Philosophical Problems in Sense Perception: Testing the Limits of Aristotelianism

Acknowledgements
Contents
Abbreviations of Aristotle’s Works
About the Authors
Chapter 1: Introduction
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 Aristotle’s Theory of Perception: The Basics and the Problems
	1.3 Aristotelian Tradition or Traditions?
	1.4 After Aristotle
	1.5 Brief Description of the Contents of This Volume
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 2: Aristotle on the Transmission of Information: Receiving Form Without the Matter
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Two Ways of Receiving Forms
	2.3 The Wax and the Seal
	2.4 How to Receive Form Without Matter
		2.4.1 Transduction
		2.4.2 Ratios
	2.5 The Authority of Perception
		2.5.1 The Seal of Reality
		2.5.2 The Basis of Infallibility
	2.6 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 3: Aristotle on Perception as Representation
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Primitive Agency
	3.3 Illusion
	3.4 Concluding Remarks
	Bibliography
Chapter 4: Reply to Ganson
	Bibliography
Chapter 5: The Case of Red-Stained Mirrors: Perception, Strange Phenomena, and the Role of Exemplification in Aristotle
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 The Phenomenon of Stained Mirrors – De insomniis 459b23–460a23
	5.3 Red-Stained Mirrors as Evidence of a Literalist View of Perception
	5.4 The Theme of Red-Stained Mirrors in Context
	5.5 Does Aristotle Accept the Idea of Stained Mirrors as Credible?
	5.6 Aristotle’s Pedagogical Use of Examples
	5.7 Expository Principles and the Problem of General Cohesion
	5.8 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources (Editions and Translations of Aristotle Cited by Editor or Translator)
		Other Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 6: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Simultaneous Perception
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 The Problem of Simultaneous Perception
		6.2.1 Argument from Mixed Perceptibles
		6.2.2 Argument from the Numerical Correspondence of Activity and Object
		6.2.3 First Attempt: Different Parts of the Soul
	6.3 Problem of Opposites
	6.4 Simultaneous Perception of Heterogeneous Perceptibles
		6.4.1 General Account
		6.4.2 Apple Analogy
		6.4.3 Point Analogy
	6.5 Judgement and Affection
		6.5.1 Perception as Judgement—Opposition in Judgement
		6.5.2 Material Change and Judgement
		6.5.3 The Solution for the Point Analogy
		6.5.4 The Solution for the Apple Analogy
	6.6 The Adequacy of Alexander’s Account
	6.7 Conclusion
	Bibliography
Chapter 7: Common Sense in Themistius and Its Reception in the pseudo-Philoponus and Avicenna
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Themistius on the Common Sense
	7.3 Themistius’ ‘Logos’ on the Common Sense, the pseudo-Philoponus, and Sophonias
	7.4 Avicenna as a Reader of Themistius’ Paraphrase: The Common Sense
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 8: On Common Sense, Estimation, and the Soul’s Unity in Avicenna
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 Themistius’ Influence on Avicenna’s Theory of the Common Sense
	8.3 Common sense and Estimation
	8.4 Spirit, Dualism, and the Primary Subject of Perception
	8.5 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 9: Sense Perception in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī: A Theologian’s Encounter with Avicennan Psychology
	9.1 Introduction
	9.2 Al-Āmidī’s Life and Works
	9.3 Discussions of Vision in Ibn Sīnā and Classical Ashʿarism
	9.4 Twelfth and Thirteen Century Responses to Ibn Sīnā on Vision
	9.5 Al-Āmidī on Vision
		9.5.1 Kashf al-Tamwīhāt and Rumūz al-Kunūz
		9.5.2 Abkār al-afkār and Ghāyat al-marām
	9.6 Conclusions
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 10: Setting One’s Sights on Sight: Observations on Sense Perception in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī
	10.1 Introduction
	10.2 Pre-Avicennan and Avicennan Theories of Vision and Cognition
	10.3 Post-Avicennan Theories of Vision and Cognition
	10.4 A Difference in Intellectual Genera or a Difference in Intellectual Genre?
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 11: John of Jandun on Sense Perception and Instantaneous Change
	11.1 The Contemporary Debate on Aristotle’s Account of Sense Perception
	11.2 Sense Perception and the So-Called Quasi-Alteration
	11.3 John of Jandun and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Illumination and Vision as Relational Changes
	11.4 Perception and the Reception of a Form in Jandun’s Commentary on the De anima
	11.5 Instantaneous Qualitative Changes in Physics 7.3
	11.6 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 12: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Brito and Jandun: Comments on Aurélien Robert’s Paper
	12.1 Introduction
	12.2 Alexander of Aphrodisias on Habitudes and Relations
	12.3 Probable Source: Radulphus Brito
	Appendix
		: Quaestiones super librum De sensu et sensato
	Bibliography
Chapter 13: Attention, Recognition, and Error in Nicole Oresme’s Psychology
	13.1 Introduction
	13.2 The Causes of Perceptual Errors in Oresme’s Scholastic Works
		13.2.1 Sensation as a Judgment
		13.2.2 The Influence of the Persectivists’ Theory of Error
		13.2.3 The Discursus of the Internal Senses and the Problem of Error
	13.3 Perception of Movement: A Touchstone for the Account of Perceptual Error
		13.3.1 The Uncertainty of the Perception of Movement
		13.3.2 Habit, Perception and Error
	13.4 A Step Towards a Constructive Psychology: The Nature of the Perception in Oresme’s Later Works
		13.4.1 Perception as an Activity: The Problem of Attention
		13.4.2 A New Account of the Relationship Between Habit, Perception and Error
	13.5 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Chapter 14: Activity, Judgment, and Recognition in Nicole Oresme’s Philosophy of Perception
	14.1 Introduction
	14.2 Erring
	14.3 Attending
	14.4 Processing
	14.5 Conclusion
	Bibliography
		Primary Sources
		Secondary Sources
Index