Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12

Content: Cover
 Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 12
 Copyright
 Contents
 List of Contributors
 Introduction
 1: Locating Morality: Moral Imperatives as Bodily Imperatives
 1.1 Claims of the Body
 1.1.1 Democratism as a Humeanism
 1.1.2 Calls for Action
 1.1.3 Bodily Imperatives
 1.1.4 Bodily Imperatives as (Distinctive) Calls for Action
 1.1.5 Explaining other Normative Claims using these Resources
 1.2 Queer Metaethical Theory
 1.2.1 Reconsidering Mackieś Challenge
 1.2.2 Objectivity and Universality
 1.2.3 Varieties of Prescriptivity
 1.2.4 Moderate Prescriptivity, Not Lost? 1.2.5 Strong Prescriptivity, Lost1.3 Conclusion: Queering the Subject?
 References
 2: Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief
 2.1 Difficult Moral Cases
 2.2 Objections and Replies
 2.3 Consequences for Moral Epistemology and Moral Metaphysics
 2.3.1 Moral Epistemology
 2.3.2 Moral Metaphysics I
 2.3.3 Moral Metaphysics II
 References
 3: Moral Testimony: Going on the Offensive
 3.1
 3.2
 3.3
 3.4
 3.5
 3.6
 3.7
 References
 4: Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities
 4.1 Non-naturalism and the Supervenience Objection
 4.2 Fundamentalist Non-naturalism 4.3 Grounded Non-naturalism4.4 Essentially Grounded Non-naturalism
 4.5 Avoiding Bruteness Revenge
 4.6 Conclusion
 References
 5: The Grounding Argument against Non-reductive Moral Realism
 5.1 The Supervenience Argument
 5.2 Normative Supervenience
 5.3 Hyperintensional Differences
 5.4 The Grounding Argument
 5.5 Interlude on Reduction
 5.6 Normative Grounding
 5.7 Amalgamating Normative Grounds
 5.8 Conditional Normative Grounds
 5.9 Ethical Idlers?
 5.10 Conclusion
 References
 6: What is a Moral Law?
 6.1 The Grounding Problem in Metaethics
 6.2 Normative Grounding 6.3 Bridge-law Non-naturalism6.4 What is a Moral Law?
 6.5 Normative Necessity
 6.6 When is a Moral Law?
 6.7 Why the Question Needs an Answer
 6.8 A Preliminary Answer
 6.9 A Better Proposal?
 6.10 A Comparison
 6.11 A Problem for Proposal 2
 6.12 Solving the Problem
 6.13 Conclusion
 References
 7: Ought to Is: The Puzzle of Moral Science
 7.1 Introduction
 7.2 Barberś Anti-Realist Strategies
 7.3 Barberś Realist-Friendly Approach
 7.4 Alternatives that Are Not
 7.4.1 Metaphysical Priority Entails Epistemic Priority?
 7.4.2 Moral Science is a Bankrupt Policy of Belief Revision 7.4.3 Inconsistent Grounds7.5 Resolving the Puzzle: A Dilemma for Moral Science
 7.6 Conclusion
 References
 8: Disagreement Lost and Found
 8.1 The Case Against MLD
 8.2 The Case Against QED
 References
 9: Normative Language in Context
 9.1 Introduction
 9.2 Contextualism and Discourse Disagreement
 9.2.1 Characterizing Contextualism
 9.2.2 Normative Disagreement in Discourse
 9.3 Managing the Context: Toward Discourse Contextualism
 9.4 Deontic Modals in Discourse: The Basic Account
 9.4.1 Components 1 and 2: From Formal Semantics to Interpretive Constraints