Metaphilosophy and Free Will

Contents......Page 10
1. Free Will Subjectivism and Metaphilosophy......Page 16
2. An Example of the Importance of Metaphilosophy......Page 21
3. A Provisional Definition of Free Choice......Page 23
4. Overview of the Book......Page 25
I: THE FREE WILL PROBLEM AS A PROBLEM IN METAPHILOSOPHY......Page 28
1. What Is Philosophy For?......Page 30
2. Desires-for-Philosophy and Conceptions of Philosophy......Page 32
3. Four Metaphilosophies......Page 35
4. The Importance of Having a Metaphilosophy......Page 45
5. The Unprovability of Metaphilosophy: Two Reasons......Page 46
6. Three Objections to the Relativity of Metaphilosophies......Page 50
7. Conclusion......Page 52
1. Five Pairs of Intermediate Principles......Page 53
2. The Unprovability of Intermediate-Level Principles......Page 60
3. The Interplay of Metaphilosophies, Intermediate Principles, and Lower-Level Theories......Page 62
4. Why Adopt Philosophy as Continuous with Science?......Page 66
5. Conclusion......Page 68
1. Reasons for Believing in Free Will......Page 69
2. The Burden-of-Proof Issue......Page 73
3. How Far May Philosophers 'Go' to Accommodate Free Will?......Page 75
4. Strawson's Subjectivist Account of Blame......Page 76
5. The Debate over Dual Rationality......Page 82
5 How the Free Will Debate Depends on Metaphilosophy (II)......Page 90
1. The Analogy between the Metaphysics of Ethics and the Metaphysics of Free Will......Page 91
2. Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument......Page 95
3. Frankfurt's Principle of Alternative Possibilities......Page 99
4. Is Equal Proof Needed in All Areas of Philosophy?......Page 103
5. Standard and Non-Standard Views of Moral Responsibility......Page 106
6. Conclusion......Page 109
II: FREE WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PHILOSOPHY AS CONTINUOUS WITH SCIENCE......Page 110
6 How to Frame the Free Will Problem......Page 112
1. A Radical Approach to Free Will......Page 113
2. Four Free Will Theories......Page 114
3. Another Theory......Page 116
4. Conclusion......Page 121
7 The Fragmentation of Free Will......Page 122
1. The Unity Objection......Page 123
2. The Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection......Page 124
3. Two Preliminary Reasons to Reject Both Types of the Fragmentation-Is-No-Problem Objection......Page 125
4. Reasons to Reject the Bald Example......Page 127
5. Reasons to Reject Cockburn's Move......Page 132
6. Mele's Objection......Page 135
7. Conclusion......Page 137
8 Free Will Is a Moral Concept......Page 139
1. What Does It Mean to Call Free Choice a Moral Term?......Page 140
2. A Preliminary Reason for Thinking That Free Choice Is Moral......Page 141
3. The Open-Question Argument: Goodness and Freeness......Page 143
4. The Analogy with Moral Facts: Freeness Facts Have No Explanatory Power......Page 145
5. The Goodness of Ultimacy......Page 147
6. The Dispute over Magnanimity......Page 151
7. Conclusion......Page 155
9 Hume's Principle: The Subjectivity of Moral Responsibility and Free Will......Page 156
1. Defining the Key Terms......Page 157
2. Why Hume's Principle Implies That Ascriptions of Moral Responsibility Cannot Be True......Page 160
3. Why Hume's Principle Implies That Free Choice Is a Moral Concept......Page 164
4. Conclusion......Page 167
1. Where We Are......Page 169
2. Philosophical Consequences......Page 171
3. Consequences for Persons......Page 174
References......Page 180
F......Page 186
M......Page 187
R......Page 188
Z......Page 189