio......Page 200
EFFICIENT UNCERTAINTY AND POLITICAL RESPONSIVENESS......Page 201
A Modest Proposal......Page 202
THE QUANDARY OF STABILITY VERSUS CHANGE OF RULES......Page 203
REFERENCES......Page 204
INTRODUCTION......Page 208
DEMOCRACY AS A COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE: THE NOTION OF CITIZEN SOVEREIGNTY......Page 210
MUTUAL ADVANTAGE AND VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT IN POLITICS......Page 212
COMPLEX EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS......Page 215
ORIGINAL AND CONTINUING AGREEMENT......Page 217
OPPORTUNISM AND RENEGOTIATION......Page 221
RE-NEGOTIATION IN TRANSACTION-COMMITMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENTS......Page 223
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS: ONGOING AGREEMENT AND STRATEGIC BARGAINING......Page 227
REFERENCES......Page 230
INTRODUCTION......Page 232
PREFERENCES......Page 233
The General Framework......Page 235
Comparative Statics......Page 241
The General Framework......Page 244
Some Comparative Statics......Page 250
COMPARING THE OUTCOME OF COMPENSATION IN THE TWO MODELS......Page 253
CONCLUSION......Page 254
REFERENCES......Page 255
Index......Page 257