Law's ideal dimension

Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Introduction
Part I The Nature of Law
	1. The Nature of Legal Philosophy
		I. The Nature of Philosophy
		II. Pre-Understanding and Arguments
		III. Three Problems
		IV. Four Theses
		V. Entities and Concepts
		VI. Necessary Properties
		VII. Law and Morality
	2. On the Concept and the Nature of Law
		I. The Practical and Theoretical Significance of the Debate
			A. Statutory Injustice and the Radbruch Formula
			B. Law’s Open Texture and the Self-Understanding of Jurists
			C. The Concept of Law as a Concept of a Non-Natural Kind
		II. Positivism and Non-Positivism
			A. Separation Thesis and Connection Thesis
			B. Exclusive and Inclusive Positivism
			C. Exclusive, Inclusive, and Super-Inclusive Non-Positivism
		III. Concept and Nature
			A. Nature
			B. Concept
		IV. The Dual Nature of Law
			A. Coercion
			B. Correctness
		V. What the Law Is and What It Ought to Be
	3. The Dual Nature of Law
		I. The Ideal
			A. The Claim to Correctness
			B. Discourse Theory
		II. The Real
		III. The Reconciliation of the Ideal and the Real
			A. Outermost Border
			B. Democratic Constitutionalism
	4. Law, Morality, and the Existence of Human Rights
		I. Positivism, Non-Positivism, and the Existence Problem
			A. Three Elements and Two Dimensions
			B. Two Forms of Positivism
			C. Three Forms of Non-Positivism
			D. Inclusive Non-Positivism and the Existence Problem
		II. The Existence of Human Rights
			A. Human Rights as Moral Elements
			B. The Concept of Human Rights
			C. The Justifiability of Human Rights
	5. An Answer to Joseph Raz
		I. Separation Thesis
			A. Kelsen’s Statement
			B. The Idea of a Definition of Law
			C. Necessary Connections
		II. Participants and Observers
		III. The Argument from Correctness
		IV. The Argument from Injustice
		V. The Argument from Principles
	6. The Ideal Dimension of Law
		I. The Claim to Correctness
		II. Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Necessities
			A. The Argument from Fruitlessness
			B. The Argument from Deficiency
		III. The Necessity of the Real Dimension of Law
		IV. A Conceptual Framework
			A. First-Order and Second-Order Correctness
			B. Observer and Participant
			C. Perspectives and Dimensions
			D. Classifying and Qualifying Connections
		V. The Relation between the Real and the Ideal Dimension
			A. The Radbruch Formula
			B. The Special Case Thesis
			C. Human Rights
			D. Democracy
			E. Principles Theory
	7. Gustav Radbruch’s Concept of Law
		I. Gustav Radbruch’s System
			A. The Law Triad
			B. The Idea Triad
			C. The Triad of Purpose
		II. The Radbruch Formula
Part II Constitutional Rights, Human Rights, and Proportionality
	8. The Construction of Constitutional Rights
		I. The Rule Construction
			A. Rules and Principles
			B. The Postulate to Avoid Balancing
			C. Problems of the Rule Construction
		II. Principles Construction and Proportionality Analysis
		III. Objections to the Principles Construction
		IV. The Rationality of Balancing
			A. The Central Role of the Rationality Problem
			B. The Irrationality Objection
			C. Pareto-Optimality
			D. The Law of Balancing
			E. The Weight Formula
	9. Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation
		I. Balancing
			A. Two Objections
			B. The Structure of Balancing
		II. Constitutional Review
		III. Representation
			A. Argumentative Representation
			B. Conditions of True Argumentative Representation
	10. The Existence of Human Rights
		I. The Theoretical and Practical Significance of the Existence Question
		II. The Concept of Human Rights
		III. The Justification of Human Rights
			A. The Principles Structure of Human Rights
			B. Scepticism and Non-Scepticism
			C. Justification and Thesis
			D. Eight Justifications
	11. The Weight Formula
		I. The Norm-Theoretic Basis: Rules and Principles
		II. The Principle of Proportionality in the Narrower Sense
		III. The Triadic Scale
		IV. The Formula
		V. The Extended Formula
	12. Formal Principles: Some Replies to Critics
		I. The Problem
		II. Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory
			A. Rules and Principles
			B. Proportionality
			C. Weight Formula
		III. The Concept of Formal Principle
		IV. Principles and Balancing in General
		V. The Wrong Way
		VI. Two Kinds of Discretion
		VII. Second-Order Epistemic Optimization
		VIII. Formal Principles and Discretion
	13. Ideal ‘Ought’ and Optimization
		I. The Index Model of the Ideal ‘Ought’
		II. The Law of Competing Principles
		III. The Weight Formula
		IV. Law of Competing Principles and Law of Balancing
		V. A Fundamental Equivalence
		VI. Poscher’s Argument from Identity
		VII. Sieckmann’s Reiterated Validity Obligations
	14. Human Dignity and Proportionality
		I. Absolute and Relative Conceptions of Human Dignity
		II. Practical Significance
		III. Some Basic Elements of Principles Theory
			A. Rules and Principles
			B. Proportionality
			C. Weight Formula
		IV. The Concept of Human Dignity
			A. Descriptive and Normative Elements
			B. The ‘Double-Triadic’ Concept of Person
			C. Human Dignity as a Bridge Concept
		V. Human Dignity as Principle and as Rule
			A. Human Dignity as Principle
			B. Human Dignity as a Rule
		VI. Devaluation of Human Dignity?
			A. Clear Cases
			B. Object Formula
			C. Abstract Weight and Epistemic Reliability
			D. Rationality
	15. Proportionality and Rationality
		I. Empirical and Analytical Approaches
		II. Proportionality and Principles Theory
			A. Rules and Principles
			B. Proportionality
		III. Balancing and Argumentation
			A. The Formal and the Substantive Dimension of Rationality
			B. Numbers, Classification Propositions, and their Justification
			C. Disagreement, Discourse, and Rationality
		IV. Balancing, Universalizability, and Legal Certainty
			A. The ad hoc Problem
			B. The Law of Competing Principles
			C. Rules and Conditions
	16. The Absolute and the Relative Dimension of Constitutional Rights
		I. The Absolute and the Relative
		II. Constitutional Rights
			A. Constitutional and Human Rights
			B. The Degree of the Absolute Dimension of Constitutional Rights
		III. Proportionality
			A. The Absoluteness of the Principle of Proportionality
			B. The Relativity and Absoluteness of the Application of the Principle of Proportionality
Part III. Argumentation, Correctness, and Law
	17. A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason
		I. Introduction
		II. In Defence of the Concept of Practical Reason
		III. A Kantian Conception of Practical Rationality: Discourse Theory
			A. The Basic Idea of Discourse Theory
			B. The Status of Discourse Theory as a Theory of Practical Correctness and Rationality
			C. Towards the Justification of the Rules of Discourse
			D. The Application of Discourse Theory
	18. Problems of Discourse Theory
		I. Discourse Theory as a Procedural Theory
		II. Rules of Discourse
		III. The Ideal Discourse
			A. The Problem of Construction
			B. The Problem of Consensus
			C. The Problem of the Criterion
			D. The Problem of Correctness
		IV. The Real Discourse
			A. The Discursive Modalities
			B. The Relative Concept of Correctness
	19. Legal Argumentation as Rational Discourse
		I. Models
			A. The Model of Deduction
			B. The Model of Decision
			C. The Hermeneutic Model
			D. The Model of Coherence
		II. A Discourse Theory of the Law
			A. General Practical Discourse
			B. Institutionalization
		III. Legal Argumentation
			A. The Different Kinds of Legal Arguments
			B. The Strength of the Arguments
	20. Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of the Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication
		I. The Problem of Rationality in Adjudication
		II. Three Insufficient Answers
		III. Ronald Dworkins’s Theory of Rights
		IV. Law as an Ideally Coherent System of Norms
		V. Theory of Legal Argumentation
		VI. The Special Case Thesis
			A. Moral, General Practical, and Legal Discourse
			B. The Rules and Forms of Legal Discourse
			C. Unjust Law
			D. Specific Legal Nature?
	21. Law and Correctness
		I. The Concept of the Claim to Correctness
			A. The Subjects
			B. The Addressees
			C. Raising a Claim
		II. The Necessity of Connecting Law and Correctness
			A. An Absurd Constitutional Article
			B. An Absurd Judgment
			C. The Alternative
		III. Legal and Moral Correctness
			A. Law’s Open Texture
			B. The Autonomy Objection
			C. The Objection of Impossibility
			D. Reality and Ideal
Index of Names
Index of Subjects