Language and Logic: A Speculative and Condition-Theoretic Study

Editorial page
......Page 3
Title page
......Page 4
copyright page
......Page 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS......Page 8
PREFACE......Page 12
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS......Page 14
CHAPTER I. METHODOLOGY, CONTENTS, AND RELEVANCE
......Page 16
CHAPTER II. FROM POSSIBLE WORLDS TO HUMAN ACTION
......Page 24
1.1. Philosophy of mind and reflection......Page 25
1.2. Ontology and reflection......Page 29
1.3. Reflection......Page 30
2.1. States of affairs......Page 33
2.2. Minimal ontology......Page 35
2.3. Possible worlds......Page 37
3.1. Beliefs and desires......Page 42
3.2. Consciousness and beliefs......Page 46
3.3. Intentionality and desires......Page 48
4. Human action......Page 51
CHAPTER III. SPEECH ACTS AND MEANINGS
......Page 56
1.1. Meaning versus intended, natural, and non-natural meaning......Page 57
1.2. Speech act meaning......Page 58
2.1.1. ρ......Page 60
2.1.2. S believes that ρ......Page 61
2.1.3. S speaks as if he or she believes that ρ......Page 62
2.2.1. The speech acts of non-belief.........Page 65
2.2.2. ... are the speech acts of desire......Page 67
2.3. Basic speech acts......Page 68
3.1. Mental states versus conceptualizations......Page 70
3.2. Genetic reflection and focus......Page 74
1.1.1. What logicians do......Page 76
1.1.2. What philosophers of logic say......Page 80
1.2. Reflectionist logic......Page 87
2. Intra-logical RL interpretations......Page 91
3. Conditions......Page 102
3.1. Basic conditions......Page 106
3.1.1. Sufficient conditions......Page 107
3.1.2. Necesssary conditions......Page 109
3.1.4. Completeness......Page 112
3.2. Impossibility conditions......Page 113
4. Truth......Page 115
4.1. Truth and conditionality......Page 117
4.2. Two-subvalued \'truth-of\'
......Page 120
4.3. Three-valuedness
......Page 130
4.4. Correspondence and Coherence
......Page 133
4.5. A tinge of holism
......Page 136
4.6. Truth and satisfaction......Page 139
CHAPTER V. PROPOSITIONAL OPERATORS
......Page 144
1. Conditional and componential analyses......Page 145
2. Conjunction......Page 147
3.1. Values and supervalues......Page 148
3.2. Pseudo-monadicness and presupposition......Page 172
3.3. Truth-value paradoxes......Page 184
4. Modality......Page 192
4.1. Necessity, contingency, and impossibility......Page 193
4.2. Iterated modality......Page 198
4.3. Fatalistic necessity......Page 199
4.4. The necessity of possible worlds semantics
......Page 200
4.5. Generic modality......Page 203
5. Implication......Page 204
5.1.1. The connection thesis......Page 205
5.1.2. Objections......Page 208
5.1.3.2. Strict implication......Page 215
5.1.3.3. Variably strict implication......Page 216
5.2. Possibility......Page 218
5.2.1. Particular conditionals......Page 219
5.2.2. Generic conditionals......Page 223
5.2.3. Objections......Page 226
6. Postliminaries......Page 228
NOTES......Page 232
REFERENCES......Page 244
INDEX......Page 266