Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in International Trade (Columbia Studies in WTO Law and Policy)

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 9
Introduction......Page 11
Introduction......Page 17
Historical and Legal Context......Page 18
Definition of Subsidy......Page 23
Financial Contribution......Page 24
By a Government......Page 32
Income or Price Support......Page 33
Benefit......Page 35
Specificity......Page 38
In Conclusion: Interplay between the Domestic and International Level......Page 40
Categories of Subsidies......Page 43
Prohibited Subsidies......Page 44
Export Subsidies......Page 49
Local Content Subsidies......Page 58
Actionable Subsidies......Page 59
Nonactionable Subsidies......Page 63
Remedies......Page 64
Multilateral Remedies: WTO Adjudicating Bodies......Page 65
Procedural Requirements......Page 70
Substantive Requirements......Page 73
The Imposition of CVDs......Page 75
Ratione personae: Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries......Page 78
Ratione Materiae: AoA......Page 81
Export Competition......Page 83
Domestic Support......Page 85
Relationship between the SCM Agreement and AoA......Page 89
Conclusion......Page 92
Introduction......Page 95
Justifying Domestic Subsidies Disciplines in the WTO......Page 97
How Well Do the Existing Rules Perform (i.e., Absent Nonactionability)?......Page 98
Nonactionable Subsidies in the Doha Round......Page 110
Conclusion......Page 111
Introduction......Page 113
Accountants versus Economists......Page 114
A Basic Analytical Framework......Page 117
Defining the Benefit in the Countervailing Market......Page 119
What Happens When Many Countries Countervail?......Page 120
Fungibility and Capital Subsidies......Page 121
Lobbying and Government......Page 122
Discussion......Page 123
Article 14: Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient......Page 124
Introduction......Page 126
Why Prohibit Export Subsidies?......Page 129
Pre-Uruguay Round Export Subsidy Rules......Page 136
The WTO Framework on Export Subsidies......Page 137
What Is an Export Subsidy?......Page 139
What Is a “Subsidy”?......Page 140
Is the Subsidy “Contingent…Upon Export Performance”?......Page 143
Is the Enabling Legislation Mandatory or Discretionary?......Page 150
Remedies......Page 153
Withdrawal Without Delay......Page 155
Retrospective or Prospective Withdrawal?......Page 156
Preexisting Commitments......Page 159
Obligations Under Domestic Law......Page 163
Countermeasures......Page 165
Unilateral Domestic Remedies......Page 173
Conclusion......Page 175
Too Much......Page 178
Too Little......Page 180
References......Page 181
Introduction......Page 182
Introduction......Page 183
Selectivity......Page 184
Effect upon Competition and Trade between Member States......Page 185
The “Market Economy Investor Principle”......Page 186
Exceptions......Page 187
Introduction......Page 188
Existing Aid......Page 189
New Aid......Page 190
Conclusion......Page 194
5.1 Why Not Brussels? European Community State Aid Rules and the Boeing–Airbus Dispute: Comment on Piet Jan Slot......Page 195
The Subsidies at Issue in the Boeing–Airbus Dispute......Page 196
The Difficulties Posed By the Commissions Past History on Launch Aid......Page 199
Potential Difficulties in Challenging Other Categories of Alleged Subsidies......Page 200
Conclusion......Page 205
Background......Page 207
The Price Comparison......Page 210
Third Country Prices and Constructed Normal Value......Page 211
Export Price Options......Page 212
Selecting and Adjusting the Prices to Be Compared......Page 213
The Determination of Injury......Page 214
The Causal Relationship......Page 216
Threat of Material Injury......Page 217
The Application of Antidumping Measures......Page 218
General......Page 219
Provisional Measures and Retroactive Collection of Duties......Page 220
Other Considerations......Page 221
Initiation......Page 222
De minimis Margins/Negligible Volume......Page 223
Right of Interested Parties to Defend their Interests......Page 224
Confidential Information......Page 225
Facts Available......Page 226
Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations......Page 227
Antidumping Action on Behalf of a Third Country......Page 228
WTO Member Review......Page 229
WTO DSB Review......Page 230
WTO Antidumping Committee Review......Page 231
Major Users of the Antidumping Laws......Page 232
WTO Disputes Over Antidumping Laws and Measures......Page 234
Bibliography......Page 237
6.1 A Commentary on the Stewart and Dwyer “Overview”......Page 251
Justification for the Antidumping Laws......Page 252
Challenges in International Regulation of National Antidumping Proceedings......Page 255
De minimis Margins......Page 257
Non–Market Economy Analysis......Page 258
Material Injury Determinations......Page 259
Zeroing......Page 260
Impact of the DSB on National Antidumping Practices......Page 261
The Future of Antidumping Actions......Page 263
6.2 Comments on “Antidumping: Overview of the Agreement”......Page 267
References......Page 273
Introduction......Page 274
The Antitrust and Antidumping Systems......Page 276
RP Act......Page 278
Consensus of Agency Leadership......Page 280
Private Enforcement Alternative......Page 281
Predatory Pricing......Page 282
Antitrust and Antidumping: Consistency with Commentary......Page 285
Efforts to Establish Multilateral Rules and Methodologies Used......Page 286
Origin and Anticircumvention......Page 291
Nonpreferential Rules of Origin and Antidumping......Page 292
Origin in the Dumping Determination......Page 293
Origin in the Injury Determination......Page 298
Consumer Interest......Page 301
Origin After the Imposition of Antidumping Measures......Page 302
Sanctions for Violations of Origin Rules......Page 305
The Issue of Equally All Purposes......Page 306
Nonpreferential Rules of Origin and Circumvention: Recent Developments in Negotiation Group on Rules......Page 309
Circumvention......Page 312
Conclusions......Page 315
8.1 Nonpreferential Origin Rules in Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comment on Inama and Vermulst......Page 316
Introduction......Page 319
The Overarching Principles of Sunset Review According to the Appellate Body Case Law and Their Application in Recent EC Cases......Page 322
The Appellate Body, in Many Decisions, Decided Not to Apply the Same Provisions Regulating Original Investigations to the Sunset Review......Page 325
Only in Few Decisions Did the Appellate Body Decide in Favor of a Strict Standard for Sunset Reviews......Page 331
Final Considerations Regarding the Appellate Body Case Law......Page 332
The Interpretation of Sunset Review Provision in the EC: An Example of a Different Methodology......Page 333
Puzzling Situation in Sunset Reviews in the EC Practice......Page 334
9.1 Comments on “The Appellate Body Interpretation of 'Sunset Reviews’ Provisions of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures Agreements: A Critical Analysis”......Page 338
References......Page 343
Safeguards as a Trade Remedy......Page 344
The Role of Safeguards in the GATT/WTO......Page 345
Conditions for Imposing Safeguards Action......Page 348
(i) A Requirement, According to the Appellate Body......Page 349
(ii) Developments that are “Unforeseen”......Page 350
(iii) What Could Constitute “Unforeseen Developments”? Lessons from Case Law......Page 351
(i) Role of “Increased Imports” Compared with Other Contingent Trade Remedy Instruments......Page 353
(i) Serious Injury......Page 354
(ii) Threat of Serious Injury......Page 355
(iii) The Domestic Industry Producing the Like or Directly Competitive Product......Page 356
(i) Nonattribution......Page 358
(ii) A Relationship of Cause and Effect: Theory and Practice......Page 360
A Typology of Safeguard Measures......Page 362
General Rule: Only to the Extent Necessary......Page 363
(a) Minimum Quantity of Imports in Case of Quantitative Restrictions......Page 364
(b) Quota Allocation and Quota Modulation......Page 365
The MFN Application of Safeguards......Page 366
The Duration of Safeguards......Page 369
(a) Initiation......Page 370
(b) Article 3.1 and the General Due Process Requirement......Page 371
The Price to Be Paid for a Safeguard – Balancing the Level of Concessions......Page 372
The Elimination of Measures Having Equivalent Effect – No Grey Area Measures......Page 374
Conclusions......Page 375
Nondiscrimination......Page 377
The ECs Current Position on Safeguards......Page 381
10.2 The Agreement on Safeguards: Does It Raise More Questions Than It Answers?......Page 384
References......Page 388
Introduction......Page 389
Background: What Is a Safeguard?......Page 391
Previous Economic Research......Page 392
Safeguards Facilitate Greater Trade Liberalizations......Page 393
Safeguards Provide Insurance......Page 394
Do Safeguards in a Trade Agreement Improve National Welfare?......Page 395
Infant Industry Arguments......Page 396
Empirical Model......Page 397
Data......Page 399
Empirical Results......Page 403
Conclusion......Page 408
References......Page 409
The Puzzle of Safeguards......Page 411
The Equity Rationale......Page 413
The Efficiency Rationale......Page 414
The Political Economy Rationale......Page 416
New Approaches to Safeguards......Page 417
Divide and Conquer......Page 418
The Flip......Page 420
Conclusion......Page 421
Index......Page 423