Philosophy of Time: A Contemporary Introduction

Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Figures
Preface
About This.Book
Acknowledgements
1 Epistemology of Time
	Introduction
		Theoretical Time is Not Folk Time
		A World Without Time Is Not a World We Understand
	Folk Time
		Objects and Events
		Temporal Properties and Relations
	Independent Time
		Substantivalism
		Relationalism
		Objection: A Frozen World is Possible
			Objection: We Can Have Indirect Knowledge of Substantival Time
			Frozen Worlds
			Objection 1: We Do Not Know There is a Global Freeze (Other Explanations Available)
			Response: Inference to the Simplest Explanation
			Objection 2: Time in an Unchanging World Still Needs the World
			Objection 3: Shoemaker-Style Arguments Do Not Suit Lived Experience
	Scepticism about Time
		Kant’s Antinomies
			Thesis: Time Has a Beginning
			Antithesis: Time Has No Beginning
			Elapsing Time and Temporal Passage
			Idealism or Scepticism?
		Sextus Empiricus
			Scepticism about Change
			Objection: This Argument Is Against the Reality of Change
			Against Time’s Divisibility Or Indivisibility
			The Argument Against Time As Past, Present, and Future
			Objection 1: We Cannot Suspend Beliefs About Time
			Objection 2: Scepticism Depends On One’s Metaphysics of Time
	Knowledge of Time Through Perception
		The Causal Truth-Maker Principle
		Temporal Order Cannot Cause Belief
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
2 Metaphysics of Time I: Time and Change
	Introduction
	McTaggart’s Paradox
		The Two Main Concepts of Events in Time
			A-series
			B-series
		McTaggart’s Argument
		Solution 1: A-Series Positions Are Determined By A-Series-B-Series Positions
			Indexicals
			Objection: The B-Series is Not Enough For Change
				Objection 1: The B-Series Does Not Provide Real B-Series-a-Series Positions
				Objection 2: The B-Series Does Not Capture Real Change
			Motion and A-Series Change
				Indexical A-Series Change
				Objection: This is Not Real Change
				Analogy Between a Fundamental A-Series and Absolute Space
	Tense Theory
		Temporal Passage
		The Unique and Real Present
			Real Present and Temporal Passage
			Real Present and the Real A-Series
				Time Defined By Events and a Static A-Series
		Kinds of Tense Theory
			Presentism
				Presentism is Intuitive
				Presentism Solves Mctaggart’s Paradox
				Objection 1: No Real A-Series
				Objection 2: Presentism Lacks Truth-Makers For Truths About the Past
				Objection 3: Presentism and Physics
			Eternalism
				The “moving Spotlight”
				Objection: Events Must Change
			The Growing Block Theory
	Tenseless Theory
		Change, Static and Dynamic
			R-Theory
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
3 Metaphysics of Time II: Change and Persistence in Objects
	Introduction
		Concrete Particulars
	An Object Exists in Space
		Spatial Parts
	An Object Exists in Time
	An Object Persists
		Endurantism: An Object is at Each Time it Persists
			Being Wholly Present
			Objection: Endurantism Has No Spatial Analogue
	The Persistence of Objects Through Change
		Hinchliff’s Four Conditions of Change
			Objection: There is No Analogy For Specific Properties
		Leibniz’ Law
			Numerical Identity
		Relations-to-Times: Temporal Location is Not a Property
			Adverbialism
	The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics
		Intrinsic Properties
			Temporary Intrinsic Properties
		Endurantism
		Relations-to-Times and Adverbialism
		Temporal Parts: A Different Object is at Each Time An Object Persists
			Objection: Objects Are Continuants
			Response 1: An Object Can Have Infinite Parts
			Response 2: This Objection Requires Continuous Time
			Perdurance: The Ordinary Object is the Persisting Object
			Exdurantism (Stage Theory): The Ordinary Object is the Object at Each Time
		Intuitions About Persistence
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
4 Philosophy of Physics and Time
	Introduction
	Physics Without Time
		Substantivalism and Early Physics
	Relative Simultaneity
		Relative Frames
			Relative is Neither Private Nor Subjective
		Relative Time
			The Constant Speed of Light
			Inertial Frames
			Possible Absolute Simultaneity and Temporal Order
			Minkowski Space-Time
	Relative Temporal Order
		STR and Relative Temporal Order
			Objection: There is Absolute Temporal Order in Str
			Response: Not All Earlier Events Are Causally Related to Later Events
		Causal Order and Perceived Temporal Order
			Causal Order and the Intuition of Temporal Order
		Backwards Causation
			Entropy
			Bardon’s Entropy Account of Perception
	Objections to Relative Time
		Bergson’s Objections to Relative Time
			Objection 1: Real Time is Continuous
			Objection 2: Relative Time is Merely Imagined Time
			Objection 3: Experienced Time Requires Absolute Time
		Tense Theory Objections
			Tense Theory and Temporal Order
			Tense Theory and Relative Simultaneity
			Presentism
			Privileged Frames of Reference
			The Ether
			Objection: We Cannot Detect the Privileged Frame
		Tenseless Theory
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
5 Philosophy of Language and Time
	Time and the Linguistic Turn
		Metaphors of Temporal Passage
		Objection: Metaphors of Passage Have Meaning
		Merely Apparent Metaphysical Meaning
		Modifiers
	Temporal Properties of Linguistic Expressions
		Tokens
		Propositions
		Truth-Makers and Facts
			Truth-Makers For Propositional Variation in Truth-Value
			Objection: Propositions Are Abstract and Not in Time
		Truth-Makers and Tokens
			Implicit Context
			Token-Reflexive Truth-Conditions
	Linguistic Responses to Mctaggart’s Paradox
		Irreducible Tense
	Tense Language and Tokens
		Objection 1: Propositions Cannot Change Truth-Value in Tense Theory
		Response: Tense is a Modifier
		Objection 2: Tense Tokens Are Not Merely Linguistic Entities
		Response: The Tokens Only Undermine Mere Linguistic Solutions
		Tenseless Facts
			Objection: Some Tensed Propositions Cannot Have Tokens
			Response: Date-Reflexive Theory
	Tense Logic
		Logical Operators and Truth-Value
		Tense Logic and the Metaphysics of Time
			Objection 1: We Talk as if Tense Are Properties, Locations, or Facts
			Objection 2: Tense Logic Assumes Presentism
			Objection 3: Tense Operators Do Not Need An Unreal Past and Future
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
6 Philosophy of Mind and Time
	Introduction
	Time is Only in the Mind: St Augustine’s Argument
		Objection 1: Time is Unreal Not Mind-Dependent
		Objection 2: The Past and Future Are Real
		Objection 2: The Present Can Have Duration
			Tense Theory
			Tenseless Theory
	Temporal Experience
		The Appearance of Time in the World
		Time We Do Not Experience
		Time We Do Experience
			Objection: Time-Lag
			Response: Apparent Time
			Apparent Reality
			Phenomenological Presentism
			Appearance of Actual Times
			Duration
			Temporal Order
		Experiences of Change
			Perceived Change
			Perceived Change and Philosophical Theories of Time
		Temporal Passage
			Illusionists and Veridicalists
	Phenomenological Models of Time
		Retention Theory: The Tripartite Structure of the Phenomenology of Time
			Physical Time and Phenomenological Time
			Primary Impressions in Husserl’s Retention Theory
			Protentions and Retentions
			Objection: Nesting
			Response: Descriptive Abstraction
			Perceptual Experience and Retention Theory
		Extensionalism
			Objection 1: No Succession
			Response: Diachronic Co-Consciousness
			Objection 2: Diachronic Co-Consciousness Does Not Connect Different Experiences
			Response: Overlap Theory
			Objection 3: The Overlap is Not Explained
			Objection 4: Time-Consciousness Must Have a Tripartite Structure
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
7 Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Time
	Introduction
	The Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC)
		Reasons For NCCs
		NCCs and Causation
		The Relationship Between the Temporal Structure of Consciousness and NCCs
			Isomorphism
			Heteromorphism
	Timing
		The Ncc Has No Relation in Time to the Experience
			Objection 1: Causation is Not Possible Across Different Time Series
			Objection 2: We Cannot Know From Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens
		The Ncc is Earlier or Later Than the Experience
			Objection 1: Denies the Possibility of Mind-Brain Identity Theory
			Objection 2: It is Difficult to Know From Empirical Research When Consciousness Happens
		The Ncc is Simultaneous With the Experience
	The Timing of Free Will
		Measuring the Timing of the Will
		Objections
			Response: We Should Assume That Apparent Simultaneity is actual Simultaneity
			Rejoinder 1: Phenomenology is Not a Theoretical Constraint
			Rejoinder 2: Apparent Simultaneity and Absent Duration
			Limited Experience in Time
			Simultaneity Thresholds
	Temporal Illusions
		Examples of Temporal Illusion
			The Cutaneous “Rabbit”
			The Flash-Lag Effect
			The Phi Phenomenon
			Illusions of Simultaneity and Temporal Order
		Illusions Are Evidence of Heteromorphic Representation
		Objection: Hidden Time
			Illusions of Simultaneity
			Illusions of Temporal Order and Duration
	Philosophical Positions On Time
		Presentism and the Growing Block Theory
		Eternalism
			Tense Theory
			Tenseless Theory
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
8 Rationality of Time
	Rational and Irrational
	Temporal Bias
		Tense Bias
			Present Bias (P-Bias)
			Future Bias (F-Bias)
			Parfit’s Surgery
		The Rationality of Tense Bias
			Reality is More Important Than Unreality
			Objection: This Only Works For Presentism and Present Bias
			We Have Control Over the Future
			Objection: There Are Significant Uncontrollable Future Events
			Biases Give An Evolutionary Advantage
			Objection: Evolutionary Explanations Are Neutral With Respect to the Rationality of Beliefs
		Near Bias (N-bias)
			Reality of the Near Over the Far
			Objection: We Often Want Unpleasant Things Sooner Rather Than Later, and Pleasant Things Later Rather Than Sooner
		Persson’s Explanation of Temporal Bias
			Perceptual Bias
			The Mechanism of Spontaneous Induction (MSI)
			Imagining Sequences From the Present Into the Future
			Persson’s Proposal to Overcome Temporal Bias
	Temporal Neutrality
		Event Neutrality
		Death
			The Symmetry Argument
			Tense and Death
			Death and F-Bias
	Note
	Suggested Readings
9  Philosophy of Art and Time
	Temporal Art
		Objections
		Rejoinder: What Defines An Artwork in Only Some Cases requires Time (or Space)
			Sauvage’s Concepts of Temporal Artwork
		Objection: We Can Infer Time Through All Artworks
			Temporal Artwork As Constraining Imagination
		Formal Properties of Temporal Artwork
			Instant God
	Art’s Representation of Time
		Realist Painting
		Painting and Time
			Movement
		Temporal Art and Time
			Deleuze’s Direct Cinema
			Time Cannot Self-Represent
			The Movement in the Image
			Ephemeral Art
	Philosophical Theories of Time and Temporal Art
		Music is Inexplicable Given Four-Dimensional Four-Dimensional-Space-Time
		Art, Bergson, and Relativistic Physics
			Relative Time and Temporal Art
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
10 Philosophy of Time Travel
	Introduction
	Defining Time Travel
		Time Travel and Space Travel
			Space Travel By Leaving the Previous Space
			Time Travel By Leaving the Previous Time
		Forward Time Travel
			Skipping
		Backward Time Travel
			Personal Time
	Causation in Time Travel
		Epiphenomenal Travel
		Causal Travel
		Causal Loops
			Self-Creating and Uncreated Objects
			The Time Machine Instruction Manual
			Wear and Tear Paradox
			Feynman’s Time-Travelling Particle
		Changing the Past
			The Grandfather Paradox
		Multiple Timelines
			Objection 1: The Past is Not Changed
			Response: The New Timeline is Created
			Objection 2: A Created Timeline Has the Same Problems As the Grandfather Paradox
	Pseudo-Time Travel
		Parallel Universe Travel
			Causation Between Parallel Worlds
		Back to the Future Time Travel
			Satisfying Regret
	Notes
	Suggested Readings
Bibliography
Index