Micro-Pollutant Regulation in the River Rhine: Cooperation in a Common-Pool Resource Problem Setting

Preface
Acknowledgments
About the Book
Contents
About the Author
Abbreviations
Chapter 1: The Compelling Nature of Water Pollution as a Common-Pool Resource Problem
	1.1 The CPR and the Policy Problem of Micro-pollutants in Surface Water
	1.2 Defining the Key Terms: Management Process, Collaboration, and Cooperation
	1.3 Theoretical Explanations for Cooperation and Methodological Approach
	1.4 Societal Relevance of the Research
	1.5 Structure of the Book
	References
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 2: Theories and Theoretical Contribution
	2.1 Theories of Noncooperation
		2.1.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Non-cooperative, Nonzero-Sum Game
		2.1.2 The Tragedy of the Commons
		2.1.3 The Theory of Collective Inaction
	2.2 Theoretical Concepts on Collective Action and Common-Pool Resources
		2.2.1 A Theoretical Concept of Cooperation’s Core Relationships
		2.2.2 Preconditions for Collective Action in CPR Settings
		2.2.3 The IAD Framework: An Analytical Tool to Assess Collective Action
	2.3 Factors Supporting Cooperation in CPR Settings
		2.3.1 Recognizing the Environmental Problem
		2.3.2 The Ecology of Games Framework (EGF): How Forums Matter
		2.3.3 The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF): Actors’ Shared Beliefs
		2.3.4 Theoretical Relevance of the Research
	References
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 3: Methods and Cases
	3.1 A Public Policy Analysis
		3.1.1 The Policy-Making Process
		3.1.2 The Policy Problem
		3.1.3 The Solutions to a Policy Problem
		3.1.4 Policy Networks
	3.2 The Conceptual Framework Guiding the Research
		3.2.1 The Social-Ecological System Framework (SESF) and Its Critique
		3.2.2 Conceptualizing the Variables
			3.2.2.1 The Dependent Variable Cooperation
			3.2.2.2 The Independent Variables
			3.2.2.3 The Control Variables
	3.3 Case Study Design and Case Studies
		3.3.1 The Case Study Design: A Mixed-Method Study
		3.3.2 The Case Studies and Their Selection Criteria
			3.3.2.1 The Three Case Studies
			3.3.2.2 The SESF’s Characteristics Informing the Case Studies
		3.3.3 The Micro-pollutant Management Process at the Rhine Basin at Basel
			3.3.3.1 The Different Water Uses
			3.3.3.2 The Laws and Instruments
				Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants at the National Level
				Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants in the Cantons Basel City and Basel Country
		3.3.4 The Micro-pollutant Management Process in the Ruhr Region
			3.3.4.1 The Different Water Uses
			3.3.4.2 The Laws and Instruments
				The European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD)
				Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants in the Federal Republic of Germany
				Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants in the Ruhr Region
		3.3.5 The Micro-pollutant Management Process in the Moselle Basin
			3.3.5.1 The Different Water Uses
				…in Luxembourg
				…in Germany
			3.3.5.2 The Laws and Instruments
				Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland
					Water Policy Regarding Micro-pollutants in Luxembourg
					Water Policy Coordination at the Level of the IKSMS
		3.3.6 Similarities and Differences Between the Case Studies
	3.4 The Data Collection Process
		3.4.1 Document Analysis
		3.4.2 Actor Identification
			3.4.2.1 Based on the SESF
			3.4.2.2 Through the Reputational Approach
		3.4.3 Expert Interviews
		3.4.4 The Survey
			3.4.4.1 Collecting Data on the Dependent Variable
			3.4.4.2 Collecting Data on the Independent Variables
			3.4.4.3 Collecting Data on the Control Variables
		3.4.5 Response Rates and Handling Missing Data
			3.4.5.1 The Respondents
			3.4.5.2 The Non-respondents
				Basel Case Study
				Ruhr Case Study
				Moselle Case Study
			3.4.5.3 Handling Missing Data
	3.5 The Data Analysis Methods
		3.5.1 Descriptive Social Network Analysis
			3.5.1.1 A Graph, an Edge, and Vertices
				Walks, Trails, and Paths
				Components
				Factions
				Density
				Degree Centrality
				Core-Periphery
		3.5.2 Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM)
		3.5.3 The Qualitative Analysis: A Case Comparison
	References
		Sources
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis I: On Cooperation
	4.1 The Constituting Elements of Cooperation
		4.1.1 Aiming Towards the Same Goal
		4.1.2 Coordinating Each Other’s Actions: Actors’ Collaboration
		4.1.3 Exchanging Resources
		4.1.4 Relating the Three Elements
	4.2 A Network Perspective on Collaboration, the Core of Cooperation
		4.2.1 The Macro-level: Reciprocity, Fragmentation, and Components
		4.2.2 The Meso-level: Factions
		4.2.3 The Micro-level: Core, Important, and Peripheral Actors
			4.2.3.1 The Collaboration Networks’ Cores
			4.2.3.2 The Collaboration Networks’ Most Important Actors
			4.2.3.3 The Collaboration Networks’ Most Peripheral Actors
	4.3 Actors’ Perceptions of Cooperation
		4.3.1 … in the Basel Case Study
		4.3.2 … in the Ruhr Case Study
		4.3.3 … in the Moselle Case Study
	4.4 Qualitative Comparison I: Cooperation at Different Stages
	References
		Sources
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis II: On the Emergence of Cooperation
	5.1 The Exponential Random Graph Model
	5.2 Problem Perception and Cooperation
		5.2.1 Problem Perception as Initial Trigger: The Moselle Case Study
			5.2.1.1 Uncertainties Regarding the Management of Micro-pollutants in the Moselle Basin
		5.2.2 Knowing the CPR Problem: The Ruhr Case Study
		5.2.3 Mastering the CPR Problem: The Basel Case Study
		5.2.4 Actors’ Similar Viewpoint on the CPR Problem
	5.3 Actors’ Participation in Forums and Cooperation
	5.4 Actors’ Shared Beliefs and Cooperation
	5.5 Actors’ Attributes and Cooperation
	References
		Sources
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis III: On the Consolidation of Cooperation
	6.1 The Forums for Water Quality Management in the Rhine Basin
		6.1.1 The Diversity of Forums Actors Attend
		6.1.2 The Key Forums for Micro-pollutant Management in the Rhine Basin
	6.2 Forums’ Bridging and Bonding Capital
		6.2.1 … in the Basel Case
		6.2.2 … in the Ruhr Case
		6.2.3 … in the Moselle Case
	6.3 How Forums Reinforce Cooperation in CPR Problem Situations
	6.4 Qualitative Comparison II: The Factor Time and Triggers for Cooperation
		6.4.1 Cooperation in an Evolving CPR Management Process
		6.4.2 Cooperation in an Established CPR Management Process
		6.4.3 Controlling Factors and Cooperation in CPR Situations
		6.4.4 Contextual Factors and Cooperation in CPR Situations
	References
		Primary Literature
		Secondary Literature
Chapter 7: Conclusion I: Theoretical Insights on Cooperation in CPR Settings
	7.1 Factors Contributing to Cooperation in a CPR Problem Setting
	7.2 Explanatory Strength of the Results
		7.2.1 Construct Validity
		7.2.2 Internal Validity
		7.2.3 External Validity
		7.2.4 Reliability
	7.3 Discussing the Methods
	7.4 Contributions to Theory
	References
Chapter 8: Conclusion II: Insights for Practitioners
	8.1 Actors in the Center of Attention
	8.2 Cooperation Across Borders
	8.3 Forums as Transmitters of Knowledge and Trust
Annex
	Annex I: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (Table 1)
	Annex II: The Core Relationships (Fig. 1)
	Annex III: The Social-Ecological System Framework’s Second-Tier Characteristics (Table 2)
	Annex IV: Expert Interviews (Table 3)
	Annex V: Actor Lists (Tables 4, 5 and 6)
	Annex VI: Share of Actor Types Across the Case Studies (Table 7, 8 and 9)
	Annex VII: Questionnaire (Fig. 2)
	Annex VIII: Data Preparation
		DV: Networks of Collaboration and Information Exchange and Similar Goal Index
		IV 1a: Problem Perception
		IV 1b: Similar Problem Perception
		IV 2a: Participation in Forums
		IV 2b: Co-participation in Forums
		IV 3: Same Belief
		CV 1 and 2: Actor Has Regulatory Power and Actor Is an Implementer
		CV 3: Reputation
		CV 4: Pollution-Sensitive Water Use
		CV 5: Territoriality
	Annex IX: Lists of Non-respondents (Tables 10, 11 and 12)
	Annex X: Network Statistics (Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21; Figs. 3, 4, 5 and 6)
	Annex XI: ERGM Results—Models 1–5 (Tables 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26; Figs. 7, 8 and 9)
	Annex XII: The Model Robustness Checks and Its Goodness-of-Fit
		Annex XII.1: The Model Robustness Checks
		Annex XII.2: The ERGMs’ Goodness-of-Fit
	Annex XIII: Lists of Forums (Table 27, 28 and 29)
		References