Non-Being : New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence

Cover
Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Non-Existence
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Contributors
Introduction
Chapter 1: Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being
	1. Ontological Pluralism
	2. Historical Precedent for Pluralism about Non-Being
	3. What Ontological Pluralism about Non-Being Can Do
		3.1 Presentist Ontological Pluralism about Non-Present Events and Objects
		3.2 Omissions versus Absences
		3.3 The Ontology of Fictions
	4. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 2: Nothingness and the Ground of Reality Heidegger and Nishida
	1. Introduction
	2. Nothingness
	3. The Ground of Reality
	4. Heidegger
	5. Interlude on Zen
	6. Nishida
	7. Conclusion
	8. Appendix on Heidegger and Zen
	References
Chapter 3: Thales’ Riddle of the Night
	1. Deciphering the Riddle
	2. The Unity of the Night
	3. Threats to the Night
	4. The Night is Older than the Earth
	5. Night without Day
	6. Where Does the Day Begin?
	7. Thales and the Demystification of the Night
	References
Chapter 4: Something from Nothing: Why Some Negative Existentials are Fundamental
	1. Are Negative Existentials Fundamental?
	2. Explaining Negative Existentials
	3. Why Totality Facts are Fundamental
		3.1 The Regress Account
		3.2 Conditional Grounding Account
		3.3 Actuality Account
		3.4 Zero-Grounding Account
	4. Negative Fundamental Facts: Revisited
	5. Concluding Remarks
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 5: Against Gabriel: On the Non-Existence of the World
	1. Introduction
	2. Fields of Fields
	3. Gabriel’s Arguments and their Formal Reconstruction
		3.1 Gabriel’s Formal Arguments
		3.2 Priest’s Mereological Interpretation
		3.3 Another Mereological Interpretation
	4. Beyond Formality
	5. Conclusion
	6. Appendix: Non-Wellfounded Mereology Defined in Cotnoir and Bacon (2012)
	References
Chapter 6: How Can Buddhists Prove That Non-Existent Things Do Not Exist?
	1. Buddhist Philosophers and Non-Existence
	2. Āśrayāsiddha
	3. Avoiding the Fallacy of Āśrayāsiddha, Part I
	4. Paraphrase vs Conceptual Objects
	5. Avoiding the Fallacy of Āśrayāsiddha, Part II
	6. Difficulties of Positing Conceptual Objects
	7. Conclusion
	References
Chapter 7: How Ordinary Objects Fit into Reality
	1. Pluralities
	2. Categories of Pluralities
	3. Non-Pluralities
	4. What Trees Are Not
	5. The Foundational Theses of Plurality Pointillism
	6. Five Consequences of Plurality Pointillism
	7. Plurality Pointillism and Non-Being
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 8: The Cosmic Void
	1. Introduction
	2. The Possibility of the Cosmic Void
	3. A Case Study
		3.1 Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
		3.2 The Everettian Wentaculus
	4. Challenges
		4.1 The Semantic Challenge
		4.2 The Metaphysical Challenge
		4.3 The Empirical Challenge
	5. Conclusion
	Acknowledgements
	References
Chapter 9: Ballot Ontology
	1. Too Close to Call
	2. Too Moot to Count
	3. Experts Wanted
	4. Holes and Chads
	5. Chadology Unveiled
	6. Chadology Unleashed
	7. Seeing the Light
	8. Regrets
	References
Chapter 10: Something Out of Nothing: What Zeno Could Have Taught Parmenides
	1. Introduction
	2. Clarifications and Presupposition
	3. Omissions
	4. Zeno Causality and Other-Worldly Effects
		4.1 The Case
		4.2 Possible?
		4.3 Causation?
			4.3.1 Intra-World Causation
			4.3.2 No Causation
	5. Dropping the Presupposition
		5.1 Intra-World Causation, Take Two
		5.2 No Causation, Take Two
		5.3 The Upshot
	6. Concluding Unphilosophical Postscript
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 11: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: An Argument for Anti-Nihilism
	1. Introduction
	2. Modal Realism
	3. Combinatorialism
	4. Ersatzism
		4.1 The Nature of Propositions
		4.2 Non-Propositional Ersatzism
	5. Dispositionalism
	6. The Relevance
	7. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 12: Ostrich Actualism
	1. Introduction
	2. The Actualism–Possibilism Distinction
	3. The Argument from Possible Actions
	4. Possibilist Discourse
	5. Worldhood and Contingency
	6. The Argument
	7. Aftermath
	8. Conclusion
	References
Chapter 13: Saying Nothing and Thinking Nothing
	1. Introduction
	2. Overview
		2.1 Kinds of Meaning
		2.2 Kinds of Semantic Nonsense
	3. In Favor of Deceptive Nonsense and Illusions of Thought
		3.1 Millianism
		3.2 Neo-Fregeanism
		3.3 Fregeanism
		3.4 The Big Picture
	4. Against Deceptive Nonsense and Illusions of Thought
		4.1 The Original Argument
		4.2 Cappelen’s Objections
		4.3 The Revised Argument
		4.4 The Action-Explanation Argument
		4.5 Contra Cappelen on The Action-Explanation Argument
	5. Resolving the Antinomy
		5.1 Thinking Nothing
		5.2 Thinking Empty Thoughts
		5.3 The Language of Thought
		5.4 Unmediated Belief
		5.5 Belief Reports
		5.6 The Revised Argument Revisited
		5.7 The Action-Explanation Argument Revisited
		5.8 O’Brien’s Objection
		5.9 The Indexing Response
	6. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 14: Why It Matters What Might Have Been
	1. Counterfactuals and the State of Nature
	2. Causal Counterfactuals and the Function of Modal Thought
		2.1 Edgington’s Semantics for Counterfactuals
		2.2 Zero-Tolerance and Modal Thought
	3. The Epistemic Approach
		3.1 Updating on Counterfactual Knowledge
		3.2 Causal Counterfactuals Unsuitable for This
	4. Counterfactuals and Regret
	5. Regret and Risk-Aversion
	6. Conclusion
	Appendix: Regret and the Attitude towards Risk
	References
Chapter 15: Explanatory Relevance and the Doing/Allowing Distinction
	1. Three Kinds of Dependence
		1.1 The Counterfactual Dependence View
		1.2 The Probabilistic Dependence View
		1.3 The Causal Dependence View
	2. Anomalous Factors Influencing our Doing/Allowing Judgments
		2.1 Independently Prohibited Behavior
		2.2 Prior Obligation to Protect
		2.3 Intentionality of Harm
		2.4 Deliberateness of Behavior
		2.5 Latitude
	3. The Explanatory Relevance View
		3.1 Outline of the View
		3.2 Three Principles of Explanatory Relevance
		3.3 Why the Explanatory Relevance Account Shares the Advantages of the Causal View
		3.4 How the Explanatory Relevance View Solves the Problems Facing the Causal View
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 16: Responsibility and the Metaphysics of Omissions
	1. Introduction
	2. The Question about Causal Powers
	3. Symmetric Overdetermination
	4. Asymmetric Overdetermination
	5. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Chapter 17: Death’s Shadow Lightened
	1. Introduction
	2. Preliminaries
	3. Argument
		3.1 Against Extrinsicalist Instrumentalist Views
			3.1.1 Deprivationism
			3.1.2 Generalization
		3.2 Against Intrinsicalist Views
			3.2.1 The Case for an Intrinsicalist View
			3.2.2 Intrinsicality
			3.2.3 The Intrinsic Value-Properties of a Death
		3.3 Against Extrinsicalist Final Views
	4. Conclusion
	Acknowledgments
	References
Index