Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War

Cover......Page 1
Petro-Aggression......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Figures......Page 12
Tables......Page 13

Acknowledgments......Page 14
1 Introduction......Page 17
Two puzzles......Page 18
The core argument: petro-aggression......Page 19
Multiple links between oil and global violence......Page 21
Oil and the broader causes of war......Page 25
Scope of inquiry......Page 28
Structure of the book......Page 29
2 A theory of oil, revolution, and conflict......Page 32
Domestic politics shape the state’s propensity for international conflict......Page 33
Definition of revolutionary government......Page 36
Leadership preferences affect state behavior......Page 37
Revolutions select risk-tolerant, ambitious leaders......Page 39
Risk-tolerant, ambitious leaders are aggressive and conflict-prone......Page 40
Oil, the resource curse, and domestic political accountability......Page 43
Effects of oil on the costs of international conflict......Page 46
The interaction of oil income and revolutionary government is crucial......Page 48
How do political constraints, accountability, and autonomy relate to each other?......Page 53
How do oil and revolution affect states as targets of international conflict?......Page 54
Does oil income make a state more susceptible to revolution?......Page 56
3 Evidence and research design......Page 57
Operationalizing the dependent variable......Page 58
Identifying revolutionary governments......Page 60
Identifying petrostates......Page 64
Case selection for qualitative studies......Page 66
Testing the causal mechanisms......Page 70
Conclusion......Page 74
4 Quantitative impact of oil and revolution on conflict......Page 75
Dependent variable......Page 76
Explanatory variables......Page 77
Control variables......Page 84
Data sources......Page 85
Empirical results......Page 86
Dyadic analysis......Page 92
Robustness checks......Page 95
Other natural resources......Page 99
Further evidence of petrostate leaders’ political autonomy......Page 100
Conclusion......Page 104
5 Iraq......Page 106
Iraqi politics to 1968......Page 110
The Qasim government, 1958–1963......Page 111
Political turmoil, 1963–1968......Page 113
Saddam Hussein at home: 1968–1991......Page 114
Emergence of Saddam Hussein as leader......Page 115
Transformation of Iraq under Saddam......Page 118
Oil patronage in Saddam’s Iraq......Page 122
Saddam as revolutionary......Page 123
Saddam bides his time......Page 124
The war with Iran......Page 127
The war with Kuwait......Page 128
Defiance and aggression: 1991–2003......Page 131
Operation of causal mechanisms......Page 132
Did the revolutionary government make Iraq more aggressive?......Page 133
Did oil generate incentives for aggression and conflict?......Page 135
Did oil generate incentives to avoid aggression and conflict?......Page 136
Conclusion......Page 138
6 Libya and the Arab Jamahiriyya......Page 139
Libyan politics to 1969......Page 143
The young republic, 1969–1975......Page 145
The Green Book and the height of the revolution......Page 149
Limits to the revolution......Page 150
The Arab Jamahiriyya abroad: 1969–1991......Page 152
Interstate military conflicts......Page 153
Support for foreign insurgencies and terrorism......Page 156
Aggressive diplomacy and pan-Arab movements......Page 157
Military expenditures and nuclear weapons development program......Page 159
The receding tide of the revolution: 1991–2010......Page 161
Did the revolutionary government make Libya more aggressive?......Page 163
Did oil generate incentives for aggression and conflict?......Page 165
Did oil generate incentives to avoid aggression and conflict?......Page 166
Conclusion......Page 167
7 Iran......Page 168
Iranian politics to 1979......Page 172
The Shah and the “great civilization”......Page 174
The road to 1979......Page 176
Iranian domestic politics since 1979......Page 177
The rise of the radical clergy under Khomeini......Page 178
Oil revenues and the consolidation of power......Page 185
Iranian politics since Khomeini......Page 188
Foreign policy of Iran since 1979......Page 190
The Iran–Iraq War......Page 191
Additional international military incidents......Page 194
Iranian support for foreign insurgencies......Page 195
Nuclear weapons program......Page 198
Did the revolutionary government make Iraq more aggressive?......Page 199
Did oil generate incentives for aggression and conflict?......Page 202
Did oil generate incentives to avoid aggression and conflict?......Page 203
Conclusion......Page 204
8 Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution......Page 206
Venezuelan politics prior to Chávez......Page 208
The rising tide of the Bolivarian Revolution: 1989–1999......Page 212
The Bolivarian revolutionary regime at home: 1999–2010......Page 215
The new Bolivarian constitution......Page 216
Bolivarian Circles and para-statal organizations......Page 217
The 2002 coup against Chávez......Page 219
Economic policy and government expenditure in the Bolivarian Revolution......Page 220
Personalization of power under Chávez......Page 223
Aggressive diplomacy and oil nationalization......Page 226
Military spending......Page 230
Military exercises and international disputes......Page 232
Did the revolutionary government make Venezuela more aggressive?......Page 235
Did oil generate incentives for aggression and conflict?......Page 237
Did oil generate incentives to avoid aggression and conflict?......Page 238
Conclusion......Page 239
9 Saudi Arabia......Page 241
Saudi politics prior to 1967......Page 244
Saudi foreign policy, 1967–1973......Page 247
Saudi foreign policy, 1974–1999......Page 251
Saudi foreign policy, 2000–2010......Page 256
How did the non-revolutionary character of Saudi Arabia shape its foreign policy?......Page 258
Did oil generate conflict-enhancing incentives?......Page 260
Did oil generate conflict-reducing incentives?......Page 261
The difference a revolution makes......Page 263
Conclusion......Page 265
Is oil linked to revolution in theory?......Page 266
Quantitative evidence suggests no link between oil and revolution......Page 270
A closer examination of specific cases......Page 271
Conclusion......Page 275
11 Conclusion and policy implications......Page 276
Summary of key findings......Page 277
The theory in practice: Iraq, July 1990......Page 279
Considering the Arab Spring “revolutions”......Page 280
Further research questions......Page 282
Policy implications in a changing world......Page 284
References......Page 288
Index......Page 308