New Methuselahs: The Ethics of Life Extension

Contents......Page 6
Introduction......Page 12
1.1 Introduction......Page 16
1.2 Optimism about life extension......Page 18
1.3 Possible methods of life extension and the basic processes of aging......Page 19
1.4 Is it possible to reverse aging?......Page 26
1.5 Why slowing aging might be harder than we realize......Page 28
1.6 Are any life extension methods available right now?......Page 29
1.7 How long would we live?......Page 30
1.8 Misconceptions about what life extension would be like......Page 31
1.9 Not everyone thinks life extension is desirable......Page 33
1.10 Why worry about this now?......Page 36
1.11 A survey of the moral issues......Page 40
2.1 Do you want to live forever?......Page 48
2.2 A dilemma for the very, very old......Page 49
2.3 Can you avoid boredom without fading away?......Page 52
2.4 The boredom pill......Page 54
2.5 How to survive your survival......Page 58
2.7 Conclusions......Page 64
3.2 Making a case for extended life......Page 66
3.3 General problems with bioconservative arguments......Page 68
3.4 Accepting death......Page 70
3.5 Motivation and procrastination......Page 71
3.6 The meaning of life......Page 72
3.7 Character and virtue......Page 74
3.8 Narcissism and transcendence......Page 77
3.9 Adaptive preferences (sour grapes)......Page 78
3.10 Unscheduled death and the new human condition......Page 80
3.11 Conclusions......Page 86
4.1 Introduction......Page 88
4.2 Would making life extension available reduce the death benefits for Will-­nots?......Page 89
4.3 If you refuse or discontinue life extension, are you committing suicide?......Page 91
4.4 If refusing or discontinuing life extension is suicide, is it immoral?......Page 96
4.5 Conclusions......Page 101
5.1 Introduction......Page 104
5.2 Potential bad social consequences......Page 105
5.3 Potential good social consequences......Page 110
5.4 Conclusions......Page 112
6.1 Introduction......Page 114
6.2 Will life extension cause a Malthusian crisis?......Page 115
6.3 A policy to prevent a Malthusian crisis: Forced Choice......Page 130
6.4 Practical problems with Forced Choice......Page 133
6.5 Reproductive ethics and Forced Choice......Page 135
6.7 What if some countries impose Forced Choice and others do not?......Page 137
6.8 The demographic formula used in this chapter......Page 140
6.9 Conclusion......Page 141
7.1 Introduction......Page 142
7.2 Distress......Page 143
7.3 The death burden......Page 146
7.4 Can we avoid making the death burden worse if we avoid developing life extension?......Page 151
7.5 Conclusions......Page 153
8.1 Introduction......Page 154
8.2 Equality......Page 155
8.3 Inequality as a reason for collective suttee......Page 158
8.4 What if other needs are more pressing?......Page 160
8.5 Who has a duty to subsidize life extension for Have-­nots?......Page 163
8.6 What if it’s possible to provide access to some Have-­nots but not possible to provide it to all of them?......Page 167
8.7 If we are sure that many Haves will breach their duty to the Have-­nots, is that a reason to deny it to everyone?......Page 169
8.8 Conclusions......Page 170
9.1 Introduction......Page 172
9.2 Midlevel principles, moral theory, and doing applied ethics......Page 173
9.3 What it means to maximize welfare......Page 177
9.4 Objection: we don’t have enough information......Page 178
9.5 Maximizing welfare in the long run......Page 182
9.6 How to argue that a world without life extension has greater net welfare than a world with it......Page 191
9.7 Peter Singer’s objection......Page 193
9.8 Conclusions......Page 196
10.2 Rights and welfare......Page 198
10.3 The right to equality favors neither Inhibition nor Promotion......Page 200
10.4 The right to self-­determination favors neither Inhibition nor Promotion......Page 202
10.5 The right against harm favors Inhibition......Page 206
10.6 Conclusions......Page 210
11.2 How to weigh rights against welfare......Page 212
11.3 Weighing Have-­not rights against welfare......Page 220
11.4 Weighing Will-­not rights against welfare......Page 224
11.5 Two versions of Promotion......Page 227
11.6 Conclusions......Page 228
12.1 Introduction......Page 230
12.2 Risk and the precautionary principle......Page 233
12.3 Authenticity......Page 237
12.4 Sandel’s concern about “giftedness”......Page 239
12.5 It’s not natural......Page 242
12.6 The value of a natural life span......Page 245
12.8 Fukuyama, human nature, and human rights......Page 247
12.9 Is aging a disease?......Page 248
12.10 Conclusions......Page 253
13.1 Policy recommendations......Page 254
13.2 List of conclusions......Page 259
A.1 Defining aging......Page 266
A.2 Previous gains in life expectancy......Page 268
A.3 Aging is puzzling......Page 269
A.4 Why we age......Page 270
B.1 Williams’s third life extension scenario......Page 276
B.2 Categorical desires and why we want to keep on living......Page 277
B.4 Two unsuccessful objections to the third scenario......Page 279
Appendix C......Page 282
Notes......Page 322
Bibliography......Page 346
Index......Page 358