Public Opinion and the International Use of Force (Routledge Ecpr Studies in European Political Science)

Book Cover......Page 1
Half-Title......Page 2
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 13
Editors’ preface......Page 18
A confusing debate......Page 20
Limitations of the debate......Page 23
Four issues......Page 24
What we know and do not know: five sets of questions......Page 25
The concept of public opinion and how to study it......Page 26
The characteristics of public opinion: a new approach......Page 27
The nature and content of public opinion on foreign policy......Page 29
Explaining the structure and correlates of foreign policy beliefs......Page 31
The opinion-policy connection......Page 33
The use of force and the ‘casualty hypothesis’......Page 36
Outline of this book......Page 41
Notes......Page 44
Part I Determinants and correlates of support for the use of force......Page 47
The structure of foreign policy attitudes......Page 48
The role of motivational dispositions......Page 49
Motive dispositions......Page 50
Basic motivation as a source of foreign policy opinions: an analytical framework......Page 51
Three dimensions......Page 53
Examining the structure of public opinion......Page 57
The CCFR data......Page 58
The analysis......Page 60
Predicting the content of public opinion......Page 66
Conclusion......Page 68
Notes......Page 70
Introduction......Page 73
Overview of German out-of-area missions......Page 75
The study of foreign policy and security attitudes......Page 77
Data and method......Page 81
The future foreign and defence policy tasks......Page 83
The willingness to defend the country......Page 86
Support for out-of-area missions......Page 88
Determinants of the willingness of active defence and support of foreign deployments......Page 91
Summary......Page 97
Notes......Page 98
Independent variables......Page 99
Dependent variables......Page 100
Potential explanatory factors......Page 102
Support for the use of force in different situations......Page 103
Trieste......Page 105
The Middle East and Libya......Page 107
Two cases of war......Page 109
The Gulf War......Page 110
Kosovo......Page 115
Bosnia......Page 119
Concluding observations......Page 122
Notes......Page 128
Introduction: a new rationale......Page 131
UNPROFOR: the first test......Page 132
Determinants of mission support......Page 136
Dependent:......Page 137
Independent:......Page 139
Mission support and mission success......Page 142
IFOR: a quiet mission......Page 143
Risks......Page 144
Kosovo: no conclusion......Page 146
Discussion......Page 147
Appendix......Page 148
Notes......Page 152
Part II Public opinion and policy making on the use of force......Page 154
Introduction: the concept of neutrality......Page 155
Irish neutrality in a changing international context......Page 156
Neutrality and membership of the EEC......Page 157
Ireland and the European security architecture......Page 159
Ireland and NATO......Page 160
A flexible concept......Page 161
Public opinion: neutrality and peacekeeping......Page 162
The meaning of neutrality......Page 163
Neutrality and European integration......Page 166
Organised public opinion......Page 168
The opinion—policy relationship......Page 169
Notes......Page 172
Primary sources......Page 175
Secondary sources......Page 176
Introduction: coping with change......Page 177
Public opinion and foreign and security policy making......Page 179
Israeli security outlook: a brief historical background......Page 180
The Israeli security agenda......Page 184
The strategic beliefs structure......Page 185
The operational beliefs structure......Page 190
Moving away from war?......Page 194
Notes......Page 197
Introduction: the public and the use of force......Page 200
General trends on the use of force......Page 201
Support for peace operations......Page 204
The casualty hypothesis......Page 206
An explanation for rising scepticism on the part of the public about peace operations......Page 207
The public’s influence on the decision-making process......Page 208
When decision makers try to anticipate the public’s reactions: the case of the Gulf War......Page 209
Public opinion as a catalyst? Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda......Page 210
Symbolic actions to contain public opinion: François Mitterrand’s partial concessions in ex-Yugoslavia......Page 212
The executive’s margin of freedom......Page 213
Notes......Page 215
Introduction......Page 218
Belief that fatalities will result in majority demand to withdraw immediately......Page 219
Effect on policy......Page 223
Somalia......Page 225
Gulf War......Page 227
Saudi Arabia......Page 229
Lebanon......Page 230
Perceived fatalities in Bosnia......Page 231
Hypothetical scenarios......Page 233
Conclusion......Page 236
Notes......Page 237
Introduction......Page 241
Support for the air strikes......Page 243
Send ground troops?......Page 245
Bombing or other strategies?......Page 249
(1) The nature of the interests involved and the legitimacy of the action......Page 251
(2) Support for the casualty hypothesis?......Page 254
(3) The effectiveness of the action......Page 260
Some general conclusions......Page 262
Appendix......Page 265
Notes......Page 269
Introduction......Page 272
(1) The content and nature of public opinion......Page 273
(2) The opinion—policy relationship......Page 277
(3) The ‘casualty hypothesis’......Page 281
Some concluding observations......Page 283
Bibliography......Page 284
Index......Page 297