Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition

Title Page......Page 3
Dedication......Page 9
Introduction......Page 10
Introduction to the Paperback Edition......Page 26
PART ONE - Political Liberalism: Basic Elements......Page 43
§ 1. Addressing Two Fundamental Questions......Page 44
§ 2. The Idea of a Political Conception of Justice......Page 49
§ 3. The Idea of Society as a Fair System of Cooperation......Page 52
§ 4. The Idea of the Original Position......Page 57
§ 5. The Political Conception of the Person......Page 62
§ 6. The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society......Page 67
§ 7. Neither a Community nor an Association......Page 71
§ 8. On the Use of Abstract Conceptions......Page 73
§ 1. The Reasonable and the Rational......Page 77
§ 2. The Burdens of Judgment......Page 81
§ 3. Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines......Page 85
§ 4. The Publicity Condition: Its Three Levels......Page 91
§ 5. Rational Autonomy: Artificial not Political......Page 96
§ 6. Full Autonomy: Political not Ethical......Page 101
§ 7. The Basis of Moral Motivation in the Person......Page 104
§ 8. Moral Psychology: Philosophical not Psychological......Page 108
§ 1. The Idea of a Constructivist Conception......Page 111
§ 2. Kant’s Moral Constructivism......Page 117
§ 3. Justice as Fairness as a Constructivist View......Page 120
§ 4. Role of Conceptions of Society and Person......Page 124
§ 5. Three Conceptions of Objectivity......Page 127
§ 6. Objectivity Independent of the Causal View of Knowledge......Page 132
§ 7. When Do Objective Reasons Exist, Politically Speaking?......Page 134
§ 8: The Scope of Political Constructivism......Page 139
PART TWO - Political Liberalism: Three Main Ideas......Page 144
§ 1. How Is Political Liberalism Possible?......Page 145
§ 2. The Question of Stability......Page 150
§ 3. Three Features of an Overlapping Consensus......Page 153
§ 4. An Overlapping Consensus not Indifferent or Skeptical......Page 157
§ 5. A Political Conception Need not be Comprehensive......Page 160
§ 6. Steps to Constitutional Consensus......Page 163
§ 7. Steps to Overlapping Consensus......Page 168
§ 8. Conception and Doctrines: How Related?......Page 172
LECTURE V - The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good......Page 176
§ 1. How a Political Conception Limits Conceptions of the Good......Page 177
§ 2. Goodness as Rationality......Page 179
§ 3. Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparisons......Page 181
§ 4. Primary Goods as Citizens’ Needs......Page 187
§ 5. Permissible Conceptions of the Good and Political Virtues......Page 190
§ 6. Is Justice as Fairness Fair to Conceptions of the Good?......Page 194
§ 7. The Good of Political Society......Page 198
§ 8. That Justice as Fairness is Complete......Page 203
§ 1. The Questions and Forums of Public Reason......Page 207
§ 2. Public Reason and the Ideal of Democratic Citizenship......Page 209
§ 3. Nonpublic Reasons......Page 212
§ 4. The Content of Public Reason......Page 214
§ 5. The Idea of Constitutional Essentials......Page 218
§ 6. The Supreme Court as Exemplar of Public Reason......Page 221
§ 7. Apparent Difficulties with Public Reason......Page 227
§ 8. The Limits of Public Reason......Page 232
PART THREE - Institutional Framework......Page 238
§1. First Subject of Justice......Page 239
§ 2. Unity by Appropriate Sequence......Page 241
§ 3. Libertarianism Has No Special Role for the Basic Structure......Page 244
§ 4. The Importance of Background Justice......Page 247
§ 5. How the Basic Structure Affects Individuals......Page 250
§ 6. Initial Agreement as Hypothetical and Nonhistorical......Page 252
§ 7. Special Features of the Initial Agreement......Page 255
§ 8. The Social Nature of Human Relationships......Page 258
§ 9. Ideal Form for the Basic Structure......Page 261
§ 10. Reply to Hegel’s Criticism......Page 265
§ 1. The Initial Aim of justice as Fairness......Page 269
§ 2. The Special Status of Basic Liberties......Page 272
§ 3. Conceptions of Person and Social Cooperation......Page 276
§ 4. The Original Position......Page 280
§ 5. Priority of Liberties, I: Second Moral Power......Page 285
§ 6. Priority of Liberties, II: First Moral Power......Page 289
§ 7. Basic Liberties not Merely Formal......Page 297
§ 8. A Fully Adequate Scheme of Basic Liberties......Page 302
§ 9. How Liberties Fit into One Coherent Scheme......Page 305
§ 10. Free Political Speech......Page 310
§ 11. The Clear and Present Danger Rule......Page 316
§ 12. Maintaining the Fair Value of Political Liberties......Page 323
§ 13. Liberties Connected with the Second Principle......Page 328
§ 14. The Role of Justice as Fairness......Page 332
LECTURE IX - Reply to Habermas......Page 336
§ I. Two Main Differences......Page 337
§ 2. Overlapping Consensus and Justification......Page 345
§ 3. Liberties of the Moderns Versus the Will of the People......Page 353
§4. The Roots of the Liberties......Page 362
§5. Procedural Versus Substantive Justice......Page 371
§ 6. Conclusion......Page 380
PART FOUR - The Idea of Public Reason Revisited......Page 382
Introduction to “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”......Page 383
§ 1. The Idea of Public Reason......Page 385
§ 2. The Content of Public Reason......Page 391
§ 3. Religion and Public Reason in Democracy......Page 397
§ 4. The Wide View of Public Political Culture......Page 400
§ 5. On the Family as Part of the Basic Structure......Page 403
§ 6. Questions about Public Reason......Page 409
§ 7. Conclusion......Page 416
Index......Page 421
Index to the New Material......Page 470
Copyright Page......Page 595