Kant’s Critical Epistemology: Why Epistemology Must Consider Judgment First

Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Analytical Contents
Sources and Citation Methods
Introduction
Part I Epistemological Context
	1 Thought Experiments, Epistemology and Our Cognitive (In)Capacities
		1. Introduction
		2. Some Critical Cautions and a Role for Thought Experiments
			2.1. Conceivability, Infallibilism and Philosophical Cogency
			2.2. Naturalised Epistemology and Causal Reliability ‘Theories’
			2.3. Conceptual Content, Linguistic Meaning and Specifically Cognitive Reference
			2.4. Identifying and Exploiting Our Cognitive Dependencies
		3. Hegel on the Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference
		4. Kant on the ‘Transcendental Affinity’ of the Sensory Manifold
		5. Wittgenstein on Thought and Pervasive Regularities of Nature
		6. Conclusions
	2 Kant, Wittgenstein and Transcendental Chaos
		7. Introduction
		8. Realism Without Empiricism?
		9. Kantian Convergence?
		10. Transcendental Affinity vs. Transcendental Idealism
		11. Conditional Transcendental Necessity of (Critical) Realism
	3 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Analytic Philosophy
		12. Introduction
		13. C.I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order
		14. P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense
		15. Wilfrid Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes
		16. Does McDowell Have Our Perceptual Knowledge in View?
		17. Greenberg’s Reconstruction of Kant’s Account of Modality
		18. Conclusion
Part II Kant’s Critical Epistemology
	4 Constructing Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
		19. Introduction
		20. Kant’s Initial Clues
			20.1. Tetens’s Keen Deictic Point
			20.2. Philosophical Reflections on Sub-Personal Cognitive Processes?
		21. Concepts A Priori? 107
		22. Sensory Binding Problems – i.e.: Forms of Perceptual Synthesis
		23. Aristotle’s Logic: Complete and Ever so Useful
			23.1. The Square of Categorical Oppositions
			23.2. Cognitive Use: Taxa and Classification
		24. Formal Aspects of Judging
		25. From Aspects of Judging to Judging Particulars:12 Categorial Concepts, Plus Two: The Conceptsof ‘Space’ and ‘Time’
		26. Kant’s Semantics of Singular, Specifically Cognitive Reference
			26.1. Knowing Particulars
			26.2. Kant’s Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference
			26.3. The Implications of Kant’s Thesis for Knowledge and Epistemology
			26.4. Equivocating About ‘Definite Descriptions’
		27. Kant’s Constructive Strategy in the Critique of Pure Reason
			27.1. Kant’s Methodological Constructivism
			27.2. The Constructivist Strategy
			27.3. The Two-Fold Use of the Categories: Sub-Personal Perceptual Synthesis, Explicit Judgments
			27.4. Kant’s Lead Question, Re-stated
			27.5. Kant’s most Basic Inventory
			27.6. Kant’s Constructive Epistemological (Transcendental) Question
			27.7. Answering That Question Requires Addressing these Five Issues
		28. The Structure of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
		29. A Brief Concluding Word
		30. Kant’s Inventory of Basic Formal Features of Our Cognitive Capacities
	5 Human Consciousness and Its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt
		31. Introduction
		32. The Modern ‘New Way of Ideas’
		33. Kant’s Transcendental Grounds for Rejecting Cartesianism
			33.1. Kant’s Lead Question
			33.2. A Priori Concepts
			33.3. The Binding Problem
			33.4. Kant’s Critique of Global Perceptual Scepticism
			33.5. Kant’s Refutation of Global Perceptual Scepticism
			33.6. Causal Judgments are Discriminatory
			33.7. Rational Freedom
		34. Conclusion
	6 Kant’s Analytic of Principles
		35. Kant’s Critique of Justifiable Cognitive Judgment
		36. Kant’s Transcendental Critique of Judgment
		37. Kant’s Principles of Cognitive Judgment
		38. Kant’s Analogies of Experience
		39. The Postulates of Empirical Thinking
		40. Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
		41. Kant’s Critical Grounds for Distinguishing Phenomena and Noumena
		42. Some Critical Observations
		43. Diagram of Kant’s Cognitive Architecture
	7. Kant’s Dynamical Principles: The Analogies of Experience
		44. Introduction
		45. Kant’s Causal Principles in the Analogies of Experience
		46. Kant’s Justification of our Legitimate Use of These Three Principles of Causal Judgment: A Summary Statement
		47. Some Characteristic Responses
	8 How Does Kant Prove We Perceive, Not Merely Imagine, Physical Objects?
		48. Introduction
		49. Kant’s Transcendental Focus: Epistemology for Homo sapiens sapiens
		50. The Spatio-Temporality of Human Experience and Singular Cognitive Reference
		51. Two Transcendental Proofs of Mental Content Externalism
		52. Kant’s Paralogisms Proscribe Causal Judgments About Merely Temporal Phenomena
		53. Causal Judgments Are Restricted to Spatio-Temporal Substances
		54. The Transcendental Character of Kant’s Proofs
		55. Realising Kant’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference
		56. Perceptual Synthesis and Objective Reference
		57. Kant, Critical Commonsense Realism and Sensory Re-Afference
			57.1. Sensory Re-Afference
			57.2. Some Key Aspects of Sensory Perception, Integration and Behaviour
		58. Kant’s Justificatory Fallibilism Concedes Nothing to Scepticism
		59. Corroboration by Critical Comparisons: Melnick, Sellars, McDowell
			59.1. Melnick
			59.2. Sellars
			59.3. McDowell
		60. Conclusions
		61. PS: Scientia and ‘the’ Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
	9 Kant, Causal Judgment and Locating the Purloined Letter
		62. Introduction
		63. The Irrelevance of Infallibilism to Non-Formal Domains
		64. Critical Philosophy and Philosophical Self-Criticism
			64.1. Kant’s Analytic Commentators
			64.2. Kant’s Phenomenological Commentators
		65. Philosophical Specialisation and Philosophical Oversight
Part III Further Ramifications
	10 Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today
		66. Introduction
		67. Newton’s Rule 4 and His Causal Realism
		68. Kant’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference
		69. Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 and Anti-Cartesianism
		70. Kant’s Cognitive Semantics Versus van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism
		71. To What Extent Is Constructive Empiricism ‘empirically’ Adequate?
		72. Newton’s Mechanics: Dynamics or Kinematics?
		73. A Glimpse at the Semantics of Scientific Theories
		74. Conclusion
	11 How Kant Justifies Freedom of Agency (Without Transcendental Idealism)
		75. Introduction
		76. The Principle of Sufficient Reason: Regulative or Constitutive?
		77. Kant’s Semantics of Singular Cognitive Reference
		78. Kant’s Cognitive Semantics and Causal Knowledge
		79. Freedom of Behaviour
		80. Regulating our Cognitive Commitments
	12 Kant’s Two Models of Human Actions
		81. Introduction
		82. What Is Free Action, According to Kant?
		83. Practical Judgments, Incentives and Influences
		84. Conclusions
	13 Mind, Language and Behaviour: Kant’s Critical Cautions Contra Contemporary Internalism and Naturalism
		85. Introduction
		86. Kant’s Key Critical Findings
			86.1. A Recap
			86.2. The Critical Distinctiveness of Epistemology
			86.3. Kant’s Analysis of the Autonomy of Our Power of Judgment Suffices to Justify Our Rational Freedom of Deliberation and Judgment, Regardless of the Causal Structure and Functioning of Our Neurophysiology
		87. Causal ‘Theories’ and Causal Knowledge
			87.1. Davidson
			87.2. Burkholder
			87.3. McCarty
		88. Concept Empiricism Redux?
		89. Contra Contemporary Anti-Naturalism in Philosophy of Mind
			89.1. Philosophy or Science Fiction?
			89.2. The Central Pillar of Strong Internalism
		90. Regulating our Cognitive Commitments
		91. Some Final Reflections
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index