Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter

NUCLEAR HEURISTICS: SELECTED WRITINGS OF ALBERT AND ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER......Page 1
CONTENTS......Page 3
PREFACE......Page 7
INTRODUCTION ALBERT AND ROBERTA WOHLSTETTER ON NUCLEAR-AGE STRATEGY......Page 13
Contemporary Controversies and Continuing Relevance.......Page 15
I. ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF STRATEGIC POLICY......Page 18
Commentary: How He Worked......Page 105
I. WORKING ON A PROBLEM, REFRAMING OBJECTIVES......Page 107
Protecting Our Power to Strike Back Became a CrucialObjective.......Page 108
II. PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE DATA......Page 111
Learning from Many Disciplines: RAND in the 1950s.......Page 113
Experts Needed, but Not as Seers.......Page 114
III. BEYOND ANALYSIS TO DESIGN AND INVENTION......Page 115
Controlling Forces: Failing Safe.......Page 116
Challenge of Protecting Missiles, as well as Command,Control, and Communications.......Page 117
Persistent Efforts in Persuasion: Communicating the Analysisand Design’s Results.......Page 118
The Ballistic Missile Defense Dispute.......Page 119
The Arms Race Dispute.......Page 120
Civil vs. Military Uses of Nuclear Energy: Revealing a Distinction without Much Difference.......Page 123
The Need to Use Power Discriminately: The Moral Dimension.......Page 125
V. RADICALLY REDUCING UNINTENDED HARM TOCIVILIANS......Page 127
“Never Eat an Unworthy Calorie” and Other Passions.......Page 128
ENDNOTES - Rowen......Page 129
I. Madness in Methodology?......Page 135
A. Questions for Decision-Makers......Page 137
B. Theoretical Models......Page 140
C. The Time Span Covered......Page 141
D. Means......Page 144
E. Ends......Page 148
F. Uncertainties, Simplifications, and the Role of Inequalities......Page 151
A. Theories of Decision in International Affairs......Page 153
B. Potential Wars......Page 154
C. Specifics and the General: Imaginary Gardens with Real Toads......Page 165
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - Theory and Opposed-SystemsDesign......Page 170
II. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE......Page 177
The Basing Study.......Page 179
The Vulnerability Study.......Page 180
Challenging Dominant Paradigms: “The Delicate Balance” andAfter.......Page 181
The Limits of Strategic Deterrence.......Page 182
Contemporary Relevance.......Page 183
Not Just a Strategic Analyst.......Page 185
ENDNOTES - Enthoven......Page 186
I. Introduction......Page 189
II. The Presumed Automatic Balance......Page 190
III. The Quantitative Nature of the Problem and the Uncertainties......Page 191
IV. The Delicacy of the Balance of Terror......Page 195
V. The Uses and Risks of Bases Close to the Soviets......Page 200
VI. The Inadequacy of Strategic Deterrence, and Its Necessity......Page 211
VII. Deterrence, Accidents, and Disarmament......Page 216
VIII. Summary......Page 220
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - The Delicate Balance of Terror......Page 221
Discussion:......Page 225
The Concept of the “Missile Gap”......Page 226
On the Genesis of Nuclear Strategy:Letter to Michael Howard (1968)......Page 229
The Manhattan Project Scientists......Page 231
The Social Scientists and Historians......Page 238
The Military Views and the Military Stance......Page 243
Systems Analysts......Page 248
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - On the Genesis of NuclearStrategy......Page 258
III. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION......Page 267
Commentary: Timely Warnings Still—The Wohlstetters and Nuclear Proliferation......Page 269
N + 1 Problems.......Page 270
Safe or Dangerous?......Page 272
Atoms for Peace.......Page 274
Conclusion.......Page 276
ENDNOTES - Sokolski......Page 277
Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N + 1 Country (1961)......Page 279
Spreading the Bomb without Quite Breaking the Rules (1976)......Page 281
The Incoherence of Current U.S. Policies......Page 282
How We Got Into This Fix......Page 284
Is the Spread Likely?......Page 288
Figure 1.......Page 292
Table 1.......Page 293
Figure 2.......Page 294
The Fat Man and the Little Boy......Page 299
Would the Spread to More Countries be Bad?......Page 302
What Can We Do to Limit or Slow the Spread?......Page 303
Will Slowing the Spread Cost More than It Is Worth?......Page 306
On the Demand Side......Page 311
On the Supply Side......Page 312
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - Spreading the Bomb......Page 314
First Steps to a Bomb......Page 319
Shrinking Critical Time Versus Preserving the Option......Page 320
The Rhetoric of Peace and Economic Development......Page 321
Ambiguities, Ambivalence, and Sanctions......Page 322
U.S. Ambivalence......Page 324
Nuclear Versus Conventional Forces......Page 325
Policy Implications of the Indian-Canadian-U.S. Experience in Nuclear Cooperation......Page 326
Stopping Drifting Governments vs. Stopping Governments That AreCommitted from the Start......Page 327
“Safeguards” are Necessary but Not Sufficient......Page 329
Policy Toward Countries That Make Nuclear Explosives in Spite of anAgreement to Restrict Nuclear Activities to Peaceful Uses Only......Page 330
Policy Towards Countries That Do Not Disavow Intentions to MakeNuclear Explosives, “Peaceful” or Otherwise......Page 331
A Policy for Both India and Pakistan......Page 332
ENDNOTES - Roberta Wohlstetter - The Buddha Smiles......Page 334
Military Signals and Civilian Noise......Page 337
Confusions of “Peaceful Use” with “Exclusively Peaceful Use”......Page 338
Time, Warning Time and Article IV......Page 342
Sanctions and Article IV......Page 346
Increase of Civilian Nuclear Noise through Laxity in ProjectEconomics......Page 347
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter et al. - Signals, Noiseand Article IV......Page 351
Nuclear Triggers and Safety Catches,the “FSU” and the “FSRs” (1992)......Page 354
IV. ARMS RACE MYTHS VS.STRATEGIC COMPETITION'S REALITY......Page 359
Commentary: Arms Race Myths vs.Strategic Competition’s Reality......Page 361
ENDNOTES - Perle......Page 368
The Case for Strategic Force Defense (1969)......Page 369
ON THE COUNTERFORCE CALCULATIONS OF SOME PROMINENT ABM OPPONENTS......Page 377
ABM as a Part of a Second-Strike Force in the 1970’s......Page 371
On the Safely of Minuteman......Page 378
Dr. Rathjens’ Calculations......Page 379
Table 1......Page 381
Dr. Lapp’s Calculations......Page 382
Calculations of Dr. Steven Weinberg and Dr. Jerome Wiesner (in ABM:An Evaluation of the Decision to Employ an Anti-Ballistic MissileSystem, edited by Abram Chayes and Jerome Wiesner, New York,1969)......Page 386
The Calculations of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), March8, 1969......Page 387
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - The Case for Strategic ForceDefense......Page 390
Racing Forward? Or Ambling Back? (1976)......Page 393
The Standard View of the “Arms Race”......Page 396
U.S. Predictions and Soviet Realities......Page 401
Table 1
......Page 406
Charts......Page 407
Burying Wrong Predictions in the Known Past......Page 409
Figure 4a......Page 410
Figure 4b......Page 411
The Air Force, the Consensus, and Reality......Page 413
Figures 5a and 5b......Page 414
Why?......Page 416
III Mythical U.S. Increases and Actual U.S. Declines......Page 420
Total Explosive Energy and “Overkill”......Page 421
Figure 6......Page 422
The Number of Strategic Warheads......Page 423
Figures 8 and 9......Page 424
Figures 10 and 11......Page 425
Figures 12 and 13......Page 428
Figure 14......Page 432
Figures 15 and 16......Page 433
Figures 17 an 18......Page 434
IV The Net Effect of Qualitative Change......Page 435
Increasing the Choices......Page 441
Language and the Present Political Chaos......Page 442
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - Racing Forward? Or AmblingBack?......Page 443
On Arms Control: What We Should Look forin an Arms Agreement (1985)......Page 452
The MAD Momentum of MAD-Based Arms Control......Page 454
The Example of German Violations of the Versailles DisarmamentClause and British and French Complaisance in the 1920s......Page 455
Arms Agreements Based on MAD, by Paralyzing U.S. Responseto Soviet Union Arms Expansion, Encourage It......Page 462
Nominally Bilateral Arrangements Actually Reduce U.S. Arms One-Sidedly......Page 463
Such Nominally Symmetrical Arrangements are a Pragmatic PoliticalDevice Justifying Actual Asymmetry......Page 464
Since No Military Capability is Unambiguous, MAD-Based Agreements Tolerate a Pervasive Asymmetry between the Soviet Union and the U.S.......Page 469
The Advocates of Arms Agreements Based on MAD Prefer Arms Agreements of Indefinite Duration Because They are Harder to Alter Even When Circumstances Alter......Page 472
APPENDIX B: Ambiguities and the Soviet Destruction of SALT I......Page 473
ENDNOTES - The Wohlstetters - On Arms Control......Page 478
More Than One Potential Use......Page 481
Unique Opportunity......Page 484
V. TOWARDS DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE......Page 487
Commentary: Towards Discriminate Deterrence......Page 488
Technology and Strategy......Page 490
Future Conflict......Page 491
Backing Away from Massive Retaliation......Page 495
Conventional Weapon Ascendancy......Page 496
Unexplored Downsides......Page 499
The Spread of Nuclear Disorder......Page 500
ENDNOTES - Lukasik......Page 501
Strength, Interest and New Technologies (1968)......Page 503
II The Receding Technological Plateau......Page 504
Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents (1983)......Page 536
III Some Technical Changes......Page 506
IV Changes in Nuclear Offense and Defense......Page 508
V Distant Classical Wars, Old Geopolitics, and New Isolation......Page 515
VI Distant Cultural and Economic Interests......Page 518
VII Interests in Safety......Page 524
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - Strength, Interest and NewTechnologies......Page 528
How Much is Enough? How Mad is MAD? (1974)......Page 531
Mass Destruction and Initial Doubts about Stability......Page 547
The Second-Strike Theory......Page 550
Imprecision and Unintended Harm......Page 551
The Revolution in Precision......Page 553
Terror and Technology at the End of the 1950’s......Page 555
The McNamara Doctrine of the First Two Years......Page 556
McNamara, MAD, and MADCAP......Page 561
Soviet Values and MAD Nuclear Threats to Deter ConventionalAttack......Page 563
Deterring Nuclear Attack on an Ally......Page 571
The Incoherence of......Page 572
VI......Page 578
Connecting the Elements of the Strategy:Excerpt from Discriminate Deterrence (1988)......Page 583
The Enduring Aims of U.S. Policy......Page 584
An Integrated Strategy......Page 585
Changes in the Security Environment......Page 587
Wars on the Soviet Periphery and in the Third World......Page 589
The Coherent Use of Resources for Security......Page 591
RPM, or Revolutions by the Minute (1992)......Page 592
II......Page 595
III......Page 597
IV......Page 599
VI. LIMITING AND MANAGING NEW RISKS......Page 603
Commentary: Strategy as a Professionin the Future Security Environment......Page 604
The RAND Experience......Page 607
The U.S. Government......Page 611
What Backgrounds and Experiences Are Conducive to StrategicThinking?......Page 612
The Future of Strategy......Page 615
ENDNOTES - Marshall......Page 616
End of the Cold War? End of History and All War?Excerpt from an Outline for a Memoir (1989)......Page 617
The Fax Shall Make You Free (1990)......Page 619
The Bitter End: The Case for Re-Intervention in Iraq (1991)......Page 629
1. Humanitarian Aid and Future Ethnic Cleansing.......Page 641
2. Bosnia Is Not History.......Page 643
Signatories:......Page 644
Boris Yeltsin as Abraham Lincoln? (1995)......Page 649
ENDNOTES - Wohlstetter - Boris Yeltsen as Abraham Lincoln?......Page 655
ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS......Page 657