Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional Societies

Cover
Half-title
Series information
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Table of contents
Acknowledgments
Caveats
Introduction
	I. The Puzzle
	II. The Approach
	III. Overview of the Argument
	IV. Plan of the Book
Part One Judicial Accountability: Theoretical Framework
	1 The Concept of Judicial Accountability
		I. Unpacking the Notion of Accountability
		II. Specifics of Judicial Accountability
		III. The Concept of Judicial Accountability
			A. Who Is Accountable?
			B. Accountability to Whom?
			C. Accountability for What?
			D. Through What Processes?
			E. By What Standards?
			F. With What Effect?
			G. Definition of Judicial Accountability
		IV. Why Judicial Accountability Matters?
		V. De Jure versus De Facto Judicial Accountability
		VI. Accountability Perversions
	2 Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability
		I. What Do Judges Maximize?
		II. What Is “In”: Taxonomy of Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability
			A. Sticks
			B. Carrots
			C. Dual Mechanisms
		III. What Is “Out”: Contingent Circumstances of Judicial Accountability
			A. Ex Post Mechanisms That Do Not Affect Individual Judges
			B. Screening Mechanisms
			C. Transparency Mechanisms
			D. Appeals and Quasi-Appellate Mechanisms
			E. Criminal and Pathological Mechanisms of Influencing Judges
		IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Recognition and Career Judiciaries
	3 Judicial Accountability and Judicial Councils
		I. The Rise of Judicial Councils and Their Effects
		II. The Judicial Council Euro-model of Court Administration
		III. The Impact of the Judicial Council Euro-model on Judicial Accountability
Part Two Holding Czech and Slovak Judges Accountable
	4 Prologue to the Case Studies: Methodology and Data Reporting
		I. Research Design of My Case Studies
		II. What Is Measured?
		III. Data Collection
		IV. Method and Evaluation
		V. Potential Inaccuracies
	5 The Czech Republic
		I. The Czech Judiciary in Context
			A. Politics of the Czech Republic
			B. Consequences of the Division of Czechoslovakia
			C. The Impact of the EU Accession Process upon Czech Judicial Reforms
			D. Dealing with the Past within the Czech Judiciary
			E. “Superjudges” and Other Key Actors in Czech Judicial Politics
		II. Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): Two Decades of Calibrating the Ministry of Justice Model
			A. Ministry of Justice Model Retained (1993–2002)
			B. Updating the Ministry of Justice Model (2003–2010)
		III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002
			A. Contingent Circumstances
			B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used?
			C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books
			D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action
			E. Brief Summary of Years 1993–2002
		IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010
			A. Contingent Circumstances
			B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used?
			C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books
			D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action
			E. Brief Summary of Years 2003–2010
		V. Overall Conclusion on the Czech Case Study
	6 Slovakia
		I. The Slovak Judiciary in Context
			A. Politics of the Slovak Republic
			B. Consequences of the Division of Czechoslovakia
			C. The Impact of the EU Accession Process upon Slovak Judicial Reforms
			D. Dealing with the Past within the Slovak Judiciary
			E. “Superjudges” and Other Key Actors in Slovak Judicial Politics
		II. Court Administration after the Split (1993–2010): The Road from...
			A. Ministry of Justice Model Retained (1993–2002)
			B. The Judicial Council Euro-model Takes Over (2003–2010)
		III. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 1993 to 2002
			A. Contingent Circumstances
			B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used?
			C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books
			D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action
			E. Brief Summary of Years 1993–2002
		IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability from 2003 to 2010
			A. Contingent Circumstances
			B. Which Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability Were Used?
			C. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability on the Books
			D. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Action
			E. Brief Summary of Years 2003–2010
		V. Overall Conclusion on the Slovak Case Study
	7 Evaluation: The Czech Republic and Slovakia Compared
		I. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2002
			A. Who Held Judges to Account?
			B. How Much Were Judges Held to Account?
			C. Which Accountability Perversions Emerged?
		II. Comparing Results from Slovakia and the Czech Republic between 2003 and 2010
			A. Who Held Judges to Account?
			B. How Much Were Judges Held to Account?
			C. Which Accountability Perversions Emerged?
		III. Effects of the Judicial Council Euro-model in Slovakia
			A. What Happened in Slovakia after the Introduction of the JCSR?
				Who Holds Judges to Account?
				How Much Are Judges Held to Account?
				Accountability Perversions
			B. What Changes Were Caused by the JCSR?
		IV. Alternative Explanations
Part Three Conclusions and Implications
	8 Perils of Judicial Self-Government
		I. Court Presidents: Invisible Masters of Central and Eastern European Judiciaries
		II. The Judicial Leadership Theory of Judicial Councils
		III. The Judicial Council Euro-model: Toward the System of Dependent Judges within an Independent Judiciary?
		IV. Mechanisms of Judicial Accountability in Transitional Societies
		V. Oversight of Judges: Why Fire Alarms Do Not Work?
		VI. Judicial Virtues Matter
Annex A: Court System of the Czech Republic
Annex B: Court System of Slovakia
Annex C: The Number of Judges in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993–2010)
Bibliography
	Miscellaneous sources
Index