Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Preface......Page 9
List of Contributors......Page 13
1 Introduction......Page 15
1.1 Themes from Rawls......Page 17
1.1.1 Harsanyi on Rawls......Page 18
1.1.2 Liberal Egalitarian Approaches to Personal Responsibility......Page 20
1.1.3 Arneson on Personal Responsibility......Page 21
1.1.4 Griffin on Moral Intuition......Page 24
1.2.1 Ordinal and Cardinal Utility......Page 25
1.2.2 Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems......Page 28
1.2.3 The Sen--Weymark Critique......Page 31
1.2.4 Roemer on the Sen--Weymark Critique......Page 32
1.2.5 Social Welfare Functionals and Welfarism......Page 34
1.2.6 Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark on Social Aggregation under Uncertainty......Page 37
1.2.7 D'Aspremont and Mongin on Welfarism and Social Aggregation......Page 38
1.2.8 Hild, Jeffrey, and Risse on Ex Ante versus Ex Post Social Aggregation......Page 40
1.3.1 Broome on the Coherence of Preference-Based Utilitarianism......Page 44
1.3.2 Sugden on a Common Currency of Advantage......Page 47
1.3.3 Fleurbaey and Maniquet on Fair Social Orderings......Page 50
1.3.4 Barry on Want Satisfaction......Page 54
1.4 Sharing the Gains from Social Cooperation......Page 55
1.4.1 Naturalistic versus Normative Theories......Page 56
1.4.2 Game Theory......Page 57
1.4.3 Binmore on Natural Justice......Page 61
1.4.4 Skyrms on the Evolutionary Viability of Fairness Norms......Page 65
1.4.5 McClennen on the Use of Cooperative Dispositions as a Coordinating Device......Page 67
1.5 Rights and Liberties......Page 70
1.5.1 Pettit on Republicanism......Page 71
1.5.2 Riley on Rule Utilitarianism and Liberal Priorities......Page 74
1.6 Concluding Remarks......Page 77
References......Page 78
PART ONE THEMES FROM RAWLS......Page 83
2.2 The Maximin Principle......Page 85
2.3 Other Absolute-Priority Principles in Rawls's Theory......Page 87
2.5 Some Comments on Rawls's Argument......Page 88
2.6 Rawls's Conception of Justice and Social Policy......Page 89
2.7 Free Will and Moral Responsibility......Page 90
2.8 Another Interpretation of Free Will: The Bearer's Responsibility View......Page 91
References......Page 93
3 Rawls and Responsibility......Page 94
3.1 Rawls on Deservingness and Responsibility......Page 97
3.2 The Canonical Moment Version of Rawlsian Justice......Page 100
3.3 Responsibility for Voluntary Choices is Problematic......Page 102
3.4 Responsibility for Ends Reconsidered......Page 104
3.5 Joint Responsibility on the Part of Individual and Society for Individual Ends......Page 109
3.6 Effectively Equivalent Options......Page 111
3.7 AreWe Responsible At Most for What Lies Within Our Control?......Page 112
3.8 The Hybrid Proposal......Page 115
3.9 Bert’s Case......Page 116
3.10 Two Rawlsian Rejoinders......Page 120
4.1 Piecemeal Appeal to Intuition......Page 122
4.2 Purist Views......Page 125
4.3 Have We Been too Hard on Intuitions?......Page 126
4.4 The Coherence Theory......Page 127
4.5 A Coherence Theory for Ethics......Page 131
4.6 What We Need......Page 136
PART TWO Harsanyi's Impartial Observer and Social Aggregation Theorems......Page 141
5.1 Introduction......Page 143
5.2 Harsanyi's Argument......Page 144
5.3 Why the IO Is Not a Utilitarian......Page 145
5.4 The Analogy With Individual Choice......Page 148
References......Page 149
6.1 Introduction......Page 150
6.2 State-Contingent Alternatives and Social Evaluation Functionals......Page 153
6.3 Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Information Partitions......Page 155
6.4 Expected Utility Theory for State-Contingent Alternatives......Page 159
6.5 Welfarism......Page 164
6.6 Single-Profile Aggregation......Page 170
6.7 Multiprofile Aggregation......Page 174
6.8 Single-Information-Set Aggregation......Page 181
6.9 Single-Preference-Profile Aggregation......Page 189
6.10 Concluding Remarks......Page 193
References......Page 195
7.1 Introduction......Page 198
7.2 A SWFL Version of the Aggregation Theorem for a Single Profile of VNM Preferences......Page 200
7.3 A Welfarist Version of the Aggregation Theorem......Page 204
7.4 Concluding Remarks: More on SWFLs and Cardinality......Page 208
References......Page 210
8.1 Introduction......Page 212
8.2 Harsanyi's Utilitarianism......Page 214
8.3 Aggregation Ex Ante......Page 220
8.4 Aggregation Ex Post......Page 224
References......Page 230
PART THREE GOODNESS AND WELL-BEING......Page 233
9.1 Introduction......Page 235
9.2 Uncertainty......Page 236
9.3 Additivity......Page 238
9.4 Preferencism as an Account of Individual Good......Page 240
9.5 Ideal Preferencism......Page 241
9.6 A Quantitative Concept of Good......Page 242
9.7 The Expectational Concept......Page 244
9.8 Interpersonal Comparability......Page 246
9.9 Evolutionary Equilibrium......Page 249
References......Page 251
10.1 The Common Currency of Pleasure......Page 253
10.2 Harsanyi, Imaginative Empathy, and Rational Preference......Page 257
10.3 Rawls and Primary Goods......Page 261
10.4 Money Metrics......Page 267
10.5 An Impersonal Money-Metric of Opportunity......Page 271
References......Page 274
11.1 Introduction......Page 277
11.2.1 Ordinalism versus Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility......Page 280
11.2.2 Social Rankings versus Allocation Rules......Page 282
11.3 Constructing Social Orderings......Page 283
11.3.1 Direct Inquiry......Page 284
11.3.2 Rationalizing Allocation Rules......Page 287
References......Page 292
12.1 Introduction......Page 295
12.2 Rawls's Objection......Page 296
12.3 Elster's Objection......Page 304
12.4 Conclusion......Page 312
PART FOUR: SHARING THE GAINS FROM SOCIAL COOPERATION......Page 315
13.1 Introduction......Page 317
13.2 Teleological Utilitarianism......Page 319
13.3 Nonteleological Moral Theories......Page 325
13.3.1 Harsanyi’s Nonteleological Utilitarianism......Page 329
13.3.2 Rawls’ Model......Page 336
13.3.3 Kantian Foundations for Interpersonal Comparison......Page 338
13.4 The Original Position as a Natural Norm......Page 339
13.4.1 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run......Page 342
13.4.2 Morality as a Short-Run Phenomenon......Page 344
13.5 Reform......Page 345
References......Page 346
14.1 Introduction......Page 348
14.2 Distributive Justice, Symmetry......Page 349
14.3 Evolution of Justice I......Page 351
14.4 Distributive Justice, Asymmetry......Page 356
14.5 Evolution of Justice II......Page 357
14.6 Conclusion......Page 361
Postscript July 2006......Page 362
References......Page 363
15.1 Introduction......Page 365
15.2 Mutual Gains and Losses......Page 366
15.3 Modeling Cooperative Interaction......Page 368
15.4 What Drives the Equilibrium Analysis?......Page 372
15.5 Rethinking Rational Cooperation......Page 375
15.7 Repeated Interaction over Time......Page 379
15.8 Bargaining Theory......Page 381
15.9 A More Realistic Setting......Page 383
15.10 An Alternative Model of Cooperation......Page 385
15.11 The Case for the Revised Model of Cooperation......Page 388
15.12 Rule-Governed Choice......Page 390
15.13 The Efficiency-Egalitarian Principle......Page 391
15.14 The Problem of Ideology......Page 393
15.15 The Question of Adaptive Efficiency......Page 395
15.16 A Final Observation......Page 398
References......Page 399
PART FIVE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES......Page 401
16 Republican Political Theory......Page 403
16.1.1 The Constant Connection......Page 404
16.1.2 Interference and Arbitrary Interference......Page 405
16.1.3 The Harder-to-Lose-Freedom Effect......Page 408
16.1.4 The Easier-to-Lose-Freedom Effect......Page 410
16.1.5 Three Further Remarks......Page 411
References......Page 422
16.2.1 The Paley Connection......Page 413
16.2.2 Redistribution and Freedom as Noninterference......Page 415
16.2.3 Redistribution and Freedom as Nondomination......Page 417
17.1 Introduction......Page 425
17.2 Harsanyi's Liberal Rule Utilitarianism......Page 429
17.3 Absolute Priorities within a Liberal Utilitarian Code......Page 436
17.4 Conclusion......Page 443
References......Page 446
Index......Page 449