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ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Walter Hopp
سری: Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy
ISBN (شابک) : 9780367497385, 9781000069464
ناشر: Routledge
سال نشر: 2020
تعداد صفحات: 0
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : EPUB (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 940 کیلوبایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Phenomenology: A Contemporary Introduction به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
توجه داشته باشید کتاب پدیدارشناسی: مقدمه معاصر نسخه زبان اصلی می باشد و کتاب ترجمه شده به فارسی نمی باشد. وبسایت اینترنشنال لایبرری ارائه دهنده کتاب های زبان اصلی می باشد و هیچ گونه کتاب ترجمه شده یا نوشته شده به فارسی را ارائه نمی دهد.
Cover Endorsements Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents List of illustrations Acknowledgments Preface 1. Consciousness 1.1 Intentionality and Phenomenality 1.2 Transparency 1.3 A Dilemma for Phenomenology 1.4 Transparency and Intentionalism 1.5 Against Transparency 1.6 Conclusion 2. Consciousness—A Look Inside 2.1 Some Discoverable Features of Intentional Experiences 2.1.1 Intuitive Character 2.1.2 Positing Character 2.1.3 Directness 2.1.4 Originary Character 2.2 Some Further Features of Consciousness 2.2.1 The For-Structure of Consciousness 2.2.2 The Temporal Structure of Consciousness 2.2.3 The Attentional Structure of Consciousness 2.3 Conclusion 3. Intentionality and Meaning 3.1 Some Components of a Linguistic Act 3.2 What Meanings Aren’t 3.2.1 The Meaning of an Utterance is not the Utterance’s Object 3.2.2 Meanings are not Linguistic Types or Tokens 3.2.3 Meanings are not Mental Acts 3.3 The Objectivity of Meanings 3.4 The Subjectivity of Meanings 3.5 Meanings as Intentional Properties 3.6 Objections to the Species View 3.6.1 Thinking of What Does Not Exist 3.6.2 The Situated Character of Intentionality 3.7 Conclusion 4. The Mental Act 4.1 The Intentional Essence of an Act 4.2 Quality and Modification-Character 4.3 Many-rayed, Compound, and Founded Acts 4.4 The Intentional Relation 4.4.1 Consciousness and Existence 4.4.2 Immanence and Transcendence 4.5 Conclusion 5. Meaning and Intuition 5.1 Cognitive Fulfillment 5.2 Authentic Intentionality 5.2.1 Epistemic and Semantic Authenticity 5.3 The Ideal Connections Among Meanings, Fulfilling Senses, and Objects 5.3.1 Categorial Meaning and Intuition 5.3.2 Manifolds and Fulfilling Senses 5.3.3 Meaning Beyond Possible Originary Intuition 5.4 Ideal Verificationism 5.4.1 Ideal Verificationism and Realism 5.4.2 Yoshimi’s Objection 5.5 Conclusion 6. Perception 6.1 Adequate and Inadequate Intuition 6.2 Transcendence and Constancy 6.3 Transcendence and Horizons 6.4 Intuitive Fulfillment 6.5 Manifolds and Objects 6.6 Why Perception is Direct 6.7 Qualia and Separatism 6.8 Conclusion 7. The Essential Inadequacy of Perception 7.1 The Sense Datum Theory 7.2 Perspectival Properties 7.3 The Perception of Depth 7.4 Sensations 7.5 Profiles 7.6 Explaining the Disagreement 7.7 Perception without Immanence 7.8 Kinesthetic Sensations and Motor Intentionality 7.9 Conclusion 8. The Content of Perception 8.1 Conceptualism 8.2 Against Conceptualism 8.2.1 Conceptualism and the Fundamentality of Perception 8.2.2 Conceptualism and Intentionality 8.2.3 Conceptualism, Perception, and Fulfillment 8.2.4 Perception and Empty Horizons 8.2.5 Conceptualism and Knowledge 8.3 Naïve Realism 8.3.1 Hallucination 8.3.2 Naïve Realism and the Inadequacy of Perception 8.4 Perceiving Universals 8.5 Conclusion 9. Knowledge 9.1 Phenomenology and the Problem of Skepticism 9.2 A Characterization of Knowledge 9.3 Fulfillment Revisited 9.4 The Principle of All Principles 9.4.1 The Scope of the Principle of All Principles 9.4.2 The Necessity of the Principle of All Principles 9.4.3 The Principle of All Principles Is a Source, not a Ground, of Knowledge 9.4.4 The Principle of All Principles and Foundationalism 9.4.5 The “Myth of the Given” 9.5 Knowledge by Acquaintance 9.6 Conclusion 10. Phenomenology 10.1 The Things Themselves 10.2 Transcendental Phenomenology 10.3 The Transcendental Insight 10.4 The Phenomenological Reduction 10.4.1 The Hands-Off Principle 10.4.2 The Reduction and Its Results 10.5 Two Modest Conceptions of the Reduction 10.5.1 The Quotation View 10.5.2 The Bracketing View 10.6 Conclusion 11. Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism 11.1 Phenomenology and the Question of Realism 11.2 The Tension in Husserl’s Thinking 11.3 Realism in the Natural Attitude 11.4 Realism in the Phenomenological Attitude 11.5 Husserl Against “Realism” 11.5.1 Husserl Against Naturalistic Realism 11.6 Transcendental Idealism 11.7 Conclusion Bibliography Index