Peace Science: Theory and Cases (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development)

Peace Science: Theory and Cases\n......Page 4
Copyright page......Page 5
Contents\n......Page 6
List of Diagrams\n......Page 8
List of Figures\n......Page 10
List of Tables\n......Page 12
Foreword......Page 14
Preface......Page 16
Introduction......Page 18
Notes......Page 36
1.1. Introduction\n......Page 38
1.2. Economics and politics of marginalisation and clientelisation: some examples\n......Page 43
1.3. Theories of state fragmentation in the developing world\n......Page 46
1.4. Clientelisation, inter-group rivalry and violent conflicts\n......Page 48
1.5. Formation of clientelism in agrarian societies: some thoughts on fragmentation of states in backward economies\n......Page 56
1.6. A static model of rural markets\n......Page 58
1.7. Threatened markets of rural oligarchy and endogenous fragmentation as strategies of entry deterrence\n......Page 61
1.8. Incomplete Information and Signalling Issues\n......Page 68
1.9. Endogenous fragmentation with multiple small and rich farmers in the absence of the switching costs\n......Page 76
1.10. Relevance of our model in the context of modern industrial organisation theory: a digression\n......Page 82
1.11. Concluding comments\n......Page 95
Notes......Page 97
Appendix\n......Page 98
2.1. Introduction\n......Page 104
2.2. Economics of ethnic heterogeneity: models and empirical foundation of ’global firms’\n......Page 111
2.3. A simple model of ethnic heterogeneity and implications for inter-ethnic harmony and conflicts\n......Page 129
2.4. Exogenous social interactions and the social dynamics\n......Page 135
2.5. The replicator dynamics and dynamic stability\n......Page 139
2.6. Concluding comments\n......Page 140
3.1. Introduction\n......Page 144
3.2. A brief survey of the existing literature on violent conflicts\n......Page 147
3.3. A modified Cournot model: predatory activities and rivalry to capture buyers\n......Page 151
3.4. A brief discussion\n......Page 157
3.5. Conclusion\n......Page 159
4.1. Introduction\n......Page 160
4.2. Economic Impacts of Defence Spending and its Spatial Consequences\n......Page 164
4.3. Strategic Trade and Investment Models: A Discussion\n......Page 166
4.4. The Model\n......Page 168
4.5. Stage II: Nature of Competition in the Product Market\n......Page 170
4.6. Stage I: Electoral Equilibrium\n......Page 172
4.7. Electoral Equilibrium and Nature of Competition\n......Page 174
4.8. Comparative Statics (Under Assumption 5)\n......Page 175
4.9. Comparative Statics (Under Alternative Assumption)\n......Page 177
4.10. Discussion and conclusion\n......Page 178
Notes......Page 181
Appendix\n......Page 182
5.1. Introduction\n......Page 184
5.2. Privatisation, spatial models and sustainable FDI: foundation to win-win economic integration in the globalised world economy\n......Page 186
5.3. Multinationals and labour issues\n......Page 191
5.4. Privatisation: major issues\n......Page 192
5.5. Rationales for privatisation: a global picture\n......Page 194
5.6. A simple model of privatisation game with multinationalisation\n......Page 197
5.7. Post-privatisation outcome with foreign firm entry\n......Page 203
5.8. Simulation analysis\n......Page 204
5.9. Discussion\n......Page 205
Note......Page 206
6.1. Introduction to international tension: global roots of local conflicts\n......Page 208
6.2. A new index of international tension: the beta indexsolindicator of conflicts\n......Page 234
6.3. Empirical foundation of beta index of conflicts due to international tension\n......Page 240
6.4. Temporal fluctuations in conflict levels and matrix of beta mobility\n......Page 246
6.5. Data\n......Page 254
6.6. Local conflicts with endogenous global partnership formation among terrorist organisations\n......Page 258
6.7. Dynamics of conflict cycles: terror cycles as a special case\n......Page 268
6.8. Global partnerships in conflicts and terrorism: can there be endogenously driven terror cyclesquest\n......Page 276
6.9. Concluding comments\n......Page 282
Notes......Page 283
7.1. Introduction\n......Page 284
7.2. Speculation and Food Markets: Early Work\n......Page 288
7.3. The basic model\n......Page 290
7.4. Is there an impending global food crisis?......Page 301
7.5. Food crops versus biofuels: a simple model\n......Page 312
7.6. Concluding comments\n......Page 320
8.1. Governance and enforcement of peace as a contract\n......Page 322
8.2. The coase theorem and coalitional issues: multi-party conflict and tensions between grand coalition vis-à-vis sub-coalitions\n......Page 332
8.3. The baseline model of negotiations in multi-party conflicts\n......Page 333
8.4. Dynamics of negotiations in multi-party conflicts: the rational underpinning for the principle of equal relative concession\n......Page 338
8.5. Negotiations for peace and formation of a grand coalition: a brief history of economic thoughts on disarmament and peace\n......Page 340
8.6. Conclusion: some concrete observations\n......Page 348
Appendix\n......Page 351
Conclusion\n......Page 356
Politics of intrastate conflicts and peace......Page 357
Global firms, ethnicity and peace......Page 358
Peace and irrational behaviour......Page 360
Implications of endogenous inequality for peace......Page 362
Economic geography and peace......Page 363
Terrorism: global peace vis-à-vis regional peace......Page 364
Poverty, food entitlements and peace......Page 368
Peace by negotiations: problems and prospects......Page 370
Bibliography......Page 374
Further Reading......Page 387
Index\n......Page 400