Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers

Series Foreword
Contents
1 American Women Philosophers: Institutions, Background and Thought
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 Institutional Background
	1.3 Theoretical Background
	1.4 Individual Thought
		1.4.1 Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930)
		1.4.2 Grace Andrus de Laguna (1878–1978)
		1.4.3 Grace Neal Dolson (1874–1961)
		1.4.4 Marjorie Glicksman (later Glicksman Grene) (1910–2009)
		1.4.5 Marjorie Silliman Harris (1890–1976)
		1.4.6 Thelma Zeno Lavine (1915–2011)
		1.4.7 Marie Collins Swabey (1890–1966)
		1.4.8 Ellen Bliss Talbot (1867–1968)
		1.4.9 Dorothy Walsh (1901–1982)
		1.4.10 Margaret Floy Washburn (1871–1939)
	References
Part I The Nature of Philosophy
2 Introduction
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 The Nature of Philosophy According to Mary Whiton Calkins
	2.3 Dorothy Walsh on the Relationship Between Ethics and Metaphysics
	2.4 Dorothy Walsh on the Poetic Use of Language
	2.5 Glicksman on Relativism and Philosophical Pluralism
	References
3 The Nature, Types, and Value of Philosophy
	3.1 The Nature of Philosophy
	3.2 The Approach to Philosophy
	3.3 The Types of Philosophy
	3.4 The Value of Philosophy
4 Ethics and Metaphysics
5 The Poetic Use of Language
6 Relativism and Philosophic Methods
Part II Knowledge and Perception
7 Introduction
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Swabey on Perception and Knowledge
	7.3 De Laguna on Appearance and Knowledge
	7.4 De Laguna’s Naturalistic Critique of, and Alternative to, Pragmatism
	7.5 Swabey’s Critique of Naturalism
	References
8 Mr. G. E. Moore’s Discussion of Sense Data
9 Appearance and Orientation
10 Pragmatism and the Form of Thought
11 The General Nature of Reason
	11.1 The Naturalistic Interpretation
	11.2 The Impossibility of Universal Knowledge from the Standpoint of Naturalism
	11.3 Admissions of a More Liberal Naturalism
	11.4 The Ultimate Weakness of Naturalism and the Assumption of Transcendentalism
	11.5 Can the Act of Measuring Be Itself Part of the System Measured?
	11.6 The Transcendental Interpretation
Part III The Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge
12 Introduction
	12.1 Introduction
	12.2 Swabey’s Solution to the Problem of Induction
	12.3 Lavine on Relativism and the Sociology of Science
	12.4 De Laguna on Relativism and Science
	12.5 Walsh on Historical Writing
	References
13 Probability as the Basis of Induction
14 Sociological Analysis of Cognitive Norms
15 Cultural Relativism and Science
16 Philosophical Implications of the Historical Enterprise
Part IV Mind and Matter
17 Introduction
	17.1 The Mind-Body Problem
	17.2 Washburn’s Dualistic Psychology
	17.3 De Laguna’s Critique of Dualism in Psychology and Functionalist Treatment of Mind
	17.4 De Laguna’s Critique of Type Physicalism
	17.5 Calkins’ Idealist Reduction of Matter to the Self
	References
18 Excerpts from Washburn’s The Evidence of Mind
	18.1 The Evidence of Mind
	18.2 The Mind of the Simplest Animals
	References
19 Dualism in Animal Psychology
20 The Empirical Correlation of Mental and Bodily Phenomena
21 The Personalistic Conception of Nature
Part V Time
22 Introduction
	22.1 The Nature of Time: Some Distinctions and Views
	22.2 Calkins’ Irreversibility Analysis of Time
	22.3 Talbot on What We Can Learn About Time from How We Evaluate a Life
	22.4 Dolson’s Interpretation and Critique of Bergson’s Conception of Time
	Bibliography
23 Time as Related to Causality and to Space
	23.1 The Phenomenal Category of Necessary Connexion
	23.2 Time
	23.3 Causality
	23.4 Reciprocal Determination
24 The Time-Process and the Value of Human Life (Part II)
25 The Philosophy of Henri Bergson (Part I & II, Excerpts)
Part VI Freedom and the Individual
26 Introduction
	26.1 Introduction
	26.2 Talbot on the Unique and Self-sufficient Individual
	26.3 Harris’s Idealist Critique of Bergson
	26.4 De Laguna on Freedom, Rationality and the Self
	Bibliography
27 Individuality and Freedom
28 Bergson’s Conception of Freedom
29 The Freedom of the Person
Index