Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge

Acknowledgements
Contents
Chronological Table of Philosophers
Introduction
Part I: PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD
     1. Philosophical Questions and Pramanas
          1.1 The  Pramana  Epistemology
          1.2 Sceptical  Questions
          1.3. The  Empirical and  the  Non-empirical 
          1.4. The  Pramalna  Doctrine:  General  Characteristics 
          1.5. Two  World-viems 
          1.6. Ontological  Issues 
     2. Scepticism
          2.1 The  Paradoxicality of Scepticism
          2.2. Nagarjuna\'s Critique of Knowledge and Pramanas 
          2.3 Nyaya Defence of Knowlegde of Pramanas
          2.4 Is Radical Sceptiscism Feasible?
     3. The Nature of Philosophical Argument
          3.1 Philosophy versus Soteriology
          3.2 The Nyaya Project of Philosophical Inquiry
          3.3 Debate and Dialectic
          3.4 Negation versus Refutation
PART II: KNOWLEGE AND ILLUSION
     4. Knowledge as a Mental Episode
          4.1 Doubting
          4.2 Knowledge and Belief: Disposition versus Episode
          4.3 Prasastapada on Mental Episodes
          4.4 Knowing as an Episode
          4.5 Mental Acts versus Mental Episodes
          4.6. Intentionality
          4.7 Psychologism and Logical Theories
          4.8 Causal Factors o f a Mental Occurrence
          4.9 Knowledge: Ryle, Prasastapada, and Plato
          4.10 Knowledge: Sriharsa and Gettier
     5. Knowing that One Knows
          5.1 Rival Theories about Knowledge of Knowledge
          5.2 Self-awareness
          5.3 Must I be Aware that I am Aware?
          5.4 Nydya View about Knowing that One Knows
          5.5 Inference, Confirmation, and Introspection
     6. Analysis of Perceptual Illusion
          6.1 Seeing and Seeing-as
          6.2 Two Buddhist Analyses of Illusion
          6.3 The Advaita View of the Inexplicability o f the Appearance
          6.4 The Prabhakara View of No-illusion
          6.5 The Nydya Analysis of Illusion: Anyathakhyati
          6.6 Explanation of Fiction and Fantasies
          6.6 Explanation of Fiction and Fantasies
PART III: PERFECTION AND THE WORLD
     7. What Do We See?
          7.1 Phenomenalism. Representationalism, and Direct Realism
          7.2 The Nyaysautra Definition of Perception
          7.3 Vasubandhu\'s Illusionism
          7.4 The External World Does not Exist
          7.5 The External World Exists
          7.6 The Abhidharma Phenomenalism
          7.7 Nominal Existence and Substantial Existence
          7.8 Colour and Shape: Molyneux’s Question
     8. Perception as Inference
          8.1 Seeing and Inferring
          8.2 The Vaisesika Atomism
          8.3 The Whole-Part Controversy
          8.4 Nydya against Representationalism
          8.5 Nydya against Sense-datum
          8.6 Memory and Hallucination: jnana-laksana pratyasatti
     9. Pleasure and Pain
          9.1 Buddhist Concept of Pain-sensation
          9.2 The Nydya Distinction between Pain and Pain-sensation
          9.3 Udayana\'s Causal Argument
          9.4 The Vaisesika Definition of Pleasure and Pain
     10. Imagination, Perception, and Language
          10.1 Perception, Verbal Proliferation, and Concepts
          10.2 Imagination vis-a-vis Vikalpa
          10.3 Prelinguistic Perception: Dinnaga
          10.4 Immediate and Mediate Perception: Kumarila
          10.5 Percepts and Concepts: Dharmakirti
          10.6 Construction and Perception: Udayana
          10.7 Nydya Critique Sakara-jnana (Awareness-with-a-form)
          10.8 Conception-free Awareness: Gangesa
PART IV: World-View
     11. Particulars
          11.1 Three Rival Ontologies
          11.2 Phenomenalism and Atomism
          11.3 Direct Realism
     12. Universals
          12.1 The Vaisesika Notion of Real Universals
          12.2 Holistic Ontology and Meanings: Bhartrhari
          12.3 Apoha and Natural Kinds
          12.4 Mentalism and Realism
          12.5 Ontolog and Semantics
     Bibliography
     Index