Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character

Preface and Acknowledgments......Page 5
I. Ethical Knowledge, Intuition, and Moral Skepticism......Page 8
III. Moral Psychology and Ethical Character......Page 10
IV. Reason, Judgment, and Value......Page 12
Accessibility......Page 15
Internal Justification......Page 17
The Epistemic intemalism of Kantian Ethics......Page 18
The Epistemic Externalism of Utilitarian Ethics......Page 20
Virtue Ethics......Page 23
Subjectivism......Page 24
Motivational Internalism and Externalism......Page 25
Rationalism and Empiricism......Page 26
Noncognitivism......Page 27
The Supremacy of Moral Reasons......Page 28
A Problem for consequentialist Externalism......Page 29
A Unity Constraint on moral Evaluation.......Page 32
Kantian Internalism and Moral Evaluation......Page 33
Intermlist and Extermlist Accounts of moral Knowledge......Page 36
Notes......Page 39
2: Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundations of Ethics......Page 40
I. Traditional Ethical Intuitionism......Page 41
Rossian Intuitionism......Page 42
Self-Evidence and Defeasibility......Page 48
II. Intuition, Intuitionism, and Reflection......Page 51
Four Characteristics of Intuitions......Page 52
Conclusions of Reflection versus Conclusions of Inference......Page 56
III. Self-Evidence and the Systematization of Intuitions......Page 58
Two Kinds of Self-Evidence......Page 59
The Possibility of Grounds for the Self-Evident......Page 62
Intuitive Justification and Reflective Equilibrium......Page 66
Ethical Reflection as a Justificatory Method......Page 68
V. Modified Ethical Intuitionism......Page 73
Notes......Page 80
3 Skepticism in Theory and Practice: Justification and Truth, Rationality and Goodness......Page 81
1. Skepticism about Theoretical Reason......Page 82
II. The Practical Ahalogy to Theoretical skepticism......Page 83
The Good and the True......Page 84
Practical versus Theoretical Skepticism about Ratioul Action......Page 88
III. Three Major Resyonses to Normative Skepticism......Page 90
The Epistemization of Truth and the subjectivization of Goodness......Page 91
Anti-Realism about Truth and Goodness......Page 94
Naturalistic Reductivism......Page 95
IV. The Irreducibility of truth and Goodness......Page 97
V. Internalist objectivism and Reasons for Action......Page 102
Basic Reasons for Action......Page 103
The Problem of Delíberative Composition......Page 106
Conclusion......Page 108
Notes......Page 109
I. Some Major Aims of Moral Epistemology......Page 110
II. Congitivism versus Noncognitivism in Moral Epistemology......Page 112
III. Rationalism, Empiricism, and Supervenience in Moral Epistemology......Page 113
IV. Empiricism and Reductive Naturalism......Page 116
V. Rationalism, Naturalism, and A Priori Supervenience......Page 118
VI. Prospects for a Rationalistic Moral Realism......Page 121
Notes......Page 131
I. The Supervenience of the Moral......Page 132
Moral Realism versus moral Epiphenomenalism......Page 136
Moral Realism and Moral Naturalism......Page 138
The Epistemic and Explanatory Dependence of Mora roperties on Natural Ones......Page 139
Moral Explanations Naturalized......Page 143
Causal versus conceptual supervenience......Page 144
III. All Alternative Moral Realism......Page 146
Notes......Page 151
6 Self-Deception, Rationalization and the Ethics of Belief: An Essay in Moral Psychology......Page 153
Self-Deception......Page 154
Self-Deceptive Conduct......Page 157
Self-Deception as Fertile Ground for Rationalization......Page 158
Rationalization......Page 159
The Circumstances of Self-Deceptive Rationalization......Page 162
Self-Deception as a Route to Rationalization......Page 164
Rationalization as a Route to Self-Deception......Page 165
The Scope of Self-Deception and Rationalization......Page 168
III. Self-Deception and Reasons for Acting......Page 171
Self-Deception as a Source of Reasons for Acting......Page 172
Self-Deception and Our Responsiveness to Reasons......Page 173
Self-Deception, Rationality and the Ethical Regulation of Belief......Page 175
Self-Deception and Rational Action......Page 179
Conclusion......Page 181
Notes......Page 183
I. The Conceptul Territory......Page 184
II. Responsibility for Character......Page 187
Three Kinds of Responsibility......Page 188
Cogitive and Motivational Dimensions of Responsibility......Page 191
III. Responsibility and Control......Page 193
IV. The Internality of Responsibility......Page 197
Normative Internalism about Responsibility......Page 198
Normative Responsibility, Determinism, and Causation......Page 201
Notes......Page 203
I. Aristotelian and Kantian Conceptions of Action from virtue......Page 204
II. The motivation and Range of Action from virtue......Page 208
III. The cognitive and Motivational Grounding of Action from virtue......Page 212
IV. The moral scope ofActing from virtue......Page 220
Conclusion......Page 224
Notes......Page 225
IV: Practical Reason and the Foundations of Ethics......Page 226
I. Autonomy as Self-Government......Page 227
Autonomy, Freedom, and Independence......Page 228
Internal and External Threats to Autonomy......Page 229
Neutrality With Respect to Normative Theories......Page 231
Autonomy and the Internalism-Externalism Controversy......Page 232
Second-Order Attitudes......Page 235
The Scope of Autonomy......Page 237
Principled Self-control......Page 238
II. An Instrumentalist Conception of Autonomy......Page 240
III. An Objectivist Conception of Autonomy......Page 243
IV. Autonomy and the Role of Reason......Page 246
Notes......Page 251
10: Moral Judgment and Reasons for Action......Page 252
I. The Issues: Jugments, Motives, and Reasons......Page 254
II. Motivational Reasons and Motivational Internalism......Page 262
III. Practical judgment and the Diversity of Internal Motivation......Page 266
IV. Rational, Agency and the Evidential Role of Moral Motivation......Page 271
V. Normative Reasons and Motivational Internalism......Page 275
VI. Reasons internalism and Moral Motivation......Page 279
VII. Reasons Externalism and Moral Motivation......Page 282
Conclusion......Page 285
Notes......Page 289
11: Intrinsic value and the Dignity of Persons......Page 290
I. An Aristotelian Case for Intrinsic Goodness......Page 291
II. The Range of Purportedly Intrinsic Goods......Page 295
III. Prospects for an Aristotelian Hedonism......Page 299
IV. Axological Experientialism......Page 301
The Halluciation Problem......Page 302
Intrinsic value and the mixture of Good and Evil......Page 306
The Experimental Dimensions of Moral value......Page 308
Human Dignity as a Higher-Order value......Page 311
VI. The Epistemology of Value......Page 313
Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action......Page 314
Agreement in Reasons versus Agreement on Reasons......Page 316
All Analogy Between Practical and Theoretical Reason......Page 317
VII. Problems for Valutional Pluralism......Page 319
Conclusion......Page 322
Notes......Page 323
I. Ethics and the Theory of Reasons for Action......Page 324
II. Epistemology and Ethical Theory......Page 326
III. The Justification of Moral Judgments: A Kantian Intuitionism......Page 328
IV. The Descríytive and Explanatory Powers of moral concepts......Page 338
V. Ethics in Action, Morality in character......Page 341
VI. virtue in character and moral worth in Action......Page 344
VII. Reason and motivation......Page 346
VIII. The Place of Value in the Foundations of Ethics......Page 349
Notes......Page 352