Multi-Plant Safety and Security Management in the Chemical and Process Industries

Multi-Plant Safety and Security Management in the Chemical and Process Industries......Page 1
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 15
List of Acronyms......Page 17
1: Introduction......Page 19
2.1 Introduction......Page 23
2.2 Safety Risks Versus Security Risks......Page 24
2.3 The Safety-Risk Spectrum......Page 25
2.4 The Security-Risk Spectrum......Page 27
2.5.1 Domino Effects......Page 28
2.5.2 Domino-Events Categorization......Page 30
2.5.3 Domino Effects in the Past......Page 32
2.5.4 Multi-Plant Chemical-Risk Measurement......Page 36
2.6 Multi-Plant Chemical-Risk Management......Page 38
2.7 Hypothetical Benefits Associated with Multi-Plant Chemical Risks......Page 39
2.8 Safety-Risk Assessment and Safety-Risk Management......Page 43
2.10 Summary and Conclusions......Page 45
3.1 Introduction......Page 49
3.2 Encouraging Companies to Install a Multi-Plant-Safety and -Security Culture......Page 50
3.3.1 A Plant-Safety Culture......Page 53
3.3.2 A Plant Operator Security Plan......Page 55
3.3.3 Cooperative Strategies in Chemical Clusters......Page 56
3.3.4 Enhancing Collaboration in Chemical Multi-Plant Areas......Page 58
3.4 Coping with the Future: Developing a Multi-Plant-Safety and -Security Culture......Page 61
3.5 Summary and Conclusions......Page 65
4.1 Introduction......Page 67
4.2.1 Introduction......Page 69
4.2.2 Safety-Management Systems......Page 72
4.2.4 Setting Up a Multi-Plant Initiative......Page 74
4.3.1 Introduction......Page 80
4.3.2 Parties Involved......Page 81
4.3.3 The Multi-Plant (Safety & Security) Council (MPC)......Page 84
4.4.2.2 Safety Training......Page 90
4.4.2.7 Safety Inspection, Monitoring and Auditing......Page 93
4.4.3 Mitigation of Chemical Accidents......Page 94
4.4.4 Follow-Up of Incidents, Incident Investigation and Corrective Actions......Page 96
4.5.2.1 Execution of Security-Risk Assessments (Security-Vulnerability Analyses)......Page 97
4.5.2.6 Installation of Appropriate Physical Measures......Page 98
4.5.2.10 Documentation Control and Records......Page 99
4.6 System Implementation......Page 100
4.7 Summary and Conclusions......Page 102
5.1 Introduction......Page 105
5.2.1 Inherent Safety......Page 106
5.2.2.1 Introduction......Page 111
5.2.2.2 Hazop, What-If Analysis and the Risk Matrix......Page 112
5.2.2.3 An External Domino-Accident-Prevention Framework: Hazwim......Page 115
5.3.1 The Principles......Page 123
5.3.1.7 Third-Party Verification......Page 126
5.3.2 Achieving Solid Security for a Chemical Industrial Area......Page 128
5.3.3 Shaping a Framework for Indoor Security Cooperation: InSec......Page 129
5.3.5 Assessing and Evaluating Security Staffing Levels in a Multi-Plant Area......Page 134
5.4 Summary and Conclusions......Page 139
6.1 Introduction......Page 141
6.2.1.1 Drawbacks of Current Domino-Risk Software in a Multi-Plant Context......Page 142
6.2.1.2 Approach for Elaborating Industrial Area Knock-On Software......Page 144
6.2.2.1 Introduction......Page 148
6.2.2.2 External Domino-Risk Analysis......Page 149
6.2.2.3 A Suggested Multi-Plant Domino-Effect-Prioritization Methodology......Page 150
6.2.2.4 Mathematical Approach and Working Procedure for the Suggested Multi-Plant Domino-Effect-Prioritization Methodology......Page 153
6.2.2.5 Developing a Mathematical Model for Carrying Out the Preliminary Safety and Security Part of the Suggested Multi-Plant Domino-Effect-Prioritization Methodology......Page 154
6.2.2.6 Developing a Mathematical Model for Carrying Out the Security Part of the Suggested Multi-Plant Domino-Effect-Prioritization Methodology......Page 160
6.2.2.7 Developing a Mathematical Model for Carrying Out the Safety Part of the Suggested Multi-Plant Domino-Effect-Prioritization Methodology......Page 167
6.3 Summary and Conclusions......Page 173
7.1 Introduction......Page 175
7.2 Staffing-Level (SL)-Assessment Management Model......Page 177
7.3 Instrument for Existing Staffing-Level Assessment (IESLA)......Page 179
7.4 The MCSL Method......Page 181
7.5 Roadmap of Staffing-Level Assessment......Page 190
7.6 The Way Towards Continuous Staffing-Level Improvement in Industrial Areas......Page 192
7.7 Summary and Conclusions......Page 200
8.2 From Individual Plant Safety and Security Know-How to Multi-Plant Safety and Security Knowledge......Page 203
8.3 Towards a Design Code of Good Practice for Integrating Multi-Plant-Safety and -Security Building Blocks......Page 206
8.4 Planning for Safety and Security Sustainability......Page 209
8.5 Summary and Conclusions......Page 214
9.1 Introduction......Page 217
9.2 Qualitative Discussion on Multi-Plant-Safety and -Security Investments......Page 219
9.3 Two-Plant External Domino-Effects Investment Model......Page 221
9.3.1 Scenario 1......Page 223
9.3.2 Scenario 2......Page 224
9.3.3 Scenario 3......Page 225
9.4 Two-Plant Martyrdom Games......Page 226
9.5 Multi-Plant Games......Page 230
9.6 Summary and Conclusions......Page 236
10.2 Summary......Page 239
10.3 Main Conclusions and Recommendations......Page 243
References......Page 251
Appendix A: Instrument for Evaluating Security Staffi ng Levels......Page 261
B.1 Shift System, Flexibility and Organization......Page 269
B.2 Technology and Task Complexity......Page 270
B.3 Procedures and Documentation......Page 273
B.4 Communication......Page 275
B.5 Learning Facilities/Possibilities, Training and Education, Competencies......Page 276
Appendix C: Instrument for Evaluating Safety Critical Staffing Levels......Page 279
Index......Page 285