On Custom in the Economy

Contents......Page 9
List of Figures......Page 13
Introduction......Page 14
Background......Page 16
Overview......Page 18
The Nature of the Argument......Page 20
PART I: THE AMALGAM OF CUSTOM......Page 22
1.1 Malleable Foundations......Page 24
1.2 The Concept of Custom......Page 25
1.3 Conservatism......Page 26
1.4 Conformity......Page 27
1.5 Tacit Knowledge......Page 28
1.6 Emotional Encoding......Page 31
1.7 The Tacit and Malleable Nature of Custom......Page 32
1.8 Mutual Reinforcement......Page 33
2.1 A Treacherous Image......Page 35
2.2 The Nature of Entitlements and Obligations......Page 36
2.3 Entitlements, Obligations, and Custom......Page 37
2.4 Entitlements and the Law......Page 38
2.5 Clarity......Page 40
2.6 An Everyday Transaction......Page 42
2.7 Compliance and Moralistic Aggression......Page 43
2.8 Coordination Failures......Page 44
2.9 Norms......Page 45
2.10 Contracting......Page 48
2.11 Non-enforceable Contracts......Page 49
2.12 Entitlements and Morality......Page 52
3.1 Change......Page 54
3.3 Conformity and Critical Mass......Page 55
3.4 Dispersed Conformity......Page 58
3.5 Conservatism, Dispersed Conformity, and Incentives......Page 59
3.6 Conformity and Cumulative Growth......Page 60
3.7 Conformity and Sudden Decay......Page 62
3.8 Hysteresis......Page 63
4.2 Scope......Page 65
4.3 Level......Page 66
4.5 The Fuzziness of Custom......Page 67
4.6 Ambiguity and Compliance......Page 69
5.1 Full Malleability......Page 70
5.2 The Erosion and Growth of Custom......Page 71
5.3 The Smoothing of Hysteresis......Page 74
5.4 A Model of Caste......Page 75
5.5 The QWERTY Keyboard......Page 78
5.6 Passive Custom and the Problem of Efficiency......Page 80
6.1 Rigidity......Page 82
6.2 The Significance of Rigidity......Page 83
6.4 A First Glance at Clarity......Page 84
6.5 The War of the Ghosts......Page 85
6.6 Spontaneous Clarification......Page 88
6.8 Prominence, Clarity, and Culture......Page 90
6.9 Clarity and Repetition......Page 93
6.10 Context Dependency......Page 94
6.11 Culture and Colours......Page 96
6.12 Musical Perception......Page 98
7.2 A Game of Cards......Page 100
7.3 ‘Random Rules’ and History......Page 102
7.4 Categorization......Page 105
7.5 Good Continuity......Page 106
7.6 Rule Formation in Social Interaction......Page 107
7.7 Clarity and Rationality......Page 108
7.8 Clarity, Singularity, and Stability......Page 109
7.9 Schemata......Page 110
7.10 Change and Schema Switches......Page 112
7.11 Learning......Page 113
7.12 Hysteresis......Page 117
8.1 Overall Clarity......Page 119
8.2 Commitment......Page 120
8.3 Obedience and Authority......Page 122
8.4 Status Quo Preference and the Endowment Effect......Page 124
8.5 Loss Aversion versus Rule Preference......Page 125
8.6 Reciprocity and Retribution......Page 128
8.7 Conformity......Page 129
8.8 Rule Preference, Custom, and Clarity......Page 130
9.2 Attribution and Discounting......Page 132
9.3 Self-Attribution and Over-Justification......Page 134
9.4 Cognitive Dissonance and Forced Compliance......Page 136
9.5 The Miasma of Reward......Page 137
9.6 Conservatism, Conformity, and Consistency......Page 139
9.7 The Shaping of Motives by Custom......Page 140
10.1 Custom and the Human Mind......Page 142
10.2 The Strategic Interpretation of Customs......Page 144
10.3 Habitual Rules and Clarity......Page 147
10.4 Emotions......Page 150
10.5 Action......Page 152
10.6 The Emergence of Entitlements and Obligations......Page 154
10.7 Custom and Social Approval......Page 156
10.8 Interlocking Customs......Page 157
10.9 Style......Page 158
PART II: CUSTOM IN ACTION......Page 162
11.1 A Tension......Page 164
11.2 Unravelling Hume's Theory of Property......Page 165
11.3 Hume's Counterpoint......Page 166
11.4 Stability......Page 168
11.5 Symmetry......Page 169
11.6 Status Quo Preference......Page 173
11.7 Occupation......Page 174
11.8 Prescription......Page 177
11.9 Accession......Page 178
11.10 Succession......Page 180
11.11 The Workings of ‘Imaginations’......Page 181
11.12 Universality......Page 183
11.13 Property in Ethological Perspective......Page 185
11.14 The Voluntary Transfer of Property......Page 189
11.15 The Theory of Property Rights......Page 191
11.16 Some Problems with Property Rights......Page 194
11.17 Rituals......Page 197
11.18 Moral Forces......Page 199
11.19 Long-Term Contracts and Emergent Entitlements......Page 201
12.1 The Law and Custom......Page 204
12.2 A Blind Spot......Page 205
12.3 Law and Reason......Page 207
12.4 The Law as Transformation of Custom......Page 209
12.5 The Customs of Lawyers......Page 212
12.6 A Critique of Hayekian Evolutionism......Page 213
12.7 The Law and Behaviour......Page 215
12.8 The Law and Economics......Page 216
12.9 The Law as an Integrating Force......Page 218
13.1 Islands of Custom......Page 220
13.2 The Firm as an Institution......Page 221
13.3 A Defence of Vagueness......Page 222
13.4 The Firm as a Social Entity......Page 226
13.5 The Nominalistic View of the Firm......Page 227
13.6 Three Modes of Control......Page 230
13.7 Exchange: The Firm as a Specialized Market......Page 231
13.8 Command: The Firm as an Island of Authority......Page 233
13.9 Custom: The Firm as a Team......Page 235
13.10 The Three Control Modes Considered Separately......Page 236
13.11 Jobs, Routine, and Custom......Page 237
13.12 Chemical Interaction......Page 240
13.13 Piece Rates......Page 242
13.14 Hierarchy......Page 244
13.15 Ownership: Instrumentalist Aspects......Page 246
13.16 Ownership: Psychological Aspects......Page 249
13.17 Hume's Counterpoint Again......Page 251
13.18 Clarity and the Nature of the Firm......Page 253
14.1 Economic Organization and the Division of Labour......Page 255
14.2 The Division of Labour and the Extent of the Market......Page 257
14.3 Fixed Costs and Increasing Returns from Specialization......Page 259
14.4 The Division of Labour and the Nature of the Task......Page 260
14.5 Timing......Page 262
14.6 Separability and Independence......Page 264
14.7 Conceptual Integrity and Clarity......Page 266
14.8 The Enigma of Markets......Page 267
14.9 Two Faces of Integration......Page 269
14.10 The Costs of Custom......Page 270
14.11 The Use of Knowledge in Society......Page 273
14.12 Change......Page 275
14.13 The Firm, the Market, and the Division of Labour......Page 277
PART III: REVIEW......Page 280
15.1 Custom and Clarity......Page 282
15.2 The Strength of Custom......Page 285
15.3 Custom and Change......Page 286
A.2 Additive and ‘Chemical’ Interaction......Page 289
A.3 The ‘Chemical’ View of Custom......Page 290
A.5 The Individualistic View......Page 291
A.6 The Sociological View......Page 292
A.7 The Position Adopted Here......Page 293
A.8 The Paradigmatic Approach......Page 294
A.9 Comments on the Use of Psychology......Page 296
B.2 A Critique of Cultural Relativism......Page 299
B.3 An Analogue to Einstein's Principle......Page 301
C.2 Ethical Relativism......Page 302
C.3 Two Versions of Hume's Law......Page 303
C.4 The Loose Law, the Tight Law, and Ethical Relativism......Page 304
C.5 The Existence of an Ought......Page 306
C.6 The Moral Sense......Page 307
C.7 An Afterthought......Page 309
References......Page 311
B......Page 332
C......Page 333
D......Page 334
F......Page 335
H......Page 336
K......Page 337
M......Page 338
P......Page 339
R......Page 340
S......Page 341
T......Page 342
Z......Page 343