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ویرایش:
نویسندگان: Amie L. Thomasson
سری:
ISBN (شابک) : 0195319915, 9780195319910
ناشر: Oxford University Press
سال نشر: 2007
تعداد صفحات: 253
زبان: English
فرمت فایل : PDF (درصورت درخواست کاربر به PDF، EPUB یا AZW3 تبدیل می شود)
حجم فایل: 1 مگابایت
در صورت تبدیل فایل کتاب Ordinary Objects به فرمت های PDF، EPUB، AZW3، MOBI و یا DJVU می توانید به پشتیبان اطلاع دهید تا فایل مورد نظر را تبدیل نمایند.
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Arguments that ordinary inanimate objects such as tables and chairs, sticks and stones, simply do not exist have become increasingly common and increasingly prominent. Some are based on demands for parsimony or for a non-arbitrary answer to the special composition question; others arise from prohibitions against causal redundancy, ontological vagueness, or co-location; and others still come from worries that a common sense ontology would be a rival to a scientific one.Until now, little has been done to address these arguments in a unified and systematic way. Ordinary Objects is designed to fill this gap, demonstrating that the mistakes behind all of these superficially diverse eliminativist arguments may be traced to a common source. It aims to develop an ontology of ordinary objects subject to no such problems, providing perhaps the first sustained defense of a common sense ontology in two generations. The work done along the way addresses a number of major issues in philosophy of language and metaphysics, contributing to debates about analyticity, identity conditions, co-location and the grounding problem, vagueness, overdetermination, parsimony, and ontological commitment.In the end, the most important result of addressing these eliminativist arguments is not merely avoiding their conclusions; examining their failings also gives us reason to suspect that many apparent disputes in ontology are pseudo-debates. For it brings into question widely-held assumptions about which uses of metaphysical principles are appropriate, which metaphysical demands are answerable, and how we should go about addressing such fundamental questions as "What exists?". As a result, the work of Ordinary Objects promises to provide not only the route to a reflective understanding of our unreflective common-sense view, but also a better understanding of the proper methods and limits of metaphysics. "Ordinary Objects is well worth reading because it sheds new light on how to preserve the credibility of familiar things."--Marianne Djuth, The Review of Metaphysics "In Ordinary Objects , Amie Thomasson mounts a spirited and vigorous defense of the reality of ordinary objects."--Terry Horgan, Times Literary Supplement"Ordinary Objects is a fine book.... [Thomasson] writes insightfully and persuasively, and she has a realistic view of what metaphysical arguments can and cannot demonstrate... she approaches metaphysical theorizing more systematically than many other recent writers, drawing attention to the ways in which questionable assumptions in one area of philosophy are undergirding seemingly powerful arguments in another. Everyone working in metaphysics should make time for this volume."--R. W. Fischer, Metaphilosophy "In Ordinary Objects , Thomasson pursues an integrated conception of ontology and metaontology. In ontology, she defends the existence of shoes, ships, and other ordinary objects. In metaontology, she defends a deflationary view of ontological inquiry, designed to suck the air out of arguments against ordinary objects. The result is an elegant and insightful defense of a common sense worldview."--Jonathan Schaffer, Philosophical Books "Amie Thomasson has written a lovely book which is certain to irritate many professional metaphysicians. But it is not just irritating: it is challenging...This book would be good supplementary text for upper-level metaphysics classes or seminars in which the sorts of arguments to which Thomasson replies are also read."--Alan Sidelle, The Philosophical Quarterly
Contents......Page 10
Introduction......Page 16
1. Problems of Causal Redundancy......Page 22
1.1 The Threat of Causal Exclusion......Page 23
1.2 The Threat of Overdetermination......Page 28
1.3 Other Apparent Redundancies......Page 33
1.4 The Difference between Baseballs and Minds......Page 37
2. Analyticity and Conceptual Content......Page 41
2.1 One Dogma of Quineans......Page 42
2.2 Truth by Convention......Page 45
2.3 Causal Theories of Reference and the Qua Problem......Page 51
2.4 The Basis of Analytic Entailments......Page 57
2.5 The Problem of Nonexistence Claims......Page 58
2.6 Objections to Hybrid Theories of Reference......Page 61
3. Identity, Persistence, and Modality......Page 67
3.1 Existence, Identity, and Persistence Conditions......Page 68
3.2 Modal Truths......Page 75
3.3 Modal Conceptualism and Objectual Antirealism......Page 76
3.4 Analyticity and Truth-Makers......Page 81
3.5 Modal Properties......Page 83
4. Problems of Colocation......Page 86
4.1 ‘Nothing Over and Above’......Page 88
4.2 The No Coincidence Principle......Page 91
4.3 Property Additivity......Page 93
4.4 The Grounding Problem......Page 94
5. Problems of Vagueness......Page 100
5.1 Sorites-Style Arguments......Page 101
5.2 The Source of Vagueness......Page 103
5.3 Solutions to the Problems of Vagueness......Page 108
5.4 Vagueness and Contextual Semantics......Page 113
5.5 Is There Vagueness in the World?......Page 117
5.6 Can There Be Vague Objects?......Page 120
6. Handling Existence Questions......Page 123
6.1 Specific Existence Questions......Page 124
6.2 Generic Existence Questions......Page 125
6.3 Bare Quantification......Page 128
6.4 Quantifier Variance......Page 131
6.5 The Number of Objects......Page 132
6.6 Can We Revive the General Question?......Page 134
7. The Special Composition Problem......Page 139
7.1 Uniform Answers to the Special Composition Question......Page 140
7.2 Nonuniform Answers to the Special Composition Question......Page 143
7.3 Behind the Special Composition Question......Page 147
8. Problems of Rivalry with Science......Page 150
8.1 The Case for a Conflict......Page 151
8.2 The Case for a Rivalry......Page 157
8.3 Is There Really a Rivalry?......Page 160
9. Parsimony and Ontological Commitment......Page 164
9.1 Parsimony’s Plausibility......Page 165
9.2 Parsimony and Counting......Page 167
9.3 The Case for Ordinary Objects......Page 168
9.4 Trivial Transformations and Ontological Commitments......Page 172
9.5 The Point of Paraphrase......Page 181
9.6 Are We Committed to Extraordinary Objects?......Page 183
9.7 The Price of Avoiding Ordinary Objects......Page 186
10. A Coherent Common Sense View......Page 189
10.1 A Unified Diagnosis......Page 190
10.2 The Basis for a Common Sense View......Page 193
10.3 Too Many Objects?......Page 196
10.4 The Specter of Antirealism......Page 198
11. The Methods of Metaphysics......Page 201
11.1 Identity and Persistence Questions......Page 202
11.2 Existence Questions......Page 205
11.3 Genuine Debates and Merely Apparent Debates......Page 208
11.4 What’s an Ontologist to Do?......Page 212
Notes......Page 216
Bibliography......Page 238
A......Page 248
C......Page 249
I......Page 250
P......Page 251
S......Page 252
Z......Page 253