Manifestations of Genericity

Book Cover......Page 1
Title01......Page 2
Title02......Page 6
Copyright......Page 7
Dedication......Page 8
Contents......Page 10
Preface......Page 23
Acknowledgments......Page 26
1. Introduction......Page 28
2.1 Genericity in English......Page 31
2.2 The I (characteristic)/D (kind) genericity distinction......Page 32
2.3 Relevance of the characteristic/kind distinction to the IS/BP distinction......Page 34
2.4 The basic semantic structure of characteristic (I-) generics......Page 36
2.5.1 Tolerance of exceptions, law likeness, and counterfactual support of characteristic generics......Page 39
2.5.2 Kratzer’s (1981) analysis of nongeneric modal verbs and its application to the semantics of Gen.......Page 42
3. Unexpected differences between minimal pairs of IS and BP sentences......Page 45
3.1 Differences between IS and BP sentences in temporally modified sentences......Page 46
3.2.1 The original intuition......Page 51
3.2.2 Problems with the original intuition......Page 53
tremely unnatural classes” .........Page 55
ly Unconnected Properties” or extremely unconnected properties .........Page 59
3.5.1 “Out of the blue” vs. contextually supported IS and BP sentences......Page 60
3.5.2 Contextual support does not always help: IS sentences in pure inductive scenarios......Page 61
3.6 IS and BP sentences which do not differ so much......Page 63
4. Parallels between the IS/BP distinction in temporally restricted and classic generic constructions......Page 65
to (I-) genericity .........Page 67
5.2 The intuitive underlying difference between IS and BP sentences......Page 70
6. An outline of this work......Page 72
1.1 Basic Characteristics of IS Sentences......Page 74
1.2 The basic intuition......Page 77
 of IS sentences .........Page 78
1.4 The pragmatic aspects in the semantics of IS sentences and their formalization......Page 81
2.1 Krifka (1987): modality vs. nonmodality......Page 83
2.2 Unspecified modal base of I- generics—Krifka et al. (1995) and Krifka (1995)......Page 84
2.3 Cohen (2001): IS sentences as expressing rules......Page 86
3. Chierchia’s (1995) and Brennan’s (1993) theories: a formalization of the “in virtue of” intuition......Page 89
3.1 Chierchia (1995): “felicity conditions” restricting the accessibility relation......Page 90
3.2 Brennan (1993): an accessibility relation “keyed to the properties of the subject”......Page 93
3.2.2 Brennan’s intuition......Page 94
3.2.3 The formalization......Page 95
4.1 Basic data and intuition......Page 97
4.2 “Accessible w.r.t. a property”: subset, and not membership relationship......Page 98
4.3.1 Contextual restrictions on the choice of the “in virtue of” property......Page 99
4.3.2 Brennan’s suggestion for restricting the set of “in virtue of” properties......Page 102
4.3.3 An intuitive characterization of “associated properties”......Page 103
4.3.4 Formal characterization of “associated properties”......Page 104
4.4 Integrating the definition of “associated properties” into the truth conditions of IS sentences......Page 105
4.5 The problem of exceptions......Page 107
5.1 Normative, legal, epistemic, etc., “flavors” of IS sentences......Page 110
5.2 Comparing IS sentences and nongeneric universal sentences with overt deontic modal verbs......Page 112
5.3 High level of law-likeness: the “analytic” flavor of IS sentences......Page 115
5.4.1. Basic infelicity......Page 118
5.4.2 Contextual support for infelicitous IS sentences......Page 121
5.4.3 Inductive contexts......Page 123
5.4.4 “Linguistically associated properties” as improving the felicity of IS sentences......Page 124
6.1 The problem: “association” of ^S with ^P is not enough......Page 126
6.2 The intuition: A second contextual requirement on the ^S property......Page 128
6.3.1 The extensional disjunction......Page 130
6.3.2 Problems with the “extensional disjunction”......Page 132
6.3.3.1 The intuition......Page 134
6.3.3.2 Defining the right kind of “good possibility”......Page 135
6.4.1 An apparently better alternative: limiting ^Q and not ^S......Page 138
6.4.2 Triggering of the presupposition......Page 140
6.4.3 A more efficient evaluation process......Page 145
7. Conclusion and summary......Page 147
1. Introduction......Page 152
1.1 Basic properties of BP, as opposed to IS sentences......Page 153
1.2.1 The intuition......Page 155
1.2.2 Direction of formalization......Page 156
1.2.4 Basic modality/intensionality of descriptive BP sentences......Page 157
1.2.5 The nature of modality/intensionality of descriptive BP sentences......Page 158
1.2.6 Basic semantic structure, and structure of this chapter......Page 159
2.1.1 The data and the intuition......Page 161
2.1.2 The formalization: a Lewis-style definition of maximally similar worlds......Page 164
2.2.1 The data and the intuition......Page 166
2.2.2 The formalization: evaluation in world-interval pairs......Page 168
2.2.3 The problem of natural, expected, changes, and its solution......Page 171
2.3 Truth of the universal statement in the actual world: present and past......Page 174
entences .........Page 176
3. Accounting for the basic properties of descriptive BP sentences......Page 180
3.1 Descriptive BP sentences as freely expressing “unreasonable generalizations”......Page 181
3.2 Unified flavor of descriptive BP sentences......Page 182
3.3 Descriptive BP sentences as expressing a low degree of law-likeness......Page 183
4.1 Advantages......Page 184
4.2 An apparent problem......Page 187
5.1 The existence requirement: The basic data......Page 188
5.2 The existence requirement is a presupposition......Page 192
5.3 Triggering the presupposition......Page 193
5.3.1 The conventionally triggered “existence presupposition”......Page 194
5.3.2.1 The mismatch......Page 195
rinterval I′ .........Page 198
5.3.3.1 The mismatch......Page 200
5.3.3.2 A resolution of the mismatch: triggering presupposed existence in the actual world......Page 201
5.4.1 Existence presuppositions of IS sentences-basic data......Page 204
5.4.2 What triggers existence in the actual world with epistemic IS sentences......Page 207
5.4.4.1 The first support: defeasibility of the existence presupposition with epistemic IS sentences......Page 209
oncerning existence of relevant situations in the actual world .........Page 210
6. The \"enough\" presupposition of descriptive BP sentences and the relationship between descriptive generics and the process of inductive inference......Page 212
6.1 The “enough” implication: basic data and intuition......Page 213
6.2 The “enough” implication is a conversationally triggered presupposition......Page 214
6.3 The temporal asymmetry and variability of the “enough” presupposition......Page 218
6.4 Inductive inferences and descriptive generalizations......Page 221
6.5 Back to the “enough” presupposition......Page 223
6.6 An apparent counterexample: more cases where “enough” is very few......Page 225
7. Conclusion and summary......Page 226
1. Introduction......Page 230
2. The basic data: similarities in the way IS and descriptive BP sentences tolerate exceptional and irrelevant entities......Page 231
3.1 Kadmon and Landman’s 1993 theory of generics......Page 236
3.2.1 A vague restriction on the set of individuals......Page 238
3.2.2 A vague restriction also on the set of situations......Page 240
3.3 Advantages of the new mechanism for tolerating exceptional and irrelevant entities......Page 243
3.4.1. “Abnormality” of the legitimate exceptions is not captured......Page 245
3.4.2 A (newly observed) difference between IS and descriptive BP sentences is not captured......Page 246
4.1 The intuition......Page 248
tions seems impossible .........Page 249
4.3 The direction of formalization......Page 254
5.1 The further pragmatic requirement on the vague restriction on the P set of individuals......Page 256
5.2 The further pragmatic requirement on the vague restriction on the set of situations......Page 260
5.3 IS sentences with an even more vague restriction......Page 263
6.1 The further pragmatic requirement on the vague restriction on the set of individuals......Page 264
6.2 The further restriction on the vague restriction on the set of situations......Page 269
7. Conclusion......Page 270
1. Introduction......Page 274
2.1 The basic data......Page 275
2.2 Differences between BP and IS sentences......Page 276
3.1 Condoravdi’s (1993, 1997) “functional” reading......Page 281
3.2 Condoravdi’s conditions for nongenericity are relevant for temporally restricted sentences......Page 283
3.3 Examining Condoravdi’s conditions for nongenericity......Page 284
3.4 Positive indications for genericity......Page 287
4. A closer examination of the BP/IS distinction in temporally restricted sentences......Page 291
4.1 Two readings of the temporal adverbial......Page 292
4.2 A descriptive generalization......Page 295
5. How can existing theories of genericity handle the descriptive generalization?......Page 297
 and episodicity mutually exclusive? .........Page 298
e behavior of IS sentences .........Page 299
5.1.2 Modality/law-likeness as explaining the behavior of IS sentences......Page 302
ic genericity”? .........Page 303
generic sentences .........Page 306
le generalizations” .........Page 308
6.3 Truth conditions of temporally restricted present tense IS and BP sentences......Page 311
6.4.1 The “reasonable causation” presupposition with temporally restricted IS sentences......Page 314
6.4.2 Support for the proposed so the proposed solution......Page 318
6.5 Why BP sentences are compatible with the default, “indexical” reading of the adverbial......Page 320
 BP sentences .........Page 321
7. Conclusion......Page 323
1. Introduction......Page 324
2.1 Similarities between IS and BP sentences......Page 325
2.2.1 Accessibility relations......Page 327
2.2.2 Presuppositions......Page 329
2.3 Apparent interactions between “in virtue of” and “descriptive” generalizations......Page 332
3.1 The problem......Page 333
3.2 The semantic difference between IS and BP noun phrases......Page 334
 as well? .........Page 336
3.4.1 Chierchia’s (1998) and Krifka et al.’s (1995) suggestions......Page 339
3.4.2 Similarities between characterizing sentences with BP and proper-name subjects......Page 340
3.4.3.1 Option A: a Delfitto (1996)-style representation4......Page 343
3.4.3.2 Option B: a von Fintel (1994)-style representation for BP sentences......Page 347
4. Conclusion......Page 348
Bibliography......Page 352
Index......Page 358