Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Methodological Analysis

Acknowledgement
Praise for Philosophy and Neuroscience
Contents
List of Figures
Chapter 1: Methodological Problem in Philosophy and Neuroscience
	1.1 General Introduction
	1.2 Metaphilosophy: Introduction and Analysis
	1.3 The Philosophy of Neuroscience: Introduction and Analysis
		1.3.1 Nature and Structure of Neuroscience
		1.3.2 Concepts, Principles and Methods of Neuroscience
		1.3.3 Traditional Issues of Philosophy and Neuroscience
		1.3.4 Philosophy of Neuroscience, Relationship with Other Areas of Philosophy and New Research Areas
	1.4 Brief Introduction to Neuroscience
	References
Chapter 2: Methodological Isolationism
	2.1 Isolationism Approach
		2.1.1 Concepts Precede Facts
		2.1.2 Wittgenstein’s Influence
		2.1.3 Example of an Isolationist Examination: Determinism
		2.1.4 Several Defences of the Isolationist Approach
	2.2 Critical Reflection
		2.2.1 The “Conceptual Invariance” Objection
		2.2.2 Dennett’s Objection
		2.2.3 Searle’s Objection
		2.2.4 The Objection to “Philosophical Practice and Anti-Exceptionality”
	2.3 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 3: Reductive Neurophilosophy
	3.1 Assumptions of the Reductive Approach
		3.1.1 Denial of Dualism
		3.1.2 The Concept of Reductionism
			3.1.2.1	 Reduction as Translation (RaT)
			3.1.2.2	 Reduction as Derivation (RaD)
			3.1.2.3	 Reduction as Explanation (RaE)
		3.1.3 Reduction in Patricia Churchland
		3.1.4 Theory of Folk Psychology
		3.1.5 Reduction in John Bickle
		3.1.6 The Theory of Intertheoretical Reduction
	3.2 Critical Reflection
		3.2.1 The “Non-Theory” Objection
		3.2.2 The “Multiple Realizability” Objection
		3.2.3 The Objection of “Ontological Reduction”
		3.2.4 The Objection of “Methodological Isolationism”
		3.2.5 The Metaphilosophical Objection
	3.3 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 4: Neurophenomenology
	4.1 Assumptions of the Neurophenomenology Approach
		4.1.1 Phenomenology
		4.1.2 The Importance of the Body and Criticism of the Brain
		4.1.3 The 4E’s and Francisco Varela’s Neurophenomenological Approach
		4.1.4 An Example of Neurophenomenological Research: The Case of “Binocular Rivalry”
		4.1.5 The Self in Evan Thompson
		4.1.6 Three Pragmatic Lessons for a Rigorous Neurophenomenology
			4.1.6.1	 Science Reformulation
			4.1.6.2	 Better Science
			4.1.6.3	 The Focus on the Interviewer
	4.2 Critical Reflection
		4.2.1 The “Explanatory Gap” Objection
		4.2.2 The “Introspection” Objection
		4.2.3 The “Reductionist Accusation” Objection
		4.2.4 The Objection of “Inconclusive Metaphilosophy”
	4.3 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 5: Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy
	5.1 Assumptions of the Non-Reductive Approach
		5.1.1 Methodological Balance
		5.1.2 Methodological Strategies of Neurophilosophy
			5.1.2.1	 Asymmetry Principle
			5.1.2.2	 Principle of Bidirectionality
			5.1.2.3	 Principle of Transdisciplinary Circularity
		5.1.3 The Nature and Metaphilosophy of the Neurophilosophical Hypothesis
			5.1.3.1	 A Brain-Based (and Not Reduced) Perspective
			5.1.3.2	 First-Person Neuroscience
			5.1.3.3	 Example of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Research: The Case of the Self
			5.1.3.4	 Example of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Research: The Self and COVID-19
			5.1.3.5	 Example of Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Research: The Case of Emotions
	5.2 Critical Reflection
		5.2.1 Objection of the “Category and Modality Error”
		5.2.2 Objection of “Methodological Irrelevance”
		5.2.3 Objection of “Inaccurate Metaphilosophy”
	5.3 Conclusion
	References
Chapter 6: Qualia and Information in Philosophy and Neuroscience
	6.1 Concept of “Qualia”
		6.1.1 The Isolationist Approach and Qualia
		6.1.2 The Reductionist Approach and Qualia
		6.1.3 The Neurophenomenology Approach and Qualia
		6.1.4 The Non-Reductive Neurophilosophy Approach and Qualia
	6.2 Concept of “Information” and the Various Approaches
	6.3 Conclusion
	References
Conclusion
References
Index