Philosophy of Action

Title Page......Page 5
Copyright Page......Page 6
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 12
Source Acknowledgments......Page 13
Chapter 1 Philosophical Investigations §§611–628......Page 15
Part I Action and Agency......Page 17
  1.......Page 19
  2.......Page 21
  References......Page 22
  Further Reading......Page 23
 Chapter 2 Agency......Page 24
  Notes......Page 33
  I......Page 35
  III......Page 36
  V......Page 37
  VI......Page 38
  Notes......Page 39
  I......Page 40
  II......Page 41
  III......Page 42
  IV......Page 43
  V......Page 45
  Notes......Page 46
 Chapter 5 Agents and their Actions......Page 47
  1. Agent Causation......Page 48
  2. Actions and Events......Page 50
  3. Bodily Movements......Page 51
  4. What Actions Are......Page 53
  5. Basic Actions......Page 55
  6. Actions and Locations......Page 58
  Notes......Page 59
 Chapter 6 Agency and Actions......Page 62
  1......Page 63
  2......Page 66
  3......Page 67
  4......Page 68
  5......Page 71
  Notes......Page 72
Part II Willing and Trying......Page 77
  1.......Page 79
  2.......Page 80
  References......Page 81
  Further Reading......Page 82
 Chapter 7 Acting, Willing, Desiring......Page 83
  Notes......Page 89
  2. The Myth of Volitions......Page 90
  3. The Distinction between Voluntary and Involuntary......Page 93
  2......Page 97
  3......Page 100
  Notes......Page 103
  References......Page 104
  1. Agents and Actions......Page 105
  2. Bodily Movements and Bodily Motions......Page 107
  3. Voluntary Actions and Volitions......Page 108
  4. Basic and Non-basic Voluntary Actions......Page 110
  5. In Defence of Volitions......Page 111
  Notes......Page 113
Part III Intention and Intentional Action......Page 115
  1.......Page 117
  2.......Page 118
  3.......Page 119
  Further Reading......Page 120
 Chapter 11 Intention §§1–9......Page 121
  II......Page 127
  IV......Page 128
  V......Page 129
  VI......Page 130
  VII......Page 131
  Notes......Page 132
 Chapter 13 Intending......Page 133
  Notes......Page 143
 Chapter 14 Two Faces of Intention......Page 144
  1. Consistency of Intention and the Simple View......Page 145
  2. Objections and Replies......Page 148
  3. Intention and Volition......Page 149
  4. Intention and Motivational Potential......Page 152
  5. Motivational Potential Extended......Page 154
  6. Motivational Potential and the Distinctiveness of Intention......Page 156
  Notes......Page 157
 Chapter 15 Acting As One Intends......Page 159
  Notes......Page 171
 Chapter 16 Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language......Page 172
  2. Second Experiment......Page 173
  References......Page 174
 Chapter 17 The Toxin Puzzle......Page 175
  Note......Page 177
  0. Introduction......Page 178
  1. Social Agents......Page 179
  2. Social Actions......Page 180
  3. Social Attitudes......Page 181
  4. Ascribing Attitudes to Social Agents......Page 183
  5. Social Agents’ Knowledge of What They are Doing......Page 185
  6. Bodily Movements and Action......Page 186
  7. Individuating Agents......Page 188
  Notes......Page 189
  References......Page 190
Part IV Acting for a Reason......Page 191
  1.......Page 193
  2.......Page 194
  Further Reading......Page 196
  I......Page 197
  II......Page 198
  III......Page 200
  IV......Page 201
  Notes......Page 205
  1. Psychologism: The Three-Part Story and the Normative Story......Page 207
  2. Against the Three-Part Story......Page 209
  3. Because He Believes That p......Page 211
  4. The Role of Belief in the Psychologising Restatement of a Reason......Page 213
  5. Factive and Non-Factive Explanations......Page 216
  References......Page 219
  1. Introduction: Reason and Reasons......Page 220
  3. Mental States and Good-making Properties......Page 221
  4. The Goodness of Action......Page 224
  5. Motivation: The Relation between Reasons and Actions......Page 229
  Notes......Page 231
  References......Page 234
 Chapter 22 Arational Actions......Page 236
  Notes......Page 242
  1. Reason and the Good......Page 244
  2. Expressive Action......Page 251
  3. How Strong are These Arguments?......Page 256
  Notes......Page 257
  Socrates and Davidson......Page 259
  Self-Control and the Socratic Theory of Virtue......Page 261
  Weakness and Compulsion......Page 262
  Preliminary Difficulties......Page 263
  Strength and Resistibility......Page 265
  The Proposed Account versus the Common Account......Page 266
  Notes......Page 269
Part V The Explanation of Action......Page 271
  1.......Page 273
  2.......Page 275
  Further Reading......Page 276
  2. Two Basic Types of Scientific Explanation......Page 277
  3. Elliptic and Partial Explanations: Explanation Sketches......Page 281
  Notes......Page 283
  1. Historical Understanding as ‘Empathetic’......Page 284
  2. Explaining and Justifying Actions......Page 286
  3. The Point of the ‘Identification’ Metaphor......Page 288
  4. Generalizations and Principles of Action......Page 290
  Notes......Page 292
 Chapter 27 Explanation in Science and in History §§4–7......Page 294
  1. Genetic Explanation in History......Page 296
  2. Explanation by Motivating Reasons......Page 297
  3. Concluding Remarks......Page 301
  Notes......Page 302
 Chapter 28 The Explanatory Role of Being Rational......Page 303
  1. Hempel vs Davidson on the Explanation of Action......Page 304
  2. Are There Any Distinctive Non-constitutive Explanations of Action?......Page 311
  References......Page 316
 Chapter 29 The Conceivability of Mechanism......Page 317
  Notes......Page 327
  Introduction......Page 329
  1. The Standard View of Ends, Ends-in-View, and Causality......Page 330
  2. Teleology and Compensation......Page 331
  3. Compensation and Causality......Page 332
  4. Teleology and Behaviorism......Page 334
  5. Theology and Evolution......Page 336
  6. Teleology and Action......Page 337
  7. Action as Compensation......Page 339
  8. Pro Attitudes and Causality......Page 342
  Notes......Page 346
 Chapter 31 Psychological vs. Biological Explanations of Behavior......Page 347
  Triggering and Structuring Causes......Page 348
  External Structuring Causes......Page 350
  Internal Structuring Causes......Page 351
  Notes......Page 353
  References......Page 354
Part VI Free Agency and Responsibility......Page 355
  2.......Page 357
  3.......Page 359
  Further Reading......Page 360
 Chapter 32 Human Freedom and the Self......Page 361
  Notes......Page 366
  I......Page 367
  II......Page 368
  III......Page 369
  IV......Page 370
  V......Page 371
  Notes......Page 372
  I. Omissions and Alternative Possibilities......Page 374
  II. Omissions and Frankfurt-type Cases......Page 376
  III. Some Tools to Solve the Puzzle......Page 378
  IV. The Symmetric Principle of Moral Responsibility......Page 381
  V. An Objection......Page 383
  Notes......Page 385
  1. The Basic Argument......Page 387
  2. Ultimate Moral Responsibility......Page 388
  3. Restatement of the Basic Argument......Page 390
  4. Response to the Basic Argument......Page 391
  Notes......Page 393
  References......Page 394
  1. Frankfurt and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities......Page 396
  2. Agency and Determinism......Page 398
  3. Causality, Determinism and the ‘Beginnings’ of Chains......Page 400
  4. The Relevant Power of Refrainment......Page 401
  5. The Objection from Ignorance......Page 403
  Notes......Page 404
  References......Page 405
  Libet’s Work: Introduction......Page 407
  Some Conceptual Background......Page 408
  Type II RPs, Conscious Decisions, and Actions......Page 409
  Vetoing and Free Will......Page 411
  Wegner’s Work: Introduction......Page 413
  Conscious Will and Scientific Epiphenomenalism......Page 415
  Wegner on Free Will......Page 416
  Notes......Page 417
  References......Page 418
EULA......Page 420