Negotiating Trade Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Figures......Page 9
Tables......Page 10
Contributors......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 12
1 Introduction......Page 15
1 Participation explodes, negotiation process scholarship lags......Page 18
2 Main question and assumptions......Page 22
Two premises......Page 23
Coalition design......Page 26
Strategies......Page 28
Dynamic interactions on the subjective level......Page 32
Difference in institutional context changes process and thus outcome......Page 37
4 Future research, theoretical bridges, and practical implications......Page 40
Appendix......Page 42
REFERENCES......Page 45
Part I Multilateral negotiations......Page 53
2 The evolution of national interests: new issues and North–South negotiations during the Uruguay Round......Page 55
1 Method and conceptualization......Page 57
The evolution of national interests......Page 63
The negotiation of GATS and TRIPS......Page 65
Getting to Punta del Este......Page 66
Punta del Este to Montreal......Page 74
From Montreal to Brussels......Page 79
Brussels to Marrakesh......Page 84
Final analysis......Page 86
REFERENCES......Page 94
Introduction......Page 99
The main arguments......Page 101
TRIPS, the AIDS pandemic, and a fight over access to medicines......Page 104
Northern NGOs, Northern attention, and reframing......Page 106
Forming a large Geneva coalition with a mixed distributive strategy......Page 112
The endgame in Doha......Page 118
Conclusions......Page 121
REFERENCES......Page 125
4 The strict distributive strategy for a bargaining coalition: the Like Minded Group in the World Trade Organization......Page 129
1 The Logic behind the Main Argument......Page 130
2 An example of a heterogeneous coalition and a strict distributive strategy......Page 134
Coalition design......Page 135
Strategy......Page 137
3 The negotiation process, 2001......Page 141
4 The 2001 outcome: little gain and a major loss for the LMG......Page 147
5 Fragmentation is not inevitable: LMG in a comparative light......Page 150
6 Strategy Choice and Coalition Identity and Structure......Page 151
7 Alternative Explanations......Page 154
8 Conclusion......Page 155
REFERENCES......Page 157
Introduction......Page 159
1.1 Simulation protocol......Page 162
1.2 Data set......Page 165
1.3 Research questions......Page 166
2.1.1 Getting to know others’ bottom lines......Page 167
2.1.2 Viewing a zone of agreement......Page 169
2.1.3 Cooperative attitude......Page 171
2.2.1 A signalling game?......Page 172
2.2.3 Illusion of transparency?......Page 174
2.2.4 Too quick or oversimpli.ed tactical choices?......Page 176
2.2.5 Self-serving bias?......Page 177
2.2.6 Country characteristics and individual learning......Page 180
2.2.7 Truthfulness and learning......Page 182
Conclusion......Page 183
REFERENCES......Page 186
Part II Regional negotiations......Page 189
6 Getting to “No:” Defending against demands in NAFTA energy negotiations......Page 191
1 The facts on energy: Mexico’s negotiating position vs. negotiation outcomes......Page 193
1.1 Investment......Page 194
1.4 Other issues......Page 196
2 Available explanations......Page 197
3.1 Mexico’s sequentially mixed strategy and its framing tactics......Page 206
3.2 Mexico’s actions to offset biases and bolster the credibility of its position on energy......Page 212
3.3 Guarding against adverse market conditions......Page 219
4 Lessons on defending against demands in trade negotiations......Page 223
Appendix: NAFTA negotiation highlights......Page 227
REFERENCES......Page 228
Part III WTO Dispute Settlement Negotiations......Page 231
Introduction......Page 233
1 Legal framing as a source of bargaining leverage......Page 235
2 Peru takes on European food labeling policies......Page 242
Convincing the French that a scallop is a scallop......Page 243
Going all the way on sardines......Page 246
The US–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement......Page 252
The labeling dispute......Page 254
The antidumping determination......Page 257
4 Concluding remarks......Page 265
REFERENCES......Page 269
Introduction......Page 271
1 Origins of the banana wars......Page 275
2 The sequencing crisis......Page 279
3 The cross-retaliation request......Page 282
4 The twin settlements......Page 287
5 The waivers......Page 293
6 Conclusion......Page 297
REFERENCES......Page 300
Index......Page 303